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This thesis is about the people from the Mentawai Islands (in Indonesia) in the context of 
disaster risk reduction. It results from a curiosity to deeply explore the tsunami hazard 
knowledge existing before the 2010 Mentawai tsunami occurred, and current tsunami 
preparedness. It also provides theoretical frameworks and key research concepts in relation 
to the issues. In order to understand the picture of Mentawai in the past and the present, 
the thesis also includes how the tsunami vulnerability progression has been formed. The 
progression presents from the era of solitary lives of the people, the era of destroying the 
traditional beliefs and tools, and up to the current era when the people live in unsafe 
locations. In order to obtain a full picture of the topics, a qualitative case study was 
designed with the consideration of how to plot and to show a number of illuminating facts.  
The people’s reflections and perspectives on their tsunami hazard knowledge before the 
2010 tsunami occurred and devastated the islands, and their current tsunami preparedness, 
were examined. There were a number of substantial facts showing how the research 
participants captured, shared, and internalized explicit knowledge on tsunami hazards into 
their tacit knowledge. These processes occurred with little support from the district 
government and local non-government organizations, and were further impacted by their 
low socio-economic and educational status. The processes of the knowledge internalization 
were obviously influenced by their traditional beliefs and personal perceptions. Thus, the 
implications of the internalization were also different when it came to anticipating tsunami 
waves. Subsequently, the 2010 tsunami also brought different impacts to the participants. 
In the context of current measures, tsunami preparedness is applied differently at various 
levels, even though the people have experienced the 2010 tsunami. At the individual level, 
the participants mostly ignore their own preparedness, although some of the participants 
have specific personal efficacy and protective behaviour to avoid tsunami waves. At the 
household level, some would most likely leave their household members to save 
themselves, while others would try to help their family members. At the sub-village (dusun) 
level, the people tend to abandon the evacuation processes. Meanwhile, at the district 
level, although some important documents exist for the district government to follow, 
tsunami preparedness measures are less prioritized.  
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The last parts of the study are how the local community of Mentawai can increase their 
capacity to encounter potential tsunamis. In the absence of modern technologies, the 
community has a number of traditional strategies to anticipate hazards and various 
opportunities to reduce their vulnerability. Developing coping capacity is essential for the 
people through implementing community early warning systems. These systems will provide 
risk knowledge, strategies to monitor the surroundings, understandable warning 
communication, and qualified response capability in the event of a tsunami. For the longer 
term, the leaders and the community need to work hand in hand to create an adaptive 
mechanism for living in Mentawai. This will be achieved by utilizing and reutilizing their 
traditional tools and strategies, and taking any opportunity to improve their livelihoods, and 


















Tesis ini berkaitan orang-orang yang berada di Kepulauan Mentawai (Indonesia) terhadap 
pengurangan risiko bencana. Tesis ini diawali dari keingin-tahuan untuk melihat secara 
mendalam pengetahuan terhadap tsunami sebelum terjadinya tsunami di tahun 2010 di 
sekitar Mentawai dan usaha kesiapsiagaan terhadap tsunami saat ini. Di dalam tesis ini 
terdapat bagian yang menjabarkan tentang kerangka teori dan beberapa kunci pokok 
pemikiran yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini. Untuk mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih 
jelas terhadap Mentawai baik di masa lalu maupun saat ini, tesis ini juga menyajikan 
perkembangan kerentanan terhadap tsunami. Perkembangan tersebut disampaikan dari 
masa penduduk setempat mulai mengenal orang-orang di luar Mentawai sewaktu mereka 
hidup aman dan tenteram di dalam hutan, masa penghancuran kepercayaan tradisi, hingga 
masa saat ini dimana kebanyakan dari anggota masyarakat hidup di tempat yang tidak aman 
terhadap tsunami. Untuk mendapatkan gambaran yang menyeluruh terhadap topik di atas, 
maka dipandang perlu mendisain penelitian ini dengan studi kasus secara kualitatif untuk 
mendapatkan beberapa fakta yang nyata di dalam masyarakat. 
Di dalam tesis ini, terdapat beberapa pemikiran dan persepsi yang ditemukan di dalam 
masyarakat Mentawai tentang tsunami dari beberapa peserta penelitian. Pemikiran dan 
persepsi tersebut merupakan gambaran sebelum terjadinya tsunami 2010 yang merusak 
kepulauan tersebut. Beberapa hal yang sangat penting didapat adalah bagaimana peserta 
penelitian menangkap, membagikan dan menginternalisasikan pengetahuan terhadap 
ancaman tsunami yang telah secara terbuka disampaikan menjadi pengetahuan yang 
terpendem di dalam diri peserta tersebut. Proses tersebut dipengaruhi oleh terbatasnya 
peran pemerintah daerah, lembaga swadaya masyarakat maupun rendahnya tingkat 
pendidikan dan sosio-ekonomi masyarajak tersebut. Dalam proses internalisasi tersebut, 
sangat jelas terlihat adanya pengaruh kepercayaan yang lama dan persepsi pribadi. 
Sehingga, hal tersebut menimbulkan dampak yang berbeda terhadap peserta penelitian 
tersebut ketika tsunami 2010 terjadi. 
Sedangkan dalam hal usaha peningkatankesiapsiagaan terhadap tsunami saat ini, tesis ini 
menyajikan beberapa usaha yang rendah, walaupun penduduk tersebut telah mengalami 
tsunami 2010. Pada tingkat individu, terlihat bahwa kebanyakan dari peserta penelitian 
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cenderung mengangap kesiapsiagaan tersebut kurang penting. Walau demikian, beberapa 
dari mereka telah memiliki kemampuan khusus dan perilaku yang protektif untuk 
menghindari tsunami di masa yang akan datang. Pada tingkat rumah tangga, beberapa 
peserta lebih cenderung menyerahkan usaha kesiapsiagaan terhadap anggota keluarga yang 
lain. Sebagian lagi akan berusaha menolong yang lainnya bila terjadi tsunami. Pada tinkat 
dusun (masyarakat), peserta cenderung mengabaikan beberapa proses dalam evakuasi. 
Terakhir, pada tingkat kabupaten, usaha kesiapsiagaan terhadap tsunami mendapat 
prioritas yang tidak penting walaupun beberapa dokumen penting untuk pengembangan 
kesiapsiagaan telah tersedia. 
1 
 




“The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for 
existing” (Albert Einstein). 
 
1.1. Background and overview of research 
This thesis contributes to the field of disaster risk reduction, with a particular focus on 
tsunami preparedness measures in the Mentawai Islands (West Sumatra, Indonesia). The 
intended outcome of this research is to develop new useful insights into how the 
individuals, households, local community, and local government in the Mentawai Islands 
(Mentawai) respond to the threats of tsunami hazards. For this purpose, two main topics 
have been explored to develop this thesis. Firstly, the way individuals’ knowledge of tsunami 
hazards was related to their efforts to prevent and prepare for the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami 
(the tsunami) is examined. This topic addresses how the local community of Mentawai 
captured, shared, created, and applied knowledge to protect their lives from the tsunami. 
Secondly, how current tsunami preparedness measures are formed within the community of 
Mentawai is also explored. These explorations show some actions by the individuals, 
households, local community, and district government in Mentawai in developing and 
enhancing their efforts to be prepared for potential tsunamis. To conduct the research, a 
qualitative case study to collect data and analyze the field data has been employed. The 
data analyses are based on a cross-cultural and institutional framework of knowledge 
management and multi-level approach to preparedness. 
My interest in this subject arose when I worked for the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana (BNPB=the National Agency for Disaster Management) on the community 
empowerment program from 2008 to 2012. During my assignment, I attended some 
meetings to discuss how the district governments in Indonesia could revitalize the local 
wisdom within their communities to avoid disasters. One piece of local knowledge was Arat 
Sabulungan (a traditional belief and practice) from Mentawai. With its inherent values and 
principles, it was believed that Arat Sabulungan practices could afford protection against 
disasters to the community in Mentawai. However, when a tsunami occurred in Mentawai 
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in 2010, many people perished which caused several questions to arise such as to why and 
how it was that Arat Sabulungan did not work at that time. Initially, I intended to focus on 
Arat Sabulungan in relation to a cultural adaptation to tsunami; however, it became 
apparent that Arat Sabulungan would be part of the solution to the problem.  
This study has brought me new understanding and insights about Mentawai. During the 
study, some references, research interviews, and observations have provided me with 
numerous facts about the existing desires of the local community in Mentawai to be safe 
from a potential tsunami. My exposure to the theoretical and practical aspects of 
knowledge management and disaster preparedness measures has strengthened my 
capability to understand the principles of problem progressions and their potential 
solutions. As a government officer in the BNPB, this understanding is essential for me in 
developing the right decisions or guidelines for a particular community in Indonesia in the 
future. In the last part of this thesis, I also propose some practical programs on how the 
community could mainstream tsunami preparedness measures into their daily lives. Also, I 
have recommended in the thesis to the district government of Mentawai ways to develop a 
number of technical guidelines and policies to strengthen community efforts towards safety 
from tsunami waves in the future. 
1.2. Rationale of the research  
Various studies of Mentawai have brought much knowledge and understanding to the world 
and many seismic and paleo-tsunami studies have been carried out over recent years. The 
scholars have mapped the old and current locations of earthquakes in the Mentawai 
Segment where the islands lie. They have also provided the information that Mentawai is 
very prone to tsunamis and potentially bigger earthquakes may occur that can generate 
significant tsunamis BMKG (2012); (Natawidjaja, 2007; Natawidjaja et al., 2006; Newman, 
Hayes, Wei, & Convers, 2011; Philibosian et al., 2014; Philibosian, Sieh, Natawidjaja, Hong-
Wei, et al., 2012). Through these studies, the scholars have realized that the islands have 
been hit by tsunami hazards in the past and they will occur in the future. 
Also, many social studies exist. These studies are mainly related to how the indigenous 
people in Mentawai moved from the jungles to the coasts (Delfi & Weintré, 2014; Schefold, 
1988; Sihombing, 1979; Spark, 1991; Tulius, 2012a). The people mainly moved during the 
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1970-1980s when the Central Government of Indonesia applied a new program to introduce 
education and health services to the indigenous communities. Many external and internal 
factors forced them to leave their old ways of living in the jungles and find relatively new 
means of living on the coast. At the same time, the movements have made them vulnerable 
to tsunami hazards. They were never informed about any potential tsunami hazards, and 
they never knew that devastating tsunamis existed. No oral stories indicate that the 
indigenous people of Mentawai experienced tsunami hazards in the old days (Tulius, 2012a) 
so, consequently, it appears that the people of Mentawai never experienced tsunamis 
before the 2010 tsunami (the tsunami). 
The tsunami was generated by an earthquake (Mw7.9) on 25 October 2010. The earthquake 
originated in the subduction zone near the Mentawai Islands and triggered tsunami waves 
that reached the islands about seven to ten minutes after the quake. The run-ups of the 
tsunami waves were about 9 metres and inundated up to about one kilometre inland (BNPB, 
2011; Lay et al., 2011; Newman et al., 2011). The earthquake destroyed 1,262 houses and 
public facilities while the tsunami took 509 lives. The event created a number of socio-
economic problems and financial losses for the people. Over 11,000 displaced people lived 
in temporary shelters in the jungles and about 1,800 students did not have access to 
education. From the damage loss assessment, the events caused financial losses of IDR 
348.92 billion (equal to NZD 48.4 million in 2010) (BNPB, 2011).  
Before the tsunami, several tsunamis also occurred in other parts of Indonesia. They were 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Nias Island Tsunami (2005) and the Pagandaran 
Tsunami (2006). These occurrences resulted in intensive news on the national television 
channels, newspapers, radios, and other media. However, the news seemingly never 
reached many of the people in Mentawai. There are several reasons why this might have 
been the case. Firstly, most of the people had no access to TV. Secondly, some the local 
NGOs tried to work after the tsunamis hit Aceh (Aceh Darussalam Province) and Nias (North 
Sumatra Province), but they found it difficult to continue their programs. The NGOs found it 
difficult to access and reach the people who lived in very remote areas and consequently, 
the situation forced them to make high-cost programs. Lastly, socio-economic status also 





Figure 1. 1 
Several tsunami occurrences in Indonesia for the last two decades 
Sources: Satake (2014), Natawidjaja (2007) and Mori et al. (2007) 
  
Therefore, as some seismic scholars warn, the people of Mentawai are still vulnerable to any 
potential tsunamis, despite their previous tsunami experience. The resettlement of all 
individuals from the coastal areas seems to be impossible as it would create other social 
problems and the relocation efforts would consume many resources both public and 
political. For example, the district government of Mentawai has very limited human and 
financial resources (BPS Mentawai, 2012; Kementerian Dalam Negeri, 2011). It is considered 
that the provision of advanced technologies to anticipate potential tsunamis is important. 
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However, such techniques also require skilful people and secure financial commitments. On 
the other hand, to provide individually experienced personnel in Mentawai is challenging 
because the Mentawai Islands are very remote and have limited public facilities. The local 
people also have limited capacity for operating complicated technologies. On the other 
hand, after they have experienced a tsunami, it is important to know how they would build 
any current protection from future potential tsunami waves. Understanding the local 
contexts is essential to provide valuable recommendations. These potential 
recommendations will be integrated with the existing traditional knowledge, cultures, and 
mechanisms to increase their capacity to carry out tsunami preparedness measures.  
1.3. Overview of disaster preparedness in Indonesia 
After Indonesia experienced several massive disasters in the last decade, such as the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake, the Indonesian Government 
passed the Act No. 24 of 2007 on Disaster Management. Since the enactment of the Act, 
Indonesia has altered two central tenets on how to manage disasters. Firstly, the 
Government focused more on preventive measures rather than reactive measures. This has 
brought many positive changes in disaster management in Indonesia. One goal of the Act is 
to provide protection for the people from disaster hazards by ensuring the implementation 
of disaster management measures in planned, integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive 
ways. The Act emphasizes integrated measures of emergency management, encompassing 
prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The Act also mandates 
that the government at each level shall develop a disaster risk assessment and plan. This 
document becomes necessary in national or local development planning (BNPB, 2013a).  
Secondly, the shifting of government- to governance-driven programs has provided 
conducive environments for various participants to partake in different kinds of programs in 
disaster management. To achieve the above goal, for example, the substantial involvement 
of governments (central, provincial, and district/municipality), communities, and private 
sectors are necessary for the planning, implementation, and evaluations of the programs. 
Similarly, Simarmata and Suryandaru (2011) argue that since 2008, more non-state 
participants have been involved in particular disaster risk reduction and preparedness 
compared to previous periods, including community-based organizations, private 
businesses, academia, and civil society. 
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The Act has also included a national system for disaster management that consists of five 
components: the legislation, organization, budgeting, strategic plans, and annual programs. 
Since then, there have been significant changes in how the Government develops its 
policies, public programs, or partnerships. Under the Act, BNPB is established as the leading 
national agency that organizes the above system. It coordinates the planning and 
implementation processes of the integrated national programs that consist of before, during 
and after the emergency. According to Simarmata and Suryandaru (2011), BNPB was 
established to meet the needs of a national agency, which can provide regulations, 
guidance, and policies for disaster management efforts both nationally and locally in the 
context of decentralized governance.  
At the national level, BNPB also has the responsibility of maintaining and strengthening 
relationships with various ministries and other non-ministry agencies when implementing 
disaster risk management. At provincial, district or municipality level, BNPB takes part in 
establishing BPBD (Provincial or District Agency on Disaster Management) and in 
formulating the Peraturan Daerah (Perda = the Provincial, District, or Municipality 
Regulations) on disaster management. Since 2008, BNPB has supported 34 provinces and at 
least 450 districts/cities in issuing a Perda on disaster management. The Perda are used as 
the legal documents to establish public programs for disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness, emergencies, and rehabilitation after them. Furthermore, BNPB has also 
facilitated the establishment and development of 43 thematic risk reduction platforms as 
the forum to disseminate disaster risk reduction (DRR) awareness, to promote DRR 
mainstreams on local developments, and to share experiences and information among their 
members. Moreover, the Government has integrated DRR as part of sustainable national 
developments, where previously such developments were never considered (BNPB, 2015).  
The Act also obliges the governments to develop and to integrate disaster management 
programs into the applicative programs. According to Maarif (2012), BNPB has created three 
main programs namely: before disaster programs, during disaster programs, and post-




Figure 1. 2 
Annual programs on disaster management in Indonesia 
Source: Maarif (2012) 
 
Figure 1.2 shows that the before disaster program consists of two programs based on the 
situation with or without potential catastrophes. With potential disasters, the program 
consists of mitigation and preparedness measures.  
Following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that created a lot of deaths and destruction, 
Indonesia has started to develop an Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System (Ina-TEWS) 
since 2005 with the involvement of 16 ministries. In 2008, Ina-TEWS was established and 
involved district and municipal governments in the system. Ina-TEWS is a comprehensive 
system to collect all information from seismic monitoring system to detect earthquakes and 
tsunamis. It also seeks to increase institutional capacities through research and pilot 
projects. Furthermore, it creates guidelines, policies, protocols and regulations in order to 
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mitigate tsunami risk and increase the capacity of Indonesian people to anticipate potential 
tsunamis (BMKG, 2012). 
Ina-TEWS consists of three elements that are interrelated with each other i.e. Monitoring 
System, National Capacity Development and Mitigation and Emergency Response, as Figure 
1.3 below shows. 
 
 
Figure 1. 3 
The Ina-TEWS consists of Monitoring System, National Capavity Development and Mitigation and Emergency 
Response involve 15 Ministerial and National Institutions and Local Government to conduct an end-to-end 
tsunami preparedness in Indonesia 
Adapted from BMKG (2012) 
 
There are two main levels of Ina-TEWS, i.e. upstream and downstream. For the upstream 
level, the above elements work together to provide several aspects of tsunami-related 
information and to make sure the Indonesian people stay away from the tsunamis. First, the 
Monitoring System mostly focuses on earthquake detection along with analysis and 
dissemination of potential tsunamis. With supports from BIG, BMKG is responsible for the 
provisions of tidal gauges and a global positioning system, while BPPT uses deep-ocean 
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assessment and reporting of tsunamis (DART) to collect quality deep-water data during a 
tsunami (BMKG, 2012). Secondly, the National Development Capacity focuses on research 
related to physical and social aspects of tsunamis. ITB and LIPI work together to provide 
inputs for decision making institutions. ITB and LIPI also implement a number of pilot 
projects at the local level or community level in order to provide better understanding of 
model interventions. Lastly, the element of Mitigation and Emergency Response is 
coordinated by BNPB and focuses on two aspects: mitigation efforts and relief efforts in the 
event of a tsunami. Since these mitigation efforts are at the upstream level, BNPB focuses 
on how to develop a number of general guidelines and protocols, public policies and 
regulations. In any potential tsunami, BNPB is also responsible for conveying the tsunami 
warning to the relevant local government as well as ensuring the local government officers 
have sufficient knowledge and capacity to implement a series of tsunami preparedness 
programs at the local level (BMKG, 2012). 
To make all efforts work at the upstream level work, a municipal or district government 
needs to implement applicative programs, known as the downstream level. At this level, it is 
important to develop a people-centered early warning to make vulnerable people become 
capable, resilient and able to protect themselves. The district/municipal government, 
through its local agency (BPBD), is required to increase risk knowledge through increasing 
capacity of the local community. BPBD also ensures easy access for the people to conduct 
evacuation processes and to provide reliable warnings. BPBD is also required to ensure 
timely and technically accurate responses of the community in any potential tsunami 
(BMKG, 2012). As cited from UNIDSR (2006), BMKG (2012) states that the above 
requirements will “enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a 
hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of 
harm or loss”.  
Recently, the Indonesian Government implemented a decentralized authority and 
district/city autonomy based on Act 22 of 1999 on Local Governments, and Act 25 of 1999 
on Financial State Distribution. It means that the Central Government’s authorizations are 
mainly delegated to the local governments, also known as a delegation of authority. 
Disaster management is also included in the delegation of power to the local governments. 
With this, the local governments should consider all efforts to handle disasters including 
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prevention, mitigation and preparedness efforts (BNPB, 2008). In fact, at the district level, 
disaster management programs often have less priority. 
1.4. Statement of problems 
As mentioned above, the tsunami EWS in Indonesia consists of two sectors namely: 
upstream and downstream. At the downstream sector, the district/city government has the 
most responsibility for following up tsunami warnings and disseminating them to the 
community (BMKG, 2012). The district/city government is the only authority to claim and 
announce the evacuation procedures that are put into practice. Following the 
announcement, the district/city government should also provide guidance and instructions 
to evacuate the potentially affected people (BMKG, 2012). However, the District 
Government of Mentawai finds it difficult to receive the tsunami warnings from the 
upstream sector either from the government institutions or TV and radio channels. Several 
reasons may be found for the tsunami warnings being either delayed or never received. The 
placement of the buoy and tide gauges in the Mentawai sea requires high density in 
number. Currently, there are only four gauges placed in this vast sea (Yue et al., 2014). Also, 
although an office for the emergency centre (OEC) exists 24 hours a day and seven days a 
week, the electricity is often down every day (BNPB, 2012). Indeed, the OEC may have a 
power generator, but gasoline is not always easy to find in Mentawai. Similarly, the tsunami 
warnings through TV and radio channels also require electricity which is not available all 
day. So, there will be potential times that OEC may not receive the signals from the 
upstream sector, and the community cannot access the TV channels because of the 
unavailability of electricity. 
Moreover, even if the government (through BPBD) receives the warnings, it still has the 
problem of disseminating the warnings to the community. The geographic conditions of the 
islands create enormous challenges. Mentawai consists of four bigger islands, namely 
Siberut, Sipora, North and South Pagai Islands and 95 inlets (BPS Mentawai, 2012). Although 
the people mainly live on the bigger islands, some also live in the inlets and most individuals 
who live on the larger islands also live in very remote areas, in which accessibility is lacking. 
Unfortunately, potential tsunami waves in Mentawai can reach these areas in less than ten 
minutes (BNPB, 2013a). Therefore, it seems that the above standard procedure of tsunami 
EWS may not be applicable in Mentawai. 
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To save the local community of Mentawai from potential tsunami waves in the future, it is 
important to find a better way to disseminate tsunami warnings. It is considered that the 
local community has existing or traditional methods and strategies and potential 
opportunities to create, develop, or strengthen tsunami preparedness measures. Therefore, 
this study will explore that potential, so that in the future the people can use the tsunami 
hazard knowledge and preparedness measures for their safety. 
1.5. Research questions 
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide new insights of social and cultural aspects 
into preparedness measures in Mentawai. For this aim, I have designed two main 
research questions followed by several sub-questions.  
1. How was the tsunami hazard knowledge formed among the local community of 
Mentawai before the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami? 
From this question, the following questions are asked in order to explore the influence 
of such knowledge: 
a. Did the local people hear or know about tsunamis?  
b. If they did, how was the knowledge captured and shared within the community?  
c. How did the knowledge internalize within the community?  
d. What did they know about tsunamis?  
e. Was this knowledge useful to reduce the impacts of the 2010 tsunami 
preparedness?  
 
2. How is the current tsunami preparedness formed in Mentawai? 
Some sub-questions dealing with the above questions are:  
a. How do individuals and households prepare for potential tsunamis?  
b. How does the local community at the dusun level actively participate in tsunami 
preparedness?  
c. What relevant provision has the local government made for tsunami preparedness?  
1.6. Thesis statements and contributions 
The study has required proper preparation of a substantial thesis to present the findings of 
the research. The development has provided sufficient opportunity to include the broad 
framework of disaster risk reduction and the field research in the thesis. To accomplish the 
whole thesis, adequate and qualified supervisions have been obtained to ensure ability, 
persistence, vision, and guidance on a range of academic matters. As a result, the 
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supervisions have contributed to my intellectual independence and increased my capacity 
to undertake other challenges in the future. 
It is acknowledged that the study has involved many pieces of research drawn from other 
studies. During the investigation process, I have also participated in a sustained, rigorous, 
and systematic manner to the relevant body of knowledge through some literature reviews. 
This method has provided a significant contribution to my experience and understanding 
and the application of knowledge. The insightful analyses, alternative ideas, literature, 
methods, and other people’s work have been used in this thesis as building blocks, 
complementary additions, and re-framings. 
From this study, a number of original contributions to knowledge are identified which can 
become a bridge to new knowledge about Mentawai. They can also provide a clearer 
understanding of tsunami hazard knowledge and current tsunami preparedness in 
Mentawai. Moreover, they also offer the reader an opportunity to review and rethink the 
written research findings in the thesis. Similarly, the opportunity also provides a chance for 
others to carry out further research into a new area of knowledge or to find a new angle 
from my understanding of what has been found. The principal contributions of the thesis 
are: 
a) A realistic model of the vulnerability progression of tsunami hazards has been 
utilized to analyze the root causes and dynamic pressures that cause the local 
community of Mentawai to live in the hazardous coastal areas. This model has 
brought a new understanding of how past practices create huge problems for the 
future if no actions are taken to minimize or prevent the hazards in Mentawai. 
b) A set of benchmark methodologies has also been utilized to capture the tsunami 
hazard knowledge and tsunami preparedness measures of the research participants. 
Among various kinds of qualitative methodology, a case study has augmented and 
enriched other methods. With the geographic, demographic, and infrastructure 
challenges, this approach has shown its reliability and function in collecting and 
exploring the field data in the future. 
c) A particular knowledge management approach has been introduced to analyze tacit 
and explicit knowledge on tsunami hazards. This model has brought new 
understanding of how the knowledge has been transmitted, captured, and shared 
13 
 
among a “unique” group of people in Mentawai. More importantly, this also brought 
to our understanding how the knowledge was useful in avoiding the tsunami in 2010. 
d) A multi-level approach model for tsunami preparedness has also been used to 
analyze the field research findings. This model has allowed an understanding of how 
the individuals, household members, community members and district government 
officers have participated in increasing their safety from tsunami hazards.  
e)  Based on the research findings and reference reviews, some specific actions have 
been proposed to enhance the capacity of the individuals, household members, 
community, and local leaders in anticipating and avoiding tsunami hazards in the 
future. The proposed actions have taken in to account their cultures, traditions, 
existing strategies, and opportunities, not only to increase their anticipation of the 
tsunami but also to improve their livelihoods. 
1.7. Research limitation and delimitation 
Although I have carefully considered the methods that were employed in this research, a 
number of limitations that I could not control might be found within the study. These 
limitations may decrease the validity to some degree; however, the research results are still 
applicable since the integrity of the study still remains. Some limitations are identified as 
follows: 
1. As the heads of dusun were the gatekeepers in this research where purposive sampling 
was employed; they might have appointed the research participants as the best ones to 
express their opinions among others in their dusun. To avoid potential biases of the 
participants, as the criteria, I encouraged the head of dusun not to appoint the weakest 
or the strongest among the suitable participants. As Bryman (2008) warns, qualitative 
researchers should not choose participants who are the weakest or the strongest 
among the population. By considering the most talkative and the least talkative persons 
among the population, we can avoid potential bias in participants and increase the 
generalizability (Bryman, 2008). However, it is also important to note that this kind of 
bias is not easy to avoid.  
2. Although the research participants expressed their opinions and ideas in Bahasa, 
several terms or words were spoken in the Mentawai dialect. Likewise, the participants 
might have also slightly misunderstood the questions that I raised in Bahasa. Indeed, I 
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brought with me someone who could translate the dialect and words into Bahasa, but 
that person might have expressed things differently or slightly differently.  
3. It was considered that reaching a number of dusun in Mentawai was very challenging. 
The dirt roads, jungles, sea water, and weather were the main obstacles to accessing 
the dusun and the islands. It was thought necessary to have at least equal numbers of 
participants from each island; however, because of the time limitations and the above 
challenges, I had no chance to interview candidate participants from the Siberut islands.  
4. The field research was conducted in the middle of 2014. As one of the research 
questions was about the tsunami hazard knowledge before the 2010 tsunami, the 
participants might have expressed their experiences, feelings, opinions, and perceptions 
differently or slightly differently from the actual conditions. This would influence the 
findings. In order that the participants were aware of this specific issue, I always 
emphasized my questions by starting each one with “before the 2010 tsunami”. 
5. As the ethical considerations required the participants’ signature on the Consent Form, 
to some extent this could not be applied. Since the research needed to be carried out, 
however, I always requested that the participants provide me with oral consent prior to 
the interviews.  
It was also considered that a number of delimitations were identified that might be under 
my control. The delimitations of this study are as follows: 
1. It was a privilege for me to choose Mentawai as the research location as this location is 
very prone to tsunami hazards. In addition, the qualitative case study that provided me 
with numerous facts and evidence is important to increase the tsunami awareness and 
preparedness of the people in Mentawai.  
2.  In order to achieve the aim of the study, I had determined specific characteristics of the 
participants. I had also recruited the participants from certain dusun by adhering to the 
characteristics. 
2.1. Structure and organization of the thesis 
This thesis consists of three parts and eight chapters. Each part is linked as shown in Figure 
1.4. The first part is the introduction and context and consists of Chapters 1 to 4. It 
demonstrates the framework of the research. Chapter 1 introduces the context of the 
problems by addressing and describing the research’s background and rationales and setting 
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out the insights, which this thesis will contribute. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical 
foundations of disaster preparedness and some key concepts of the research. Chapter 3 
addresses the study of the theory of how the vulnerability in a community develops and 
provides an example of the vulnerability progression toward tsunami hazards in Mentawai. 
Lastly, Chapter 4 explains the methodology of the research on how the approaches and 
analytical framework are employed during the research.  
 
Figure 1. 4 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The second part contains the results and analyses of two topics that correspond to the two 
research questions. Respectively both are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 5 
explores the research participants’ hazard knowledge and, by using knowledge 
management, the chapter shows how the knowledge is captured, shared, created, and 
applied to tsunami preparedness. Chapter 6 explores how the individual/household, the 
community from the dusun, and the local government implement tsunami preparedness 
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measures. It also shows some problems and potential solutions to enhance tsunami 
preparedness in Mentawai. 
The third part is about synthesizing the lessons learned and consists of Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8. Chapter 7 addresses how the facts from the field study and vulnerability 
progression are used to develop the local community’s capacity in tsunami preparedness. 
Based on the field findings, this chapter looks at the enhancement of coping and adaptive 
mechanisms to solve the vulnerability to tsunami hazards in Mentawai. Chapter 8 extracts 
some conclusions from the study and suggests how the findings apply to other communities, 






















Theoretical Frameworks and Key Research Concepts 
 
“A concern for risk, and with it a motivation to improve disaster mitigation and 
preparedness, has tended to fall between the cracks of the conceptual framework that 
has driven development co-operation and humanitarian assistance” Christoplos, 
Mitchell, and Liljelund (2001, p. 185) 
 
2.0. Introduction 
Literary histories show that disasters have occurred over thousands of years; however 
scientific investigations of disasters, in particular from social standpoints, are just currently 
occurring. It is claimed by Dynes (2000) that the first scientist who had a social 
comprehension of disasters was Rousseau. His standpoint was based on the 1755 Lisbon 
earthquake of Mw 8.9 which created a tsunami wave 15 m high in the city of Lisbon 
(Baptista, Heitor, Miranda, Miranda, & Mendes-Victor, 1998). The earthquake killed about 
1,000 people and this number rose to 10,000 due to the tsunami (Simoes, Afihado, & 
Mendes-Victor, 1992; Zitellini, Chierici, Sartori, & Torelli, 1999). Rousseau claimed that 
because most of the people had evacuated after the initial tremors, the aftershocks that 
ruined whole buildings did not greatly affect the dense population (Dynes, 2000). 
Urbanization in Lisbon had created a high vulnerability to earthquakes. He then discussed 
that the population growth should have been reflected in the planning and development 
processes to avoid disasters (de Almedia, 2008). Lastly, he pointed out that the societal and 
cultural norms should have been part of the solutions to manage the disasters (Dynes, 
2000). In brief, Rousseau’s viewpoint on the Lisbon Earthquake was the first step to place 
social perspectives on the disaster risk management framework.  
The development of social insights into disasters is important nowadays. As this study is 
designed to produce new social insights, this chapter focuses more on the social aspects of 
disasters and will show the theoretical framework and the conceptualization of disaster 
preparedness for the thesis.  
Section 2.1. Discusses how disaster risk framework is important to be analyzed. 
Section 2.2. Discusses four phases of disaster management framework  
Section 2.3.  Links disaster preparedness with hazard knowledge. 
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Section 2.4. Explains disaster preparedness in the context of a local community at the 
household, community and local government levels. 
Section 2.5. Describes how to promote disaster preparedness through a collaboration 
with the local NGOs, private business, mass media and using social media. 
Section 2.6. Explains the theoretical concepts to achieve resilience. 
Section 2.7. Concludes the chapter. 
2.1. Disaster Risk Framework 
Disaster risk is the probability of devastating effects of hazards on vulnerable people, their 
property and environments. UNISDR (2009, pp. 9-10) defines risk as “the potential disaster 
losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur in a 
particular community or a society over some specified future time period”. It can also be 
understood that risk exists or is created within social systems as a result of the interaction of 
people with nature and their environment. Moreover, framing disaster risk has provided 
significant decreases of casualties and damages in quantity and quality through the 
development of disaster mitigation and preparedness (Christoplos et al., 2001). In addition, 
this emphasizes that capacity is also available within the people to cope with the risk. This 
capacity is considered to the sum of abilities of people, organizations and systems that exist 
such as the available efficacies, protective behaviors, and possessions to handle disasters 
(UNISDR, 2009). Therefore, discussing disaster risks involves the aspects of hazards, 
capacity, vulnerability and exposure. 





Figure 2 1 
The intersection of hazard, exposure, vulnerability 
from Reese and Schmidt (2008) cited from Power (2013). 
 
Figure 2.1 indicates that disaster risk results from an intersection of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability. This means that growing exposure and delays in reducing vulnerability or delay 
in developing capacity will increase the possibility, likelihood and consequence of a 
potential disaster.  
2.1.1. Hazards 
Disasters risk increases as a result of one or more events that trigger disruptions, known as 
hazard(s). WHO (2002, p. 3) defines hazard as “a natural or human-made event that 
threatens to adversely affect human life, property or activity to the extent of causing a 
disaster”. Similarly, Makoka and Kaplan (2005) argue that a hazard is an event that 
potentially creates deaths, wounds, physical impairment, social and economic interruption, 
or environmental ruin. Also, a hazard is a hazardous event or circumstance which may 
potentially create deaths, injuries, or decrease health status. It can also damage human 
property, ruin livelihoods, worsen public services, and bring socio-economic and 
environmental disruptions (UNISDR, 2009).  
The above definitions show that hazards are potential perils or interruptions to human life, 
property and infrastructure, livelihood, and environment. Therefore, it is vitally important to 
be aware of the existence of hazards within communities. All sectors such as individuals, 
communities, governments, and private business need to be aware of and anticipate the 
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hazards in their surroundings. This awareness allows the people to be entirely involved and 
enlightened as to how they may be affected by an emergency (Kapucu & Ozerdem, 2013). 
Through public education, adequate and effective preparedness measures may make 
people avoid the impacts of the existence of certain hazards. Or, the people may be able to 
create high levels of adjustment to harmonize the existence of the hazard (Perry & Lindell, 
2007). For this purpose, the people are required to have hazard knowledge of adjustment 
adaptation and implementation.  
Hazards can be human-induced or natural in origin. Table 2.1 indicates several kinds of 
hazard categories. 
Table 2 1 
Hazard categories 
No Hazard categories Hazard 
1 Geological Earthquakes 
Volcanoes 
Landslides. 




3 Hydrological Floods 
Debris flows. 
4 Oceanic Erosion 
Tsunamis. 
5 Biological Outbreaks of communicable 
diseases 
Wildfires 
6 Extra-terrestrial Comets 




Source: Abbott (2014); McGuire, Mason, and Kilburn (2002);  
and Wisner, Gaillard, and Kelman (2012b) 
 
Many people have tried to envisage hazards, since they believe that hazards are cyclical 
events. However, Hyndman and Hyndman (2009) point out that even the most periodic 
hazards are mostly not really cyclical, due to numerous irregularities that control the 
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behavior of hazards. Furthermore, historical records of hazards can only improve probable 
estimates as recurrence intervals. From these intervals, people may forecast when a hazard 
may happen (Hyndman & Hyndman, 2009).  
Hazards can arise in all-time scales. They may last for a few moments, hours, days, a span of 
years or decades (Gregg & Houghton, 2006; Simon, 2012). Furthermore, they can be single, 
sequential or combined. Each hazard has certain characteristics, based on its position, 
strength, magnitude, possibility, length, and regularity (Gregg & Houghton, 2006; Niekerk, 
2011; Simon, 2012). Because of different characteristics, according to Gregg and Houghton 
(2006), it becomes imperative to understand the precursory period and response time of a 
hazard. Therefore, the precursory period and response time provide substantial implications 
for a detailed planning and implementation of public programs such as preparedness 
measures.  
As indicated above, precursory periods and response times are different for each hazard. 
Some hazards have a precursory period and response time which are very short so that 
people hardly have any time to conduct certain protective behaviors. However, some other 
hazards have very long precursory periods and response times. In this case, people may 
have time to carry out proper and adequate prevention and mitigation efforts. Gregg and 
Houghton (2006) give an example that earthquakes may have only a few seconds’ 
precursory period, or even none at all. Similarly, their response time may last a few seconds. 
Other examples are river floods and droughts. Both hazards may have long precursory 
periods and response times. According to Alexander (1999), a river flood has an average of 
precursory period of 15 hours; therefore, those who may be affected can prepare for and 
react to the hazard for a longer period. 
2.1.2. Vulnerability to hazards 
Another aspect of disaster risk is vulnerability to hazards. Vulnerability is the particular 
characteristics and circumstances that exist within a group of people or within a special 
system that contribute to making the people or the system susceptible to a destructive 
hazard (UNISDR, 2009). Moreover, Cardona (2004, p. 37) defines vulnerability as an internal 
risk element within a certain community or system that creates an unprotected condition 
for the community or system from a hazard. It also corresponds to the inherent proneness 
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of the people or system to be affected or susceptible to impairment (Cardona, 2004). 
According to A. Singh, Hossain, Foresman, and Cheatle (2003), scholars have used 
vulnerability in numerous ways. Firstly, vulnerability was focused on physical structures, 
socio-economic circumstances, and accessible resources. Later on, vulnerability was also 
used to explore the linkages of hazards to demographic and geographic conditions (A. Singh 
et al., 2003). Recently, vulnerability has been used to describe the association of certain 
people with risks, hazards, climate change, and food safety. Currently, vulnerability has 
become a wide range of academic disciplines and practical intentions. However, the 
utilization of vulnerability to illustrate a phenomenon often concludes with the concerns of 
root causes and dynamic pressures of the phenomenon as these will subsequently cause the 
people to have fragile livelihoods and live in unsafe locations (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & 
Davis, 2004; Wisner, Gaillard, & Kelman, 2012a).  
2.1.3. Exposure to hazards 
Other aspect to increase disaster risk is hazard exposure (exposure). Exposure is one 
important component that may affect our lives. Exposure refers to the various elements of 
people, such as livelihoods and belongings, that are found in a particular location where 
hazard events may exist (Cardona et al., 2012). Moreover, Lavell et al. (2012) define that an 
exposure can be employed to designate the existence of people with their livelihoods and 
daily activities in a place where their existence might be jeopardized by physical events. 
Thus, exposure can occur when the people, economic resources, infrastructures and 
cultures are situated in areas exposed to perilous hazards. However, Cardona et al. (2012) 
argue that, although exposure is essentially important to consider, it is not sufficient to 
determine disaster risk. People are possibly exposed to a hazard but they may not be 
vulnerable; however, people who are vulnerable to a disaster are necessarily exposed to the 
hazard. 
Hazard exposure arises from people’s habitation in the area where they may be involved in 
a particular category of hazards that jeopardize their sustainable existence or belongings 
(Lindell et al, 2007). UNESCO (2011b) gives an example of some people who are simply 
exposed to a combination of hazards such as tsunamis. Coastal areas are frequently 
exceedingly densely inhabited and developed as domestic, profit-making, industrial and 
delivery centres (UNESCO, 2011b). These developments are often driven by regimes with 
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improper and inadequate planning which can escalate the exposure to a tsunami hazard 
when the sea water is affected by a massive power such as an earthquake. As a 
consequence, those who reside in these shoreline zones are potentially more exposed to 
tsunamis because of improper utilization of coastal areas. 
2.1.4. Capacity  
The last aspect of disaster risk is capacity. Capacity is the deployment of powers, 
characteristics, and capital that exist within communities or institutions to reach established 
objectives (Lavell et al., 2012; UNISDR, 2009). Here, capacity includes the strengths and 
characteristics of institutions, societies, and personalities that can be accessed and used in 
relation to the presence of a hazard. In order to increase capacity, the above access and 
usage require the involvement of socio-economic, psychological, cultural and natural 
resources. Moreover, capacity contains accessibility to and usage of information and 
governance to reduce vulnerability. Therefore, capacity is also known as the subsidiary 
mechanisms for the people at risk. The mechanism can be obtained by the proper 
utilizations of structures, organizations, social coping abilities, awareness, protective 
behaviors, and characteristics. These elements are linked to social relations, governance, 
and management.  
Capacity is related to short and longer terms; therefore, it is divided into two categories: a 
coping capacity and an adaptive capacity. Fletcher et al. (2013) and (UNISDR, 2007b) argue 
that coping capacity is the momentary response to decrease the effects of a traumatic 
occasion, or an adverse condition. This allows the competency of people, institutions, 
personal efficacies, and possessions to encounter and manage unexpected settings and 
emergencies. While Smit and Wandel (2006) argue that adaptive capacity is a response to 
manage and minimize the risk from recurring situations into a longer term solution by using 
community ability. 
In relation to lessen disaster risk, capacity is important to develop. Capacity reduces 




Figure 2 2 
The reduction of disaster risk 
The reduction from the intersection of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability by decreasing vulnerability and 
developing capacity and by removing the people, livelihoods, and poverty from the exposure to a hazard 
 
2.2. Disaster management framework 
Seemingly, disasters always lurk in human lives. According to Fritz (1961) a disaster is “an 
event concentrated in time and space, in which a society or one of its subdivisions 
undergoes physical harm and social disruption, such that all or some essential functions of 
the society or subdivision are impaired” (p.655). WHO (2002) also provides a definition of a 
disaster as an event disturbing a normal circumstance and causing a level of distress that 
surpasses the ability of the affected people to adjust. Similarly, UNISDR (2009) defines a 
disaster as a severe interruption within a community affecting people, their physical, 
economic, or natural destruction. This interruption is also considered to create serious 
devastation which exceeds the people’s capability to solve these problems by using their 
strategies. Furthermore, Gregg and Houghton (2006) link disasters to the inability of local 
communities to deal with their adverse influences and which require external assistance.  
It is generally accepted that disasters are the source of numerous casualties and which 
throw the human socio-economic system into crisis, and generate extensive and costly 
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damage. As disasters often require external assistance, there is a clear need to elicit more 
attention from relief donors. Nevertheless, no single measurement can capture the full 
scope of a disaster: neither the number of people killed or affected, nor the impacts on 
livelihoods or properties. However, a number of experts have tried to quantify the impact of 
a disaster. Foster (1976) and Burton, Kates, and White (1993) quantified disasters with a 
threshold of a death toll of at least 100 deaths, or economic losses reaching at least $ 1 
million. However, this kind of quantification is not workable since many elements are 
involved in the occurrence of a disaster. Later, Alexander (1997) suggested that the 
determination of a disaster should consider the death toll, the economic values of 
destruction and the adverse results on the social and environmental fabrics. But again, 
because of this complexity there are no simple measurements to determine a disaster.  
The above definitions of disasters also imply that disasters often occur from suddenly 
overwhelming and unexpected events; therefore disasters are related to before, during and 
after the events. From this view, experts argue that there is a cycle of measures as a disaster 
management to handle the problems. The measures are from latency through prevention 
and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Alexander, 2002; Godschalk, 2007; 
Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). It can be said that disaster 
management is about all measures which may be implemented before, during and after an 
emergency. The measures have come from different approaches to different aspects of 
disaster management which vary from traditional approaches to recent sophisticated 
disaster risk management approaches. In fact, disaster management is linked to a number of 
disciplines, contexts, cultures, and practices (Bhandari, Malakar, & Murphy, 2010).  
Normally, scholars and disaster-related institutions divide disaster management into four 
phases as shown in Figure 2.3. Ideally, the first phase, prevention and mitigation, comprises 
all actions designed to eliminate disaster risk to the people and their possessions and 
environment in the future. There are a number of broad actions that can be conducted 
under this phase: the establishment of legal and programmatic frameworks and systems at 
national, provincial, and district levels. These elements of governance will share common 
characteristics, while they also reflect the contexts and implementation particularities in the 
local contexts (Velasquez, Bonapace, & Srivastava, 2012). Furthermore, it is also important 
to conduct a series of risk assessments and risk prevention and mitigation (Alexander, 2002; 
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Godschalk, 2007; Khan & Khan, 2008; Lindell & Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). As 
scientific bases, these measures are useful prior to developing specific action plans from 
public policies (BNPB, 2012). 
 
Figure 2 3 
Disaster Management Cycle 
Source: Adapted from Alexander (2002); Godschalk (2007) and Lindell and Perry (2007) 
 
The second phase, preparedness, is about actions taken to decrease the impact of 
forecasted or imminent disasters. The actions are related to truthful knowledge of a hazard, 
adequate responses and external assistance (Alexander, 2002; Godschalk, 2007; Lindell & 
Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). There are also a number of broad actions needed 
such as providing emergency warning communication, evacuation procedures, training and 
simulation activities, and emergency response and equipment. The third phase, response, is 
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related to emergency deeds which focus on saving and safeguarding human lives 
throughout an emergency period and a short-term aftermath (Alexander, 2002; Godschalk, 
2007; Lindell & Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). The effectiveness of response 
actions reflects the adequacy of prevention and mitigation and especially preparedness 
efforts. During this phase, search and rescue are vital to save the affected people. This will 
be followed by conducting rapid damage assessments and protections of property. Lastly, 
recovery is the actions taken after a disaster to repair destruction, reinstate public services, 
and rebuild public infrastructures. This phase consists of important damage assessments, 
treatments and rehabilitation which affect actions. These actions will affect mitigation, 
preparedness and response phases in the future (Alexander, 2002; Godschalk, 2007; Khan & 
Khan, 2008; Lindell & Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). From this last phase, we can 
start again to the first phase and go on.  
2.3. Developing preparedness measures through hazard knowledge 
Although scholars have conducted research on both the physical and social science aspects 
of disasters and disaster risk, yet people and governments still find it difficult to handle 
disasters, to reduce risk, and to implement preparedness measures. Recognizing the 
difficulties, it is important to involve the at risk people as a part of developing strategies to 
deal with disasters. It is thought that the people might have existing or traditional methods 
and strategies to cope with their own difficulties. In addition, they might have various 
opportunities to be involved in or participate in every effort to reduce the difficulties or risk. 
As such, the people are, alongside the relevant stakeholders including the government, 
scientists and civil society, different sources of knowledge (Hyndman & Hyndman, 2009; 
Mercer, 2012).  
As actionable information, knowledge is acquired through education and experiences. 
Mercer (2012) argues that experience may include an internally embedded awareness of a 
particular situation. Or, knowledge can be acquired from exposure to, for instance, 
education and trainings (Gelkopf, Ryan, Cotton, & Berger, 2008; Mercer, 2012; Smith & 
Woodworth, 2012). Such knowledge is known as explicit knowledge. Both types of 
knowledge have been widely known and used as resources in various approaches. However, 
Polanyi (1958), as cited by Mercer (2012) divided knowledge into local (inside) and outside 
knowledge that also consists of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
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Outside knowledge has made considerable progress in the area of disaster prevention, 
mitigation and preparedness. This knowledge about tsunami mitigation measures, for 
example, tends to concentrate on public facilities enhancement such as building massive sea 
walls or providing modern technologies. The high-tech solution is based on scientific data 
and modelling that can be tried, tested, proven and utilized through methods (Mercer, 
2012). Therefore, this kind of knowledge can be developed into other areas because it has 
evidently saved lives when disasters strike. However, in many cases this effort can also fail 
to provide accurate information, or even to protect lives because it relies on specific skills 
and complicated tools, or to encourage people to believe a risky coastline is safe. Hence, 
Wisner et al. (2004) warned that high-tech solutions often require skillful expertise in 
responding disaster risk. 
Knowledge can also consist of traditional and indigenous knowledge which is acquired over 
generations. Dekens (2007) argues that this local knowledge is how indigenous or local 
people in a particular area view, interact, control, translate and respond to forceful 
differences in environments, resources and services that the people generate. However, 
Mercer (2012) claims that this local knowledge is often ignored by so-called ‘expert 
knowledge’. Similarly, the knowledge is also often disregarded, deemed insufficient or even 
forgotten over time by the local people. Local knowledge stays influential and dynamic 
through examination and adjustment to ecological as well as demographical changes. 
Therefore, in the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) UNISDR (2007a) capturing and 
practicing traditional and indigenous knowledge in disaster preparedness measures are 
urged. Thus, local knowledge becomes an access point to promote local communities’ 
involvement. This involvement requires support from local community resources and local 
institutions (Battista & Baas, 2004). 
As disasters are related to interrelated human, social and cultural factors, local knowledge is 
needed to maximize the implementations of outside knowledge (Hiwasaki, Luna, Syamsidik, 
& Shaw, 2014). The integration of local and outside knowledge on hazards will assist 
communities to manage risks and how they realize their potential solutions. Moreover, the 
significance of hazard knowledge is necessary as parts of national and local strategies to 
develop policies on disaster preparedness measures. The integration of short- and long-
term strategies is important to diminish or reduce the adverse implications, avoid the 
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further disadvantageous leverages of property, and quickly recover from disaster. Yet, it is 
very challenging to incorporate local knowledge into policy developments and their 
implementation.  
2.4. Disaster preparedness in local contexts 
As disasters have a local dimension, disaster preparedness should also begin at the local 
level. For example, households can conduct simple activities to support family members’ 
safety and to protect their belongings. Different people and communities may have 
different approaches to building various disaster preparedness measures. However, basic 
knowledge and guidance are important to understand in order to survive or escape from the 
potential presence of a hazard. Consequently, the roles of individuals, households and local 
community members in creating, maintaining and supporting disaster preparedness 
measures become imperative.  
2.3.1. Preparedness at the individual and household level 
It is crucial for individuals and family members to be safe and well and to ensure this, the 
response to disaster preparedness becomes critical. Individuals may respond differently to 
an unexpected event that occurs within their own community, but they can also create a 
similarity in principle in developing preparedness. The above Figure 2.3 indicates that there 
is a need for necessary measures to be implemented at the individual and household level. 
Before the event of a disaster, individuals can increase their ability in a significant way so 
that they are able to cope when an emergency occurs. They are also able to rapidly recover 
from it, and to protect other household members and possessions from preventable loss. 
The first step in preparing for any disaster is to realize which hazards could strike. At this 
point, being aware of where they are and what supporting and obstructing factors are in 
their surroundings are also necessary (Gerdan, 2014). Individuals also need to know about 
warning systems such as what alarms sound like, what the alarms mean, and what actions 
should be taken when they are heard (UNISDR, 2006b). For particular hazards such as 
tsunamis, a quick decision is required to evacuate to a safer place, but for other hazards 
people may need to stay at home. Therefore, it is essential to maximize awareness and 
encourage participation of individuals in disaster preparedness measures to effect change at 
the household and community levels.  
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Risk perceptions have a significant influence on disaster preparedness. Wachinger and Renn 
(2010) claim that risk perception is influenced by several factors. These factors can be local 
and outside knowledge, familiarity, norms, perceptions, and feelings. These will stimulate 
how people think about and judge the magnitude and tolerability of risks. Perceptions may 
involve the process of gathering, choosing, or interpreting signals about the uncertain 
impacts of hazards. Donahue (2010) exemplifies how people’s perceptions of risk vary 
depending on their location. His finding was that people who lived in coastal areas judged 
themselves and their properties as more at risk of disasters than people who lived inland.  
Preparedness measures at the individual level are interlinked with the same measures at the 
household level. Family members tend to inform other home-members about important 
topics. At the household level, it is necessary to involve all family members including special 
needs people in disaster preparedness. A household may consist of one or more persons 
from the family or extended families that are co-residing in a single residential unit. There 
are paramount roles of households in conducting and maintaining effective disaster 
preparedness measures. Scheer et al. (2011) and Lin, Eluru, Waller, and Bhat (2009) 
emphasize that it is essential for all households to have household evacuation plans. This 
will significantly increase family members’ ability to understand potential hazards in their 
surroundings and ensure that they are guided to safer places in time in the event of a 
disaster.  
Furthermore, Johnston and Dudley (2009), UNESCO (2014), and Acker (2007) argue that 
regular household exercises are also imperative to ensure all family members, including 
special needs people understand where to go in the event of a disaster. During the 
exercises, family members need to be well informed to perform the necessary self-
evacuation without being formally directed (UNHCR, 2014). Moreover, it is important to 
prepare equipment or facilities that households need during an emergency (Arlikatti, 
Peacock, Prater, Grover, & Gnana, 2010; E. Y. Y. Chan, Kim, Lin, Cheung, & Lee, 2014; 
DeBastiani & Strine, 2012; Harrington, 2007). Therefore, as a household is the smallest unit 
of the community, it has an important role to strengthen community participation.  
However, we also need to identify a number of factors explaining why individuals and 
households pay less attention to preparedness. Kapucu (2008) warns that 75% of individuals 
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and households who generally feel prepared through the availability of an evacuation plan, 
actually never practise the plan. Individuals and households simply provide fewer items for 
emergency and build fewer preparedness measures as a daily mission and tend do more in 
response to a disaster. DeBastiani and Strine (2012) also identify several adverse factors 
contributing to disaster preparedness, namely: younger ages, insecure jobs, limited 
education, and certain people. Even household members or individuals that have had 
previous direct disaster experiences are significantly influenced by risk perceptions and their 
personal efficacy in defending themselves and their household members often remains low 
(E. Y. Y. Chan et al., 2014). Therefore, it is necessarily important to identify what obstacles 
exist within households in order to develop, maintain, and/or achieve effective and 
continuous individual and household preparedness measures. 
2.3.2. Preparedness at the local community level 
Communities have rights and responsibilities to participate in the protection of their lives 
and to create harmonious living within their society. To achieve these aims in terms of 
disaster preparedness, it is important to conduct a number of measures by involving the 
community. Oakley and Marsden (1987), as cited by Mathbor (2008), argue that community 
participation refers to a process of how people, households, and societies undertake 
accountability for their safety. They also improve their own capacity to increase their 
survival. Therefore, community participation is an influential way of encouraging people to 
carry out their agreed objectives and the execution of meaningful programs. (Mathbor, 
2008). 
Community participation will empower local communities to build preparedness measures. 
According to Letz (2006) and Sutton and Tierney (2006), community participation in disaster 
preparedness measures involves building awareness and educating local community 
members on life saving skills as well as creating and revitalizing local early warning systems. 
It also improves coping resources, protects property, and initiates early recovery activities 
(Letz, 2006; Sutton & Tierney, 2006). Furthermore, it strengthens community empowerment 
to control the decisions affecting their lives. Lastly, it increases the effectiveness and 
efficiency of preparedness measures (Mathbor, 2008).  
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Community participation builds the social dimensions of disaster preparedness. Local 
communities can see themselves through their cultural lens, particularly their local 
knowledge of hazards and accumulated experiences (Sutton & Tierney, 2006). Local 
knowledge may become a door to promote the local community’s participation in aspects of 
disaster risk prevention and mitigation and preparedness. Considering local knowledge in 
the practice and context of disaster preparedness will also help local institutions to 
implement and improve programmatic planning and implementation (Dekens, 2007). Local 
knowledge can also improve programmatic acceptance, ownership, sustainability, and 
performance of local community members. This means cost-effectiveness in short- and 
long-term efforts may be easy to obtain. Moreover, from a social perspective, local 
knowledge may stimulate common trust, tolerance, and collective consideration from local 
people’s sense of partnership and self-confidence (Dekens, 2007).  
Moreover, Panjaitan (2012) argues that owing to the lack of resources from local 
governments, local communities should be empowered to become principal responders in 
disaster preparedness measures. Through the empowerment, local communities are 
encouraged to use their existing resources such as local skills to prevent and prepare for 
unexpected situations. In addition, local community members could also promote disaster 
preparedness measures for others to participate in. Empowerment of local communities is 
necessary to understand their exposure to hazards, disaster risks, and their prioritized 
actions (Delica-Willison & Gaillard, 2012). Local communities can participate in every action 
taken from the planning process to evaluation of the action. 
Previous experience with hazardous events may intensify community risk perception and 
encourage the preparedness movements of communities (Lindell & Perry, 2000; Muttarak & 
Pothisiri, 2013). Although evidence shows that many communities pass their experience and 
knowledge from one generation to the next as an intergenerational knowledge, they tend to 
ignore both the knowledge and the essence of practising the knowledge. Thus, continued 
reminders can be important to help others to remember and to understand certain hazards. 
In addition, Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) suggest that in a community with no recent 
hazard experiences, it is vital to give the people community memories of past events. The 
memories can be sustained through oral histories or disaster memorials. Disaster survivor 
records and spoken histories may form hazard awareness in other people. They may also 
33 
 
increase risk perceptions in order to encourage others, so that if preparedness measures are 
taken, people may be able to survive a disaster (McAdoo, Baumwoll, & Moore, 2008; Paton 
et al., 2008).  
In relation to disaster preparedness measures, however, social vulnerability is important to 
consider at the community level. Communities of limited socio-economic status are a major 
determinant of the vulnerability to the efforts of preparedness (Dash, McCoy, & Herring, 
2010; Usman, Olorunfemi, Awotayo, Tinde, & Usman, 2013). Certain demographic 
characteristics also often increase vulnerability to disaster. Peek (2010) argues that infants, 
under five year olds, special needs and older people are vulnerable to disasters and become 
challenges for preparedness measures. UNDP (2010) argues that in many cases, minority 
and indigenous people may not have the right to self-determination. Furthermore, they also 
may not be able to access their political rights, or socio-cultural and economic growth to 
protect themselves from disasters.  
To be specific, gendered contexts are important in deliberating on preparedness measures. 
In many societies the disparities between men and women are wide and women tend to 
have less access to obtaining assets, skills, and social status. The imbalance will highlight the 
gendered nature of disaster impacts. Kottegoda (2007, p. 16) states “women, especially if 
they do not receive timely warnings, or other information about hazards and risks, or if their 
mobility is restricted, or otherwise affected by cultural and social constraints, are major 
casualties in disasters”. In addition, Mulilis (1999) argues that in certain cultures, women 
may be at more risk of being affected by a disaster than men. In many societies, women 
generally spend longer inside their house than men. In addition, women tend to appraise 
the risk of hazards and disasters as being more threatening and serious than men do 
(Mulilis, 1999). Moreover, protective behaviors between women and men are also different. 
Lastly, Alston (2015) found several ways that women are more likely to be vulnerable to 
disasters, such as limited access to early warning information, increased responsibility for 
their household, difficulty in accessing relief goods, and physical constraints (having long 
hair and clothing). Therefore, women tend to exhibit higher levels of preparedness 
measures, and in many cases are affected more than men.  
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It is important to link local communities to their local cultures. Understanding local culture is 
most suitable to implement disaster preparedness measures. Cultural perspectives may 
provide lessons on hazards and how to prevent and prepare for them. These lessons can be 
applied in other places and scholars such as Hewitt (2012) and Cannon, Schipper, Bankoff, 
and Kruger (2014) divide the main roles of culture in disaster preparedness measures into 
two. Firstly, culture may be an obstacle which increases vulnerability to hazards. In many 
cultures the exposure can be seen as a punishment from their gods or spirits rather than 
something to be prepared for, or certain hazards such as volcanic eruptions are perceived as 
social rather than natural events (Cannon et al., 2014). So, in order to prepare for it, the 
people could offer to do certain things for their gods. In many societies disasters are “acts of 
God” that could not have been avoided, foreseeable, or preventable. Furthermore, J. Lewis 
(2015) argues that cultures can often change and shift, become modified, grow, or are 
diminished over a longer period rather than temporarily, because cultures change when the 
mind-sets of the people change. Lastly, the changes in indigenous cultures tend to include 
adopting new or majority cultures in one country, and ignoring intergenerational native 
strategies in coping with certain problems could worsen their risk to disasters (A. Phillips, 
2007). Therefore, cultures can be an obstacle to building disaster prevention and 
preparedness measures because of their own characteristics in particular societies, or the 
changes or modifications of the cultures. 
The second role is that culture can have tangible and intangible heritages that play a role in 
reducing vulnerability (Cannon et al., 2014; Hewitt, 2012). Generally, tangible heritage can 
be classified as immovable and movable cultural products. They can be buildings and 
historic places, monuments, artifacts or music instruments. Meanwhile, intangible heritages 
are the practices, methods, knowledge, and skills which a local community and individuals 
identify as fragments of their culturally unique legacies (UNESCO, 2003). UNISDR (2015) 
ensures that cultural heritages (tangible and intangible) are an encouragement to be 
resilient that supports measures to lessen disaster risks. As a result, the heritages can be 
linked to traditional land usage, oral and local history, identity, traditional technologies, and 
other local knowledge systems. These can provide necessary information to both prevent 
the creation of new risks and reduce existing risks. Therefore, cultural heritages can 
contribute to local communities by increasing their disaster preparedness.  
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Understanding types of communities is important when it comes to disaster management 
measures. BNPB (2014) defines a community as a parochial or categorical group of 
individuals. Firstly, a parochial community refers to groups of people who live in one 
territory and which local governments have legally acknowledged, such as villages or 
districts. This community develops an approach of promoting the involvement of grassroots 
into disaster preparedness measures at the local level. For this, a series of efforts is required 
that includes community self-interpretation of hazards and disaster risk, reduction and 
monitoring and evaluation of their own performance in disaster preparedness (Paripurno, 
2008). Furthermore, this community can also form a group of practitioners as a part of the 
community to have particular responsibility related to preparedness measures. This group, 
for example, can share knowledge and experience with other community members 
(Paripurno, 2008). According to Paripurno (2008) the development of such practitioner 
groups is often linked to customary and religious institutions.  
Secondly, a categorical community can refer to a group of individuals with particular 
objectives, such as non-government organizations, or other institutions such as research, 
peer groups, and media. The community can conduct some efforts to strengthen disaster 
preparedness such as programmatic frameworks of evacuation procedures; awareness 
campaigns; capacity buildings; safe schools; and advocacies as seen in Figure 2.3. Now, it is 
common to find governments and NGOs as categorical communities that actively work on 
disaster preparedness for local communities as parochial communities. Therefore, the roles 
of local governments are important for the communities to be prepared.  
2.3.3. Preparedness at the local government level 
Undoubtedly, local governments have important roles in enhancing disaster preparedness 
measures as categorical communities. The main role of local governments in disaster 
preparedness is to ensure that all community members and their property are spared from 
disasters. In order to achieve this role, Lindell and Perry (2007) state that local governments 
can provide certain activities such as: 
- Developing a number of standard operating procedures 




- Conducting periodic drills and exercises to verify responses to warnings 
- Conducting risk communication programs to promote necessary emergency 
preparedness 
- Evaluating preparedness programs 
The above roles will ensure local governments and local communities have disaster 
preparedness measures as routine or mainstream activities. The roles are also considered to 
reduce a dichotomy between the responsibility that local governments have for the future 
of their jurisdictions and specific before and after disaster planning functions. 
Figure 2.3 indicates that disaster preparedness actions are not only programmatic affairs, 
but also legal and political affairs. Consequently, local government leaders should have 
strong leadership to build coordination with local parliaments. As Schoch-Spana, Franco, 
Nuzzo, and Usenza (2007) suggest, building a coordination mechanism through structured 
dialogues, joint problem-solving and collaborative actions is compulsory in order to build 
strong disaster preparedness. The involvement of the local parliament is necessarily 
important to design the legal frameworks and systems of disaster management in the 
region. Moreover, in many democratic countries such as Indonesia, the approval of 
parliament is required prior to the implementation of public programs, so that financial 
support may be prioritized to support the programs. Additionally, demonstrations of local 
governments’ ability to manage disasters and disaster risks have to be made under changing 
sociopolitical circumstances (Jasanoff, 2009). Thus, in order to conduct a number of 
activities in local communities, it is a challenge to develop or change legitimacy for public 
reasons. Local communities, for example, progressively need more access to information on 
disaster risk, therefore local governments should expand their capacity to gain the required 
information with better equipment. 
2.5. Promoting preparedness through collaboration 
In order to conduct preparedness actions as mentioned in Figure 2.3, it is important to build 
strong collaboration. This measure can be gained from local, national and even international 
collaboration and partnership. Robust collaboration is a key element in emergency 
preparedness with those communities (Gerber & Robinson, 2009). Several entities are 
identified that are inclusively important to develop collaboration in disaster preparedness 
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measures such as NGOs, businesses, and media. They often provide technical expertise, 
resources and programmatic actions to develop, maintain and expand disaster 
preparedness. 
2.4.1. Local non-government organizations (NGOs) 
As categorical communities, NGOs are well positioned to develop capacities of parochial 
communities at the local level such as individuals and households and local communities. 
Thompson (2012) mentions that an NGO is an institution in which citizens organize 
themselves to achieve agreed goals to improve, regulate or even change society. Moreover, 
D. Lewis and Kanji (2009, pp. 9-10) define an NGO as:  
“either legal (focusing on the type of formal registration and status of 
organizations in different country contexts), economic (in terms of the 
source of the organization’s resources) or functional (based on the 
types of activities it undertakes)”. 
Therefore, D. Lewis and Kanji (2009) conclude that an NGO has five key characteristics: 
formal as an institution, private due to its separation from a government (although many 
governments support NGOs), non-profit distributing, self-governing, and voluntary. 
Local NGOs’ roles can influence the implementations of disaster preparedness programs 
and the development of public policies and political will related to disaster preparedness. 
Benson, Twigg, and Myers (2001) argue that many local NGOs offer local communities 
opportunities to examine the nature of their vulnerability. They often incorporate 
appropriate disaster preparedness measures into the analyses through community 
participatory approaches. Moreover, local NGOs can provide specific technical expertise to 
local communities such as the technical aspects of hazard mapping, capacity buildings, and 
evacuation procedures. In order to develop public policies, accountability and political will, 
according to Thompson (2012), local NGOs also often have no doubts about working 
through advocacy activities with local government institutions, local parliaments, and local 
media. NGO activists often do advocacy, both for public policies and legal frameworks on 
disaster preparedness as mentioned in Figure 2.3. 
Initiatives of disaster preparedness from local NGOs should be value-added programs to 
those of local governments. UNISDR (2006a) argues that initiatives should be part of the 
local government’s strategic plan on disaster management. At the community level, local 
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NGOs may have strategic thinking on disaster preparedness. They can implement micro-
level initiatives on disaster preparedness that may provide wider positive impacts on 
individuals and communities. Schoch-Spana et al. (2007) argue that these positive impacts 
are attainable only if constant discourse, collaboration, and engagement between local 
NGOs, local governments and community members are increased. Therefore, the roles of 
local NGOs become necessarily important to develop tsunami preparedness measures in 
one community. 
However, it is also critical to consider that program interventions by NGOs are 
complementary. Farrington (1997) argues that, although having great intuitive appeal and 
reflecting widely commended values within communities, many NGOs find difficulties with 
financial sustainability. Many NGOs will forsake their target programs as well as their target 
communities if they find it difficult to support the programs. UNISDR (2014) also finds a 
challenge in how NGOs work in harmony with local governments. There needs to be further 
harmonization and synchronization of cross-sectoral public intervention policies among 
NGOs and local governments. 
2.4.2. Private businesses  
As Figure 2.3 also specifies, disaster management requires good collaboration with private 
businesses in implementing prevention and preparedness measures. The involvement of 
private businesses contributes to strengthening local disaster preparedness measures within 
communities as well as within their organizations (UNISDR, 2008). Although private 
businesses produce goods and provide services for profit, they can also place great 
emphasis on and allocate resources for disaster preparedness. Haddow and Bullock (2006) 
and Sutton and Tierney (2006) also note that the ultimate goal of private businesses to be 
involved in disaster planning is to ensure their business survives. Similarly, private 
businesses also desire to use resources to reduce the impacts of disasters by contributing to 
disaster preparedness measures (Zyck & Kent, 2014). Furthermore, it is important for 
private businesses to develop business continuity plans that encompass a variety of 
elements, including evacuation protocols, environmental security, and information 
technology security (FEMA, 2011). To ascertain business continuity, private businesses need 
resources to maintain the running of the companies. Therefore, private sectors must design 
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plans to allow business operations to continue under adverse conditions by implementing 
appropriate resilience strategies (Sutton & Tierney, 2006). 
In addition, Niekerk, Ndlovu, and Chipangura (2015) argue that private businesses are also 
able to contribute to making communities safer. Communities gain benefits from businesses 
that set procedures and quality assurance to be implemented within the communities. They 
can also invest in a number of programs in community risk reduction efforts. Moreover, 
particular expertise from private businesses can help communities with external disaster 
risk assessments. Lastly, they can act as financial sources to support agreed community 
programs by providing funds and volunteers (Niekerk et al., 2015). A number of strategic 
business concepts from the private sectors may be involved in relation to preparedness 
measures. The concepts may be as private-public partnerships, corporate social 
responsibility, charity, sponsorship and philanthropy, which can support disaster 
preparedness at the business and community levels. 
2.4.3. The media in disaster preparedness 
In response to disasters or emergencies, local communities tend to use improvised or 
impromptu media to communicate the real situation to others. Media are combined 
communication channels or equipment used to store and deliver information or data. Media 
can be mass media such as electronic or printed media and the press and broadcast (radio 
and television), or as social media (text, images, audio and video). Nowadays, both are 
important sources of information on hazards and disasters for people.  
Mass media have been inextricably entwined with disaster management measures including 
disaster preparedness. The electronic, printed and broadcast media reflect great public 
interest and concern and provide extensive coverage of disaster preparedness measures 
(Radford & Wisner, 2012). Iqbal, Ali, Khursheed, and Saleem (2014) believe that mass media 
can raise awareness about hazardous events and educate people about disaster warnings. 
Mass media can also disseminate details of hazards or disasters and their potential impacts 
including physical, economic, social, and psychosocial. Furthermore, mass media can 
provide information about the sources of disaster assistance, and coordinate with 
governments and emergency response organizations (Iqbal et al., 2014). Moreover, mass 
media can gather and transmit the right information about preparedness measures and 
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contribute to the control of discourse progression within communities. According to W. 
Zhang (2015) mass media can be a channel of discussions for a community to understand 
confusing information and at the same time strengthen communal cohesion for disaster 
preparedness measures. Lastly, Radford and Wisner (2012) state that the media play an 
important and decisive role in responding to the about-to-occur events with energetic and 
persuasive pressures on people. Therefore, it is important to include or consider mass 
media (local or national) as participants in disaster preparedness measures. However, 
disaster preparedness topics in the mass media are not always interesting for certain 
people. These people tend to be interested in disasters only after the disasters have 
occurred.  
The presence of social media has changed the world, including the area of crisis 
management, considerably over recent years. Dewing (2012) argues that social media has 
numerous kinds of Internet-based and mobile services. These social media enable the 
people to share online interactions, participate in user-created content, and link virtual 
groups. J. C. Chan (2012) argues that with readily available social media, individuals and 
institutions are able to disseminate, obtain, and interpret information more proficiently. 
They have also improved collaboration between individuals within a community or an 
organization. Social media are also good sources for persons to produce and share their 
opinions or information (Edosomwan, Prakasan, Kouame, Watson, & Seymour, 2011). It may 
be more efficient and easier than writing and sending a letter, making a call or personally 
attending a meeting or an office.  
According to Dewing (2012), several kinds of social media that exist today include social and 
status-update services. In pre-emergency and emergency situations; however, people 
mostly use and participate in social network sites and status update services. Social network 
sites allow individuals to share and discover information to and from their list of 
connections within a bounded system. Some popular examples of this are Facebook and 
Linkedln, while services (such as Twitter) enable users to update their status. Their status 
may relate to what they have just experienced (such as a disaster). Therefore, others can 
view this status and understand what has just happened (Dewing, 2012). 
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Social media are an important method of social interaction during pre-emergency and 
emergency situations (Howell & Taylor, 2012). In these situations, social media can be used 
to inform other people of the location and how to reduce the risk. Prevention of risk is the 
top priority and then making the people vigilant and taking the right decisions for their life 
safety are next (Coombs, 2010). It is also clear that users of social media may shift from 
users to participants to actively distribute information sharing. However, Howell and Taylor 
(2012) warn that it is necessarily critical to understand the dynamics of status-updates or 
information sharing and how to address the prevalence of right, trustable, proper 
information. Otherwise they could create panics and unnecessary actions by others.  
To avoid untrustworthy information, it is important that local governments use mass media 
and social media to get messages or information out to their community members in pre-
emergency and emergency situations. J. C. Chan (2012) suggests five characteristics of mass 
media in delivering their topic material to people, namely:  
 Collectivity to connect people across geographic restrictions and time zones. 
 Connectivity to connect users to other resources. 
 Completeness to capture and keep the messages in a constant state to be viewed and 
shared;  
 Clarity of content from those partaking to be mindful of every opinion; 
 Collaboration on how information is gathered and feedback provided.  
 
2.4.4. Regional and national partnership 
Figure 2.3 also indicates that the importance of broader frameworks is applied into local 
contexts. Local disaster frameworks should be in line with regional (provincial) and national 
frameworks. A disaster regional or national framework is a set of guidelines developed by a 
provincial or central government and this framework can recognize present best practices 
that have been implemented in other areas. It can also be developed to describe certain 
procedures, roles, and accountabilities of certain persons with their unique task and 
responsibilities Baker and Cormier (2015) also outline necessary procedures of how the 
framework is operated. The framework requires the maintenance of an engaged 
partnership and creation of a tiered response among all levels to ensure all planned 
activities are well implemented. Moreover, the framework can demonstrate scalable and 
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flexible operational capabilities to anticipate emergencies. Lastly, it can show unity of action 
and preparedness to perform (Baker & Cormier, 2015).  
The above framework can lead the responsible persons to perform quick responses if 
needed. It may also ascertain a comprehensive and efficient strategy to be implemented. In 
addition, the framework can be manifested in legislation, strategic plans, and regional or 
national disaster systems. Therefore, specific local strategy documents affirm that specific 
legislation, certain disaster programs and disaster preparedness systems are harmonized 
with the regional or national frameworks. Strong partnerships can be built among local, 
regional and national players to develop disaster preparedness. More importantly, when in 
the event of disasters, local and higher frameworks are not contradictory and can easily 
match with one another, it may take fewer efforts to adjust activities in emergency 
situations.  
2.4.5. International collaborative agreements 
It is important to establish strong collaborative networks among players of preparedness 
measures in advance. Collaborative networks and cooperative agreements are the efforts to 
reach goals by integrating a wide range of organizations and entities into their daily tasks on 
preparedness measures (A. Patton, 2007). In a situation where fewer resources are found, 
networks are required to integrate energy, insight and enthusiasm. The networks also have 
significant roles in assisting the affected communities or countries to distribute international 
assistance. (Varda, Forgette, Banks, & Contractor, 2009). However, they are also considered 
to have costs and challenges. The integration of policies, programs and operations among a 
variety of disaster preparedness related institutions requires a strong commitment and 
leadership. Meanwhile, the institutions might also have different priorities, insights or 
platforms to implement the polices, programs or operation on tsunami preparedness 
(McEntire & Dawson, 2007).  
Indonesia, for example, performs cooperative agreements on emergency assistance through 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has ratified and adopted the 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). AADMER 
is the arrangement to deliver and offer operative mechanisms to attain a considerable 
decrease in disaster impacts of the ASEAN member countries. It also enables a mutual 
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response to any unexpected events with regional and international co-operation (ASEAN, 
2014). AADMER entered into force on 24 December 2009. This document is a practical 
regional framework for collaboration, procedural support, and technical deployment to 
relieve the affected member states of ASEAN (ASEAN, 2014). Based on this, ASEAN has also 
established an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster 
Management (AHA Centre) in 2011, in Jakarta, Indonesia. The AHA Centre aims to provide 
information and knowledge of disasters in the region. It is also intended to serve as the 
resource mobilization during an emergency among member countries. It also has a role as 
the means to certify emergency responses in quick and collective actions (ASEAN, 2011). In 
order to operate the Centre, ASEAN has developed a Standard Operational Procedure for 
Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Response Operations (SASOP); recruited and trained the ASEAN-Emergency Rapid 
Assessment Team (ERAT), and established a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN 
(DELSA) in 2012 in Malaysia. Since being established, the AHA Centre has conducted a 
number of humanitarian missions in the region.  
In short, the development of several networks and collaboration in a number of joint and 
mutual areas of cooperation at the bilateral and regional levels and with international and 
domestic NGOs has been acknowledged. Proper disaster preparedness may integrate 
collaborative mechanisms and networks into the frameworks. It may also accommodate 
different actors in cooperating based on agreed principles and objectives. Appropriate 
means and ways of disaster preparedness at the community level consequently enable the 
potential resources and capacities to be identified, recognized and utilized.  
2.6. Pathway to resilience  
The disaster management cycle shown in Figure 2.3 has been discussed above. Conducting 
an adequate preparedness phase, along with the other phases, may create resilience. 
Resilience is the capability of a system within a community to have better handles with 
catastrophic events, to encounter change, and to master vital functions, structure, and 
identity (Longstaff, Armstrong, Perrin, Parker, & Hidek, 2010, p. 3). Resilience reflects direct 
implications of the unexpected event, response, recovery and re-building activities. It also 
presents a new circumstance to community members, in which the circumstance may differ 
in several essential means from the pre-event of an emergency (Paton, 2006a). Therefore, 
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resilience is a condition in which a community has a comprehensive and integrated action 
before and after a disaster.  
Although its definitions seem simple, resilience to disaster is a complex phenomenon. 
Resilience can be reached when a community can attain all actions in Figure 2.3. Bruneau 
and Reinhorn (2006) conceptualize resilience into robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, 
and rapidity as the four R properties. Robustness is the power of components or schemes to 
endure in a certain degree of pressure or demand without experiencing decline or deletion 
of functions. Redundancy demonstrates the substitutability of part of the element or the 
system. The substitution shows the capability to satisfy purposeful necessities when the 
interruption, decline, or deletion of a function occurs. Resourcefulness is a capacity to 
elaborate difficulties, set urgencies, and deploy capital when part of elements or systems 
are disrupted. It may be financial, physical, technical, informational, and social capital that 
are used to attain objectives. Lastly, rapidity is a capacity to use urgency to accomplish 
objectives in a timely manner during decline or deletion of functions and improving 
functionality to prevent potential interruption (Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2006). 
The above properties need to be adopted in the context of operationalization. Bevc (2013) 
argues that the properties can be operationalized within organizations and communities 
through strengthening technical, organizational, societal, and economic systems. The 
integration of both frameworks provides strong commitments within communities and 
organizations. However, the integration of conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept 
of resilience requires capabilities, knowledge, and resources. Thus, the above resilience 
properties do not warrant escalating capacity in the short-term, but rather perseverance of 
system utilization for the longer term (Longstaff et al., 2010). Furthermore, Zukowski (2014) 
points out that the scope, type and impact of catastrophes also influence pathways to 
resilience. Although all actions in Figure 2.3 have been implemented in very proper and 
adequate concepts of the above properties; however, if a very massive, destructive, and 
intensive disaster occurs, the efforts seem to be insufficient. Therefore, the pathway to 
resilience is not easy to achieve and takes a long time. It involves multiple activities, 
interactions and relationships and requires complex systems at the organizational and 
community levels.  
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2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework for the study and has defined an 
understanding of disasters and hazards and their linkages to the social contexts. It also 
shows how disasters and hazards influence disaster management actions, in particular 
preparedness measures. As a critical phase to avoid disasters, there are several key 
concepts that have been considered to develop disaster preparedness measures. A clear 
understanding of hazard knowledge and integrating it into actions may be strategic to 
develop preparedness; the participation of individuals, households, local communities and 
governments is essential to develop preparedness measures; and building collaborations 
and partnerships is also a necessity. These actions will provide skills, resources and 
knowledge at the local levels. Lastly, although resilience to disaster is complex, 
comprehensive actions are required to increase capacities to face unexpected events. 
As the above discussions have defined several terms of the key research concepts, the next 
chapter will mainly discuss how the local community of Mentawai becomes vulnerable to 
tsunami hazards. Their vulnerability is important to explore so that the readers of this thesis 
















Tracing Vulnerability to Tsunamis in Mentawai 
 
“It is necessary to move beyond looking at disasters as simply physical 
events and consider the social and economic factors that make people 
and their living conditions unsafe or secure to begin with. Fragile 
livelihoods are as important as fragile buildings in understanding 
vulnerability to environmental hazards” (Bolin & Stanford, 1998, p. 42). 
 
3.0. Introduction 
The Mentawai archipelago is situated in West Sumatra Province. It is about 150 km to the 
west offshore of Sumatra Island. Its width is about 600 km2 and it is situated between 
0055’00” to 3021’00” South and between 98035’00” to 100032’00” East. The topography of 
the islands is dominated by plains with hills. The lowland plain is between 0 – 50 m high 
(Bappeda, 2013). Later in this chapter, we can see how this situation contributes to the 
development of vulnerability to tsunami hazards for the local community of Mentawai.  
This chapter explores the fundamental and significant techniques of how we frame an 
understanding of the way communities become vulnerable to disasters. It consists of six 
sections as follows. 
Section 3.1. Discusses a number of challenges for people who live in coastal areas. 
Section 3.2. Discusses vulnerability as a concept and a term. 
Section 3.3.  Demonstrates the root causes of vulnerability of the local community in 
Mentawai to tsunami hazards. 
Section 3.4. Describes the dynamic pressures of the local community of Mentawai who 
are vulnerable to tsunami hazards. 
Section 3.5. Explains a number of reasons why the local community of Mentawai live in 
the coastal area which is a location unsafe from tsunami hazards. 
Section 3.6. Concludes the chapter. 
3.1. Challenges in living in coastal settlements 
Nowadays, coastal and marine ecosystems are among the most important and productive 
ecosystems for human society and provide a range of services. The utilization of coasts 
increased significantly during the 20th century and continues into the 21st century (Post et 
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al., 2007). As a result, human populations, settlements, and socioeconomic activities are 
growing rapidly on the coasts and Nicholls et al. (2007) projected that about 23 per cent 
people in this world live on coasts within <100 metres above sea level. Similarly, the World 
Bank (2015) reports that about 10 – 12 per cent of people all over the world have 
livelihoods related to fisheries and aquaculture. However, coastal zones encompass less 
than 15 per cent of the land surface and therefore, population densities in coastal zones are 
much higher than the average global density.  
Despite the important roles of coastal and marine ecosystems, there is increasing evidence 
of high exposure to a variety of hazards in coastal zones. More importantly however, living 
in coastal settlements can put people’s lives at risk from tsunamis. Many coastlines are 
geologically prone to disaster hazards that create tsunamis. Tsunamis, in particular local 
tsunamis, can reach coasts a few minutes after sea waters are affected by strong energies 
such as an earthquake. Therefore, according to Lauterjung, Muench, and Rudloff (2010), the 
most challenging problem for people who live in coastal areas is the avoidance of local 
tsunamis. However, it is a big challenge to produce reliable tsunami warnings that require 
sophisticated tools, technologies and skills. In addition, existing tsunami warnings are often 
intentionally vandalized from direct or indirect contact by fishing activities. UNESCO (2011a) 
states that this kind of vandalism has had a dramatic impact on the data delivery of tsunami 
early warning systems. 
As a result, the above situations make those who live in coastal areas environmentally 
vulnerable. However, this vulnerability is not just a product of the present, but also from 
inherited past practices. According to Hilhorst and Bankoff (2004), a proper understanding 
of vulnerability is frequently blocked by the less than sufficient historical perspective of the 
contexts and roots of disasters. Therefore, vulnerability among coastal residents has 
become more complex, because it is interlocked with political powerlessness, isolation, 
income poverty and other aspects of social status. 
3.2. Vulnerability: term and concept 
As briefly defined in Chapter 2, vulnerability is a term and concept. As a term, it is tangibly 
simple, but it is also hard to quantify in practice. It exists around the people and relates to 
their livelihoods and assets (Bankoff, 2004; Cardona, 2004; Wisner et al., 2004). 
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Furthermore, it is associated with susceptibilities, instabilities and insufficiencies of the 
people to counter catastrophic events (Cardona et al., 2012). Therefore, in terms of tsunami 
preparedness, to reduce vulnerability is often connected to the physical development of 
giant sea walls, or the liability of the people living in coastal residence. In fact, as a concept, 
it is employed in numerous other contexts. It refers to the imbalances of political practice 
and power (Cannon, 2008; Oliver-Smith, 2002; Parkes, 2013), or the susceptibility of 
physical, economic, and social conditions (de Leon, 2006), or an integration of poor 
livelihood, poor natural resources and property (Wisner et al., 2004). Therefore, the above 
discussion shows a clear understanding that vulnerability is formed by many factors from 
within the community itself as well as from the place in which the community lives.  
After a series of hazardous disasters worldwide, the United Nations International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) developed the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. 
Through their actions, UNISDR has recognized that preventive measures are more important 
than responsive measures in disaster management. Therefore, UNISDR has promoted the 
effective action of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development frameworks. These 
efforts include exceptional highlights, particularly on disaster preparedness in relation to 
vulnerability reduction. These efforts also embrace a habitual behavior of prevention in the 
area of natural disasters (UNISDR, 2005). Furthermore, UNISDR (2007b) defines vulnerability 
as the essences and conditions of certain people with their system and assets that make 
them susceptible. Therefore, it is imperative, by involving all sectors, to implement effective 
and integrated measures within a community to reduce vulnerability.  
As for the term and concept, I will address the tracing of the vulnerability of the local 
community in Mentawai. To discuss this vulnerability, Wisner et al. (2012a) and Wisner et al. 
(2004) have developed a Pressure and Release (PAR) model which identifies three main 
factors that explore the progressions of vulnerability. These factors are root causes, dynamic 
pressures, and unsafe locations. The PAR model can also be applied to the situation in 




Figure 3. 1 
Pressure and Release Model on the progression of vulnerability  
Adapted from Wisner et al. (2004); Wisner et al. (2012a) 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the PAR model which demonstrates the idea that social factors and 
processes cause the people to be vulnerable to certain hazards (Wisner et al., 2004). The 
progression of vulnerability has three different factors which link a series of progressions 
which make people live close to hazards. Heyse (2015) mentions that root causes will lead 
to dynamic pressures that in turn produce unsafe conditions that create vulnerability to 
disasters. 
3.3. Root causes  
Commonly, root cause is the major reason for the occurrence of a problem. It is used to 
describe the depth of the causal chain within complex systems. In terms of the concept of 
vulnerability, root causes are various underlying deep-rooted aspects that exist in 
communities. The root causes interrelate synergistically to shape and sustain vulnerability. 
Furthermore, root causes “nudge” a number of factors to create vulnerability. As a result, 
according to Wisner et al. (2012a), root causes are determined by an imbalance of social and 
economic structures, rapid changes of ideologies, and historical and cultural problems.  
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3.3.1. History and culture 
a. Development history of Mentawai 
Understanding the root causes of vulnerability requires a study of the historical and 
development changes among the indigenous Mentawai. Schefold (1988) and Spark (1991) 
have stated that these people have cultures going directly back to the Neolithic Age (the 
late Stone Age), when the people lived inland on the Mentawai Islands. It is believed that 
people from Southeast Asia migrated into Indonesia more than three thousand years ago 
and gradually settled in the various islands (Spark, 1991; Tulius, 2012b). Those who arrived 
in the isolated Mentawai Islands had less exposure to other parts of Indonesia. As a result, 
the traditions of the Neolithic Age are more intact in the Mentawai Islands than anywhere 
else in Indonesia. The people lived in small groups next to rivers and survived by hunting 
animals, gathering fruits from the forest and catching fish from the rivers (Tulius, 2012a).  
Kennedy (1943) and Heine-Geldren cited in Loeb (1935) have classified the indigenous 
Mentawai people as having a very archaic and primitive culture. The people often carried 
out human headhunting raids (Schefold, 1988) and, in addition, they had “no true chiefs, 
laws, or government” (Loeb, 1935, p. 176) and were egalitarians (Schefold, 1991). Although 
some Hindu practices were found, such as the customs of chicken and pig sacrifices, the 
communal meal and the arts of divination, no Hindu influences have been found in their 
mythology. Furthermore, the indigenous Mentawai knew nothing about metal technology, 
paddy rice planting, and weaving arts (Schefold, 1991). Also, no customs of creating 
megalithic stones have been found among them. The people bartered their crops for metal 
axes with the Sumatra traders from about the 1800s (Schefold, 1991).  
Loeb (1935) argued that the name “Mentawei” (now called as Mentawai) is derived from 
the native word for a man or male “si manteu”. The islands of Mentawai were firstly 
designated as one island under the name of Isle de la Fortune in a French atlas of 1692. 
Subsequently, a Dutch sea captain discovered “Si berut” (the Mouse) Island when his ship 
was wrecked there. Later, he also discovered another island “Si Pora” (Good Fortune). 
Subsequently, the people called these two islands Big Luck Island (Siberut) and Little Luck 
Island (Sipora). However, the first contact of the Mentawai people with Western people 
began when John Crisp, an employee of the English East India Company, ‘discovered’ the 
Mentawai people in Pagai in August 1792. He originally called the island ‘Poggy” Island. 
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Since then, these groups of people have called the islands the “Mentawei Islands”. Crisp 
then published a document dealing with the islands and mentioning that the people had a 
very different language from those of the mainland of Sumatra (Loeb, 1935; Rudito, 2013). 
Later on, another Englishman, John Christie, made several visits to Pagai and started 
exporting timbers to the Dutch East Indies Resident in Sumatra in 1825 (Reeves, 1999). From 
10 July 1864, the Dutch East Indies (the Dutch colonization state in Indonesia) officially 
brought the Mentawai Islands under Dutch sovereignty, under the Resident for the Pesisir 
Selatan-Painan area. H.A. Mess (the Assistant-Resident) once said that the people who 
inhabited the islands lived in the past and had no knowledge of God (Reeves, 1999). The 
Mentawai people were recognised as one of seven Sumatran tribal groups (Kennedy, 1943) 
and in 1893 the Dutch East Indies sent troops to Sipora in order to stop the plunder of 
trading vessels by the Mentawai people. However the colonial involvement in the islands 
was relatively small. The Dutch paid less attention to Mentawai due to geographical 
barriers, the total population was estimated to be below 10,000 and the inhabitants were 
considered primitive (Kennedy, 1943; Loeb, 1935; Reeves, 1999). Sihombing (1979) also 
mentioned that the social changes during the Dutch Administration were relatively small.  
The first Christian missionary, August Lett (a German), took up residence in 1901, but he 
was killed 8 years later. In 1904 the Dutch East Indies started increasing its influence in the 
Islands by placing a permanent military post in Siberut to prevent further plunder of trading 
vessels (Persoon, 1987). The troops also banned the human headhunting raids (Schefold, 
1988), but it was not easy to stop them, and the people headhunted monkeys or other wild 
animals in the forest instead (Tulius, 2012a). They continued to practise the traditional 
belief known as Arat Sabulungan.  
In 1914, the missionaries started not only focusing on religious affairs, but also on medical 
treatment and hygiene, public education and carpentry skills in Sikakap, North Pagai 
(Sihombing, 1979). In 1915, the first Mentawai person converted from Arat Sabulungan to 
Christianity and this conversion extended to Sipora and Siberut in the following year. A 
mission station was eventually established in 1932 at Maeleppet (North Pagai). In addition, 
the developments of the above basic services were always next to the coasts for easy access 
for everyone. Furthermore, the timber concessions had aggressively widened in the North 
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and South Pagai Islands. As a result, the communities from both islands had major changes 
and moved to the coasts (Sihombing, 1979).  
After Indonesian Independence in 1945, significant changes began to occur. The Central 
Government banned the practices of traditional belief in 1954 (Schefold, 1988), decreeing 
that the people should choose one of five official religions (Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism), under threat of police action. Following the decree, 
there was a series of meetings in several settlements in Mentawai in 1954 known as “The 
Three Religions Meeting” to discuss the traditional beliefs of the Mentawai people (Arat 
Sabulungan). The meetings were attended by a number of representatives from Islam, 
Protestantism and Arat Sabulungan. The meetings discussed the ban of Arat Sabulungan 
and the conversion to one of the five official religions (Delfi, 2012). As a result, the meetings 
issued the following two important instructions that influenced the community: 
 Sabulungan belief will be abolished by force by the police officers 
 In the three months (after the meeting), the local community of Mentawai should 
decide to choose either Protestantism or Islam. If the community has not chosen 
one of the two after three months, all traditional artefacts and tools that are used 
for the rituals of Sabulungan, will be burned by the police and they will be 
charged (Sihombing, 1979, pp. 10-11). 
Three months later, the Government of Indonesia forced the local community to convert to 
either Islam or Protestantism after the Ali Sastroamijoyo Cabinet issued a decree (No. 
167/PROMOSI/1954) that proscribed any practices of traditional beliefs or animism 
(Sihombing, 1970). Thus, by 1955, officially most of the people of Mentawai had converted 
to Islam, Protestantism, and even Catholicism (Sihombing, 1979). Furthermore, Schefold 
(1991) explains explicitly the efforts to make the “uncivilized” “more civilized”  
“...in Sukarno Era, the Mentawaians hardly corresponded to the image 
of the national Indonesian personality, and everything was undertaken 
to adapt them to it as soon as possible. In 1954 a decree was 
promulgated prohibiting their traditional religion, which was said to be 
heathen; all the inhabitants were given three months to decide whether 
they wanted to convert to Christianity or to Islam. Anyone who did not 
choose within this period was threatened with punishment by the 
police or by mission teachers, and his ritual equipment was burned... As 
the same time, external features such as glass-beaded jewellery, the 
long hair of the men, loincloths, tattoos and the custom of chiselling the 





After the ban on the practice of traditional beliefs, the Central Government established a 
program known as Pemukiman Kembali Masyakarat Terasing (PKMT) or resettlement of 
isolated communities, during the 1970s-1980s (Erwin, 2007; Hernawati, 2007). G. A Persoon 
(2002) argues that the core of PKMT was the resettlement of the scattered communities 
into large villages within reach of government services and infrastructures. To achieve its 
goal, the Government gathered the Mentawai people who had lived as an inland community 
in the forests and relocated them on the coasts. There was no clear data that showed how 
many people were moved by this program; however, Goeltenboth and Timotius (1996) 
indicated that 30 % of the people in Siberut participated in the program. They also indicated 
that the numbers of people from the other islands who participated were higher than those 
from Siberut. The impacts of PKMT will be discussed in the following sections. 
Therefore, it is clear that the recent development history of Mentawai has brought 
significant changes to the community of Mentawai and the arrival of Western people 
provided a massive chance to exploit the area of Mentawai. However, the missionary 
activities provided several basic services in the coastal areas and these stimulated the 
people to move their settlements there. The deforestation of a number of forestry 
industries also forced some parts of them to move to the coasts in both Pagai Islands. 
Furthermore, in the early era of independence, the Indonesian Government forced the 
“uncivilized” to leave their traditional animisms and to convert to one of the official 
religions. These factors were among other root causes that led to the dynamic pressures on 
the people in Mentawai to move from the forest to the coasts.  
b. Settlement Changes of the Indigenous People of Mentawai 
As mentioned in the above section, the indigenous Mentawai people had a belief in arat 
sabulungan. This animistic belief is that each thing has a ”spirit” that exists either in the sky, 
sea, earth, or the jungle (Coronese, 1986; Mulhadi, 2008; Salmeno, 1994). The spirit can 
move and separate from its “host” and the separation can create death and imbalances 
such as damage, illnesses, or gales. The word arat means tradition, while sabulungan comes 
from the words sa, meaning a group of and bulung, meaning leaves. Therefore, arat 
sabulungan can be defined as “a system of knowledge, values, norms, and regimes in 
understanding and interpreting the environments that consist of the interaction patterns 
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among humans, animals, trees, soil, water and air and man-made things” (Mulhadi, 2008, p. 
53). The indigenous Mentawai people always used particular leaves of trees and specific 
animals that were found in the jungles. Therefore, it was important for them to live in the 
middle of the jungle, so they could easily conduct their rituals. To practise arat sabulungan, 
one uma had one sikerei (shaman) as a cultural leader.  
In addition, the indigenous Mentawai people lived in a lalep next to their communal house 
called an uma. A lalep consists of several individuals, namely father, mother, sons, 
daughters, and sometimes one or more widows (Tulius, 2012a), while an uma is surrounded 
by 5-10 laleb and about 30-80 individuals (Hernawati, 2007). The measurements and the 
number of people in each uma were relatively stable over a long period (G. A Persoon, 
2002). Hernawati (2007) mentions that generally uma are surrounded by their gardens and 
trees. If possible they are also surrounded by several hills as a protection from other clans. 
Furthermore, uma are next to a river for planting sago trees and taro, as well as for daily 
needs such as bathing (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3. 2 
A sketch of indigenous settlement 




The word uma is also related to the genealogical lineage of a particular clan (Delfi, 2013; 
Schefold, 1991). Interestingly, an uma is usually built from five different kinds of vegetation 
(meranti woods, rattan, bamboo, eaglewood, and palm leaves) (Figure 3.3). The main pillars 
of the uma are made from the meranti wood, known as the lord of earthquakes (Teteu Ka 
Baga). The people believed that the pillars would prevent the uma’s collapse when 
earthquakes occurred. The pillars (bakkat uma or riokuma) should be protected in the same 
way as parents protect their children (Ponting, 2001). The pillars are the strongest parts of 
the uma and knotted to other parts.  
 
Figure 3. 3 
This sketch shows how the indigenous Mentawai people built their traditional communal house, uma by using 
different kinds of woods. 





Figure 3. 4 
This picture shows an original uma from Mentawai 
Courtesy: The Tourism Agency of Mentawai, date unknown. 
 
Now, most of the local communities have left this type of the traditional settlement and 
prefer living on the coasts. They live in towns or dusun next to the sea. As a result, the 
younger generation has been used to living on the coasts and has forgotten their traditional 
settlements and old ways of living. As the change in traditional settlements in Mentawai has 
brought the community to live on the coasts, therefore this has contributed to the dynamic 
pressures on the people in Mentawai to move from the forest to the coasts. 
3.3.2. Social and economic changes 
In a continuation of the changes in the traditional history and culture in Mentawai, several 
new social and economic systems have been introduced in systematic and comprehensive 
ways. Firstly, a new system was introduced through the PKMT. Although the PKMT played a 
critical role in creating a more equitable society and helping the community build wealth, 
this program has destroyed the existing traditional social and economic structures of the 
people in Mentawai. Originally, these structures were very simple. The people were all of 
the same status without leaders or a lower class such as slaves. As an uma was based on the 
same paternal line, loyalty to the other uma members was high. What one family (lalep) 
harvested from its crops, belonged to the lalep members; however, if other lalep members 
needed the crops, they had to share them. One lalep could not eat meat without sharing it 
with other lalep members (G. A Persoon, 2007; Schefold, 2007). Each lalep collected pigs 
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and chickens when the uma had punen (rituals) such as a special party or a wedding 
ceremony. They would also share the same amount of meat between lalep. This social and 
economic structure has disappeared. The PMKT grouped people without considering their 
original clans and the people in mixed community live independently in more individualistic 
ways and are suspicious of one another (Hernawati, 2007).  
The PMKT also introduced the dusun, rukun warga, and rukun tetangga systems to which 
the local people were not accustomed. Moreover, new rules at the dusun and village 
administrative level were also implemented, whereas originally they had no true chiefs, laws 
or government (Loeb, 1935). A dusun is the smallest unit of the community that consists of 
several households/families living together in a particular area, while a village consists of 
several dusun. Since then, a dusun has been led by an appointed leader who is chosen by 
the members of the dusun. The leader is responsible to the community members and often 
is representative of the community. However, the newly mixed dusun people often have 
less respect for the dusun leaders, because they are of different origin or uma (Sihombing, 
1979). Therefore, this makes it difficult to deliver any programs within the community.  
In addition, the Government moved some families from Java to Sipora, North and South 
Pagai Islands (Figure 3.5). In order to rapidly assimilate the local people with this external 
migration, the Government also moved the local community of Mentawai, mixing them with 
the people from Java and placing them into a number of dusun along the coasts. The mixing 
was thought to be good for the local people and they learned from the migrants how to 




Figure 3. 5 
In 1987 there were the Central Government conducted an external migration of a number of people from the 
Java Island to several villages into the Sipora, North and South Pagai Islands. 
Source: Agustina et al. (2014) 
 
In short, rapid changes in Mentawai have affected the social and economic structures. 
Previously, they lived as egalitarians without any particular ranking or status in the 
community, but the PMKT introduced government administration with the dusun and village 
regulations. The old social and economic structures where they shared crops and meat with 
other members of uma changed, with each individual household now having to survive 
more independently. These aspects also became root causes for the people to move to the 
coasts in Mentawai.  
3.4. Dynamic pressures  
Beside the above root causes, there were various aspects to contribute the people to move 
to the coasts, known as the dynamic pressures. As discussed, it is obvious that the 
indigenous Mentawai people have experienced profound changes in their history and 
culture and in social and economic aspects. Usman et al. (2013) define dynamic pressure as 
59 
 
an intermediary process which incurs negative effects for the people and subsequently the 
people live in unsafe conditions. Similarly, Wisner et al. (2004) believe that dynamic 
pressure distributes the root causes of vulnerability into particular forms of unsafe locations 
in relation to a hazard. Several elements are found as dynamic pressures in developing the 
vulnerability to tsunami hazards in Mentawai: population growth, poverty and lack of local 
government capacity, along with deforestation.  
3.4.1. Population growth 
Wisner, Bleakie, Cannon, and Davis (2003) and Philip and Rayhan (2004) argue that there is 
an indirect linkage between population growth and developing vulnerability to disaster. 
Generally rapid population growth will increase poverty among people; as a result poverty 
will create vulnerability. In many cases, rapid population growth will create economic and 
social implications with limited access to income and resources in the society. Consequently, 
the limitations can affect certain groups of the population, and increase the numbers of 
poor people. Today, the BPS Mentawai (2014b) have reported that population growth in 
Mentawai is high, about 2.3 per cent in 2013. There are several reasons for this growth: the 
headhunting ban, an inter-clan conflict ban, migrations and births (Tulius, 2012a). 
Additionally, BPS Mentawai (2012) reported that the population growth in Mentawai is 
different in the towns and in the remote areas. In the towns the population growth is mainly 
caused by migration from external and internal Mentawai, while in the remote areas, it is 
caused by births.  
With a population growth of 1.39 per annum, the population in 2014 numbered 81,840 
people of which the dependent age groups (1-14 years) are dominant (see Figure 3.6). These 
dependent groups are projected to remain the same, unless there is a significant effort to 
reduce the birth rate. This means that there are many basic needs such as food and 
education to be filled (Siahaan, 2004). In fact, 78.32 per cent of the workforce in Mentawai 
have mixed jobs (gardening, fishing, gathering crops from the jungles) (BPS Mentawai, 
2012), but many earn insufficient money for their daily needs (Bakker, 2007; Reeves, 1999). 
These unmet needs can be a dynamic pressure in increasing the vulnerability of the people 




Figure 3. 6 
The expansive pyramid of population growth in Mentawai, 2014 
Source: BPS Mentawai (2014b) 
 
3.4.2. Lack of local government capacity 
In order to increase the welfare of the local community, local governments have powers and 
responsiblities in providing policies, regulations, development and services. Local 
governments also have to promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural well-
being of communities. However, in many cases local governments fail or partly fail to 
perform their responsibilities to their local community. Even worse, governments often 
participate in making the community poorer. The poor performances increase poverty 
among the local community, thereby increasing their vulnerability to disasters. 
In 1999, the Mentawai Islands became a new district after the enactment of Law No. 49 of 
1999 on the Establishment of the Mentawai Islands District. This district was officially 
separated from its mother district, the Padang Pariaman District on Sumatra Island. Since 
then, the Mentawai District has managed the local community of Mentawai and is required 
to perform services in transparent, accountable, effective and democratic ways. However, 
several aspects indicate that the district government of Mentawai performs its tasks in a 
way that is inadequate for the welfare of the local community.  
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Firstly, in 2011 Kementerian Dalam Negeri (2011) evaluated certain performances for 
districts and municipalities in Indonesia and found that Mentawai was one of the ten worst 
in providing public services such as education and health. In Mentawai, providing easy 
access to education and health services could create further problems. The Government of 
Indonesia obliges all children to participate in compulsory education based on the 2003 Act 
20 of the National Education System and on the Government’s Regulation 47 of 2008 on 
Compulsory Education. In these legal documents, it is well formulated that each child in 
Indonesia should finish at least intermediate school as a minimum formal education 
requirement. The local community of Mentawai understands the essential meaning and 
purpose of formal education and there are 108 elementary schools and 19 intermediate 
schools in Mentawai (BPS Mentawai, 2012). However, about 90 per cent of the schools are 
located next to the coasts and in order for the children of Mentawai to get access to school, 
it is necessary for the adults to move and stay near the schools on the coasts.  
The BPS Mentawai (2014a) have also reported that there are ten community health centres 
(Puskesmas) in Mentawai and all of them are located near the coasts. In addition to 
Puskesmas, the government also developed 14 community health sub-centres (Puskesmas 
Pembantu) in several dusun. Although the Puskesmas Pembantu are also found inland, 
Supporting Indigenous Futures (2012) reported that it is common to find these without 
medical staff. Moreover, often the Puskesmas Pembantu do not co-operate in providing 
medical services. However, because of the absence of the sikerei owing to the Arat 
Sabulungan ban and the rarity of particular trees for traditional treatments and rituals 
found inland owing to deforestation, the Puskesmas have forced the local community of 
Mentawai to move and live close to them. These are dynamic pressures stemming from the 
provision of local services to encourage people to live on the coasts, thus exposing them to 
vulnerable locations. 
Secondly, private investments provide multiplier effects and positive impacts on the 
investor(s), the local people and the local government. Investments can be defined as every 
asset that is owned or controlled by the owner(s) and is committed to gaining or expecting 
to gain some positive rate of return. Therefore, it is important for a private investor to make 
rational investment decisions before investing. In order to attract investors to a particular 
area, the local government must ensure the environment is conducive to carrying out 
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business. Pambudhi et al. (2008) reported that there are a few potential sectors for private 
investment in Mentawai, namely: marine tourism, hotel development and the fishery 
industry. However, these are difficult to exploit because the local government has little 
capacity to create a conducive environment. The local government fails to provide sufficient 
gasoline and electricity and to build infrastructure such as roads and bridges (BPS Mentawai, 
2014a). 
In fact, during the field research, one of the interviewed researchers mentioned that there 
has been an increase in hotel investment in Mentawai for marine tourism. However, she 
said: 
“…[indeed there are] significant hotel developments [in Mentawai]. This 
indicates an economic increase [in Indonesia]. But, the workers [in this 
sector] are all from Sumatra [not from Mentawai]” (Researcher, No.05). 
It may be assumed that a number of private investors have invested their assets in marine 
tourism and hotels. In addition, the investors also recruit workers from Sumatra who 
temporarily live in Mentawai. However, there has been no chance for the local people to be 
recruited as employees. It can thus also be assumed that no or few multiplier effects of the 
investments reach the local community even though the local government has the authority 
to request the investors to recruit a number of the local people to work for them. As a 
result, in the absence of the local government’s requests for the local people to be 
recruited, this has become another dynamic pressure for people to remain in their current 
circumstances as poor people and living in unsafe locations on the coasts.  
Thirdly, Wisner et al. (2003) urged that local communities should have easy access to 
markets to sell their local products. Otherwise, the local products will be less-valued and/or 
will require extra costs to sell. In Indonesia, the traditional markets are normally organized 
by local governments. Therefore, local governments have the authority to facilitate the local 
community to trade their local products in the traditional markets. In Mentawai there are 
six traditional markets that operate on only one or two days in a week. From my 
observations, however, they are not easily accessed by the local community. The markets 
mostly sell brought-in products rather than local ones. In fact, in two markets in Sikakap and 
Tuapejat that I observed, the people traded brought-in products, rather than the local 
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products such as bananas and taros (Figure 3.7). I also found that the local products were 
sold to incoming middlemen (from Padang) on the ferry. This indicates that the local 
community has less power to bargain over the prices of the products. As normal practice in 
Indonesia, middlemen buy at lower prices than in traditional markets. Therefore, the 
unavailability of government intervention in how the community trades their products is 
another factor keeping them in poverty. 
 
Figure 3. 7 
In 2014 there was one one traditional market in Sipora island namely Tuapejat. Mainly the people from the 
island bought their daily needs from the market once in a week. The people mainly sold their local products 
directly to the harbour nearby. Similarly, in both South and North Pagai, in 2014 we found only one market in 
Sikakap. The people bought their daily need once a week. They also brought their local product to the Sikakap 




In conclusion, the district government of Mentawai seems to lack the capacity to provide for 
the welfare of the local community which remains in a poor condition. As a result, the 
people may struggle to meet their basic needs. In order to meet their children’s education 
and their health needs, they live close to schools and puskesmas that are situated on the 
coasts. Despite the availability of a number of private investments in Mentawai, the local 
community receives no or few multiplier effects from the investments. The government has 
failed to make or has never requested the investors to recruit members of the local 
community. Lastly, it seems that the district government of Mentawai has never intervened 
in the trading of the local products. The government has the authority to ban the 
middlemen from operating in Mentawai and can encourage the local people to trade their 
products in the traditional markets at competitive prices. As a result, the lack of local 
government capacity to provide for the welfare for the people produces other dynamic 
pressures. These result in the people remaining in their current circumtances and living in 
poverty next to the coasts. Consequently, the poverty will create vulnerability to tsunami 
hazards for the local community of Mentawai. 
3.4.3. Deforestation 
Indonesia is one of the countries that is blessed with abundant natural resources. Indonesia 
is the country with largest extent of tropical jungle after Brazil (Barber, 2010). Based on its 
constitution, these forests are to be managed by the Central Government. Mr. Seoharto 
(the second president) ruled the country from 1968 to 2008 and called his regime the “New 
Order Era”. This era was famous for its policy developments to exploit natural resources and 
under his centralised system, no-holds-barred exploitation reduced the forests considerably. 
The main reason for exploiting the forests was to boost the country’s economy and, in order 
to run forest deforestation smoothly, the regime worked together with the Indonesian 
armed forces (Chidley & Marr, 2002). The Government intentionally cut millions of hectares 
of the forest every year, and destroyed much of it. Barber as cited by Chidley and Marr 
(2002) described it as follows: 
"From nearly nothing in 1966, the timber and forest products 
industry has with the state's active support grown into a highly 
concentrated, wealthy and well-connected political and economic 
actor dependent on cheap raw materials, used to high levels of profit 
and accustomed to passing on the environmental costs of 
unsustainable logging practices to local communities, the state and 
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society at large. The industry is now a significant factor in forest 
policy-making and thus lessens the autonomy of the state to move in 
directions that might be more sustainable but would hurt the 
industry" (Chidley & Marr, 2002, p. 8) 
 
Following the natural resource exploitation policy, the forest concessions in both Pagai 
Islands started in 1970, followed a couple of years later in Sipora Island (Hernawati, 2007). 
Now, we only find limited and permanent production forests in Pagai and Sipora. The forest 
concessions in Siberut started in 1982 through the Ministerial Circular Letter, Surat Edaran 
Kementerian Pertanian No.623/Kpts/Um/8/1982. According to Darmanto and Setyowati 
(2002) Siberut Island was divided into several forest functions as follows: 
 
Table 3. 1 
Distribution of the functions of forests in Mentawai, 2002 
No Functions of forests Wide (ha) Per cent 
1 Conservation forest 132,900 32.95 
2 Protected forest 3,500 0.87 
3 Limited production forest 59,550 14.77 
4 Permanent production forest 119,900 29.73 
5 Convertible production forest 87,450 21.68 
 
Total 403,300 100 
Source: Darmanto and Setyowati (2002) 
 
Table 3.1 shows that about 44 per cent of the forest in Siberut was designated for 
conservation and protection and approximately 15 per cent is limited production forests. In 
the limited production forests, the local community of Mentawai is given a right to plant 
their crops among the trees. About 30 per cent belongs to the timber companies and about 
21 per cent is convertible production forest. This kind of forest can be changed into 
permanent production forest.  
Since the New Era Order started, the forest concessions in Mentawai have been extensively 
exploited. Consequently, many Mentawai people who lived in the forests have started 
moving to the coasts. No documents are available to indicate whether the indigenous 
people worked for the forestry industries. However, as they respected tai kai leleu, one of 
their gods that was believed to protect the trees (Rudito, 2013), it is considered that they 
would never work for the industries. They then started to have mixed jobs as mentioned 
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above. This deforestation became a dynamic pressure to channel the community towards 
unsafe locations vulnerable to tsunami hazards.  
3.5. Unsafe locations 
The above dynamic pressures work on the underlying root causes to push the people to live 
or keep living in unsafe locations. Wisner et al. (2004) argue that unsafe locations are 
distinctive circumstances in which vulnerability is stated in time and space in relation to a 
hazard. In Mentawai, there are several key elements that create these situations as 
explained below. 
3.5.1. The Mentawai Segment 
The Mentawai Islands are above the Mentawai Segment (Prawirodirdjo, McCaffrey, 
Chadwell, Bock, & Subarya, 2010) which is about 700 km long, between Batu Islands in the 
north west and Enggano Island in the south east. The Mentawai Islands are situated next to 
the Sunda Megathrust (Figure 3.8). Prawirodirdjo et al. (2010) described the Sunda 
Megathrust (Sunda Trench) as located in the Indian Ocean and forming the converging 
borderline between the Indian-Australian Plate and the Eurasian Plate. It is about 305 km 
from the coast of Sumatra and 2,600 km long. The Indian-Australian Plate moves towards to 
the Eurasian Plate about 5-6 cm/year (Ambikapathy et al., 2010; Briggs et al., 2006; 
Natawidjaja, 2007). This area, about 40 km from the plates’ joint-point at the seafloor into 
the subduction zone, is generally elastic. However, beyond this area the convergence of the 
plates is weakened. Therefore, the motion becomes slow and creates a shrunk locked area 
(Natawidjaja, 2007; Weller et al., 2012). As a result, the continuing thrusts from the Indian-






Figure 3. 8 
An illustrative diagram shows the sources of earthquakes in the small islands (including the Mentawai Islands), 
west of Sumatra. The Megathrust area is about  ̴ 50km depth and traps potential energy to create earthquakes. 
The plates are melted and become magma in about 150-200 km deep in the crust of the Earth. Magma will rise 
up and become volcanos. Source: adapted from Natawidjaja (2007). 
In addition, paleo-seismic and paleo-tsunami studies in Mentawai produce interesting facts 
about the Segment. According to Philibosian et al. (2014) the Segment has a centurial cycle 
and a shorter-term supercycle (a series of ruptures). The Segment is also bounded by 
persistent barriers to major ruptures that could potentially produce a series of ruptures 
rather than one massive rupture (Sieh et al., 2008). Evidence has also been gathered 
through the coral micro-atoll records. These records are a good tool to know the change in 
the sea level after a vertical tectonic deformation has occurred. Philibosian, Sieh, 
Natawidjaja, Chiang, et al. (2012) reported that a large rupture between the Sunda 
Megathrust and the Mentawai Islands occurred in 1314. Their conclusions are drawn from 
the elevation and deaths of coral records that indicate a number of earthquakes had 
occurred in the past. 
Furthermore, Ambikapathy et al. (2010); Borrero, Sieh, Chlieh, and Synolakis (2006); Briggs 
et al. (2006); and Natawidjaja (2007) mention that large events occur approximately every 
200-240 years on the Segment. The repetitions of the uplifted coral on the Mentawai 
Segment show the seabed transfigurations that were produced in the 1797 and 1833 
tsunamis. These tsunamis were triggered by a number of great earthquakes (Mw 8.3-8.7) in 
1797 and (Mw 8.9) in 1833. The 1833 tremor started in southern Sumatra and cracked the 
Enggano Island in the south to Sipora Island (Collings et al., 2012). Both tsunamis hit the 
western coasts of Sumatra and were recorded in a number of memoirs of the Dutch 
residents (Natawidjaja, 2007). 
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Recently, earthquakes have taken place around the Mentawai Segment resulting in several 
ruptures within it. On 12 September 2007 and 13 September 2007, the Segment released its 
energy and created the earthquakes called the September 2007 Bengkulu Earthquake of 
respectively Mw 8.4 and Mw7.8 (Collings et al., 2012; Natawidjaja, 2007). The earthquakes 
in 1833(Mw > 8) and 1797 (Mw 8.5 – 9.2) occurred in the Mentawai Segment (Figure 3.9).  
 
Figure 3. 9 
Several major earthquakes that occurred in past and present time 
Source: Collings et al. (2012) and Natawidjaja (2007) 
 
According to Natawidjaja (2007) the affected area has about a slope 120 degrees to the east 
that created the motion to the west. This slope upheld the tsunami waves that were only 
less than 3 m in Bengkulu (Sumatra) and less than 1 m in Padang (Sumatra). Twelve hours 
after the above earthquake (13 September 2007), another earthquake occurred in the 
compound of the Mentawai Segment of Mw 7.8 (Natawidjaja, 2007). Experts agree that this 
earthquake was not an aftershock of the Bengkulu Earthquake because it was too big to be 
an aftershock. Normally, an aftershock earthquake is less than Mw 7.4. Natawidjaja (2007) 
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and Philibosian et al. (2014) believe that the energy released was less than one third of the 
total energy that had accumulated since 1797 and 1833. 
The last big earthquake was on 25 October 2010 with the above kind of rupture taking place 
at 9:42 pm (local time) in the Mentawai Segment. The earthquake was known as the 2010 
Mentawai Earthquake with a magnitude of Mw 7.8. The source duration of the earthquake 
was about 102 seconds and it occurred in a shallow megathrust area. According to L. Zhang, 
Liao, Jinggang, and Wang (2015), big quakes that are able to split the shallow area close to 
the Sunda Megathrust are relatively rare. However, when a large rupture occurs, it could be 
exceptionally tsunamigenic. This tsunamigenic type of earthquake is categorized by low 
rupture velocity which can trigger tsunami waves because it is responsible for converting 
oddly weak short-period seismic wave energy to long-period signal levels. This type of 
earthquake could produce waves bigger than those of other earthquakes with the same 
magnitude (L. Zhang et al., 2015).  
According to Collings et al. (2012), the 2007 and 2010 events only released a portion of the 
seismic energy accumulated since 1797 and 1833, and the ruptures are only found at the 
southern part of the Mentawai Segment. This means that the amount of the energy still 
trapped is larger than that released. Therefore, scholars predict that in the near future a 
series of earthquakes will occur in the Mentawai Segment that could generate a series of 
tsunami hazards. BNPB (2013) also predicts that the potential earthquake(s) could be of 
Mw  ̴9.3 and the tsunami waves will affect more than 1,000 people in Mentawai alone.  
3.5.2. Backthrusts in the Mentawai Fault Zone (MFZ) 
Mukti et al. (2012) found that the MFZ is situated along the borderline between the 
accretionary wedge and the mainland barrier. An accretionary wedge is the mass of 
sediments accreted at the edge of convergent boundary. This barrier shows curved ridges 
on the seabed towards the east. Underneath the ridges, there are overlapping high-angle 
backthrusts toward the Mentawai Islands in the innermost portion of the accretionary 
wedge. The backthrusts deform the Mentawai forearc basin sediments (Mukti et al., 2012) 
and are also called “secondary faults” because they are like braces on the main fault.  
The strength of the continental backstop (from Sumatra) has a significant influence on the 
deformation pattern at the rear of the wedge if any energy stresses the backthrusts (Figure 
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3.10). Wiseman, Banerjee, Sieh, Bürgmann, and Natawidjaja (2011) found that the 
backthrusts are active and have a number of steeply-dipping seismic occurrences. These 
occurrences are positioned on the MFZ. On 10 April 2005, a large earthquake (Mw 6.7) 
occurred on the MFZ in the eastern strait between Siberut and Sipora (red dots). This was 
followed by two other earthquakes seven hours later with magnitudes of 6.5 and 6.1. These 
earthquakes triggered a tsunami of one metre high in the south east of Siberut. 
Furthermore, Wiseman et al. (2011) also found that a Mw 6.7 earthquake on 16 August 
2009 occurred next to the locations of the 2005 earthquakes. This earthquake was also 
followed by a series of earthquakes over several days with magnitudes from 5-6 (blue dots).  
 
Figure 3. 10 
This illustrative figure shows backthrusts created earthquakes  
in the Mentawai Basin in 2005 and 2009 
Source: S. C. Singh et al. (2010); Wiseman et al. (2011). 
 
In addition, S. C. Singh et al. (2010) found that there are three kinds of backthrust traces on 
the MFZ, namely coastal backthrust (CBT), main backthrust (MBT), and frontal backthrust 
(FBT). The FBT interfaces the continental plate and is fitted to the relocated earthquakes at 
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a depth shallower than 30 km. As a result, earthquakes could cause the features of the 
accretionary wedges to erode. Wiseman et al. (2011) found that the 2007 Bengkulu 
earthquakes ruptured a number of one-metre slip features on the wedges in the areas of 
the earthquake centres. Therefore, Natawidjaja et al. (2006) predict any interventions from 
the backthrusts to the wedges could create undersea landslides. These landslides can create 
strong local tsunamis in the future. Furthermore, Natawidjaja et al. (2006) also found that 
no broken sections on the MFZ have been found for at least 200 years. This means that 
submarine landslides could potentially occur at any time. These landslides could also be 
triggered by the direct intervention of earthquake activities from the Sunda Megathrust 
(Mukti et al., 2012). If mass wasting occurs near the brinks of the MFZ, submarine landslides 
occur that may trigger tsunami in the Mentawai Islands.  
The above discussion shows that the Mentwai Islands are prone to being hit by tsunamis 
since their location is situated on the Mentawai Segment and next to the Mentawai Fault 
Zone. However, there are several natural barriers that could lessen tsunami impacts such as 
coral reefs, mangroves, and coastal dunes.  
3.5.3. Mangroves as natural barriers 
Accumulating scientific evidence shows that mangroves are important to human 
communities and can protect vulnerable coastlines and populations from destructive waves. 
Giesen, Wulffraat, Zieren, and Scholten (2007) define mangroves as a group of woody 
vegetation grown in marine and brackish environments. The growth of this vegetation is 
mainly influenced by the tidal zone which allows the vegetation to have numerous tangled 
roots that appear to be standing upright above the water. Growing evidence shows that 
mangroves become a crucial pathway to tsunami resilience in coastal areas (Adger, Hughes, 
Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstro, 2005). Mangroves are also important in limiting the exposure 
level of tsunamis on people. Coasts with dense mangroves are better protected from 
tsunamis. According to Harada and Imamura, as cited in Forbes and Broadhead (2007) a 
coastline vegetation 200 metres in width can decrease 80 per cent of the hydraulic force 
from a tsunami. Furthermore, Utomo, as cited in Diposaptono and Budiman (2008), argues 
that a mangrove forest with a 3000 trees/ha and 5-m in height can reduce 52 per cent of a 
tsunami’s height, 38 per cent its energy and about 14 – 22 per cent of its run-up. 
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According to Ghufran (2012), there are five factors necessary for optimum growth of 
mangrove vegetation: less frequent and less intense sea waves, high salinity of water, 
particular kinds of substrata, muddy river flows in estuaries, and lots of sunshine. Pemda 
Mentawai (2010) reports that there are 25 species of mangroves in the coastal areas of the 
Mentawai Islands. Rhizophora nucronata is the main species found in Sipora and other 
smaller islands where the coasts have deep mud and another species and Rhizophora 
apiculate is mostly found in Siberut where there are more rivers.  
Furthermore, the Pemda Mentawai also reports that the average density of mangroves is 
about 473 trees per ha with an average height of 13.15 m and an average diameter of 14.80 
cm. It is also said that the average density of seedlings is 2905 per ha. The seedlings cannot 
grow very well because there is no thick mud on the coasts. Moreover, the average 
diameter of the trees is about 40 cm and the average height is about 25 m (Pemda 
Mentawai, 2010). As a comparison, these averages are very much lower than those in the 
Sembilan National Park in South Sumatra which has one quarter of Indonesia’s remaining 
mangroves (Adger et al., 2005) with up to 2.490 trees per ha and 2.328 seedlings per ha 
(Nurlia, Siahaan, & Lukman, 2013). 
According to Anwar and Gunawan (2006), the soil type beneath the water bays in Mentawai 
is saline young soil. This type has less clay, is more alkaline, and has less organic content. On 
the other hand, the rivers in Mentawai are relatively short, so the flows bring less mud and 
natural fertilizers. These natural factors have less influence on the thickness and growth of 





Figure 3. 11 
The coast on the Dusun Betumonga (Sipora) has no mangroves on the shoreline.  
In fact, the dusun people live about 100 metres from the shoreline 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
Figure 3. 12 
The coast on the ex Dusun Lakkau (South Pagai) has few mangroves, 
because its clay is mainly covered by dead corals.  
This settlement was abandoned by the community after the devastating 2010 tsunami. 






Figure 3. 13 
Mangroves are also found on the coast of the Dusun Limu (South Pagai).  
The settlement is about 150 metres from the coast 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
Pemda Mentawai (2010) claims that generally 70 per cent of the mangroves are still in a 
good condition. However, Yayasan Minang Bahari (2009) reported that several human 
activities have devastated the mangroves in Mentawai. Firstly, members of the local 
community exploit the mangroves for their daily needs by cutting and drying them for their 
cooking fires. Secondly, it is also found that the level of coastal erosion in certain areas is 
very high due to human activities such as logging. After cutting the trees from the forests, 
the forest concession companies often push the logged trees to the closest sea waters 
before they are shipped. These activities damage the mangroves and no tree seedlings 
grow. Thirdly, the over exploitation of the corals causes the sediment loads to lessen which 
can create vegetation removal. Many of the community members of Mentawai use the dead 
corals as the foundations and walls of their houses, instead of using river sand and stones 
(Yayasan Minang Bahari, 2009). In fact, no river sand and stones are found naturally in 
Mentawai.  
In conclusion, the shrinkage in the density and number of the mangroves in Mentawai is 
influenced by several factors such as human activities and natural conditions. The local 
community and the private companies are responsible for reducing and destroying the 
mangroves in significant ways. While the soil type beneath the bay waters is saline young 
soil, the estuaries in Mentawai are relatively poor in mud and natural fertilizers that 
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influence the growth of the trees. This shrinkage creates less power to withstand energy 
and run-up tsunami waves, because the buffer zones between the ocean and the land are 
wider. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Based on the Progression of Vulnerability Model above, we found there are a number of 
factors which make the local community of Mentawai vulnerable to tsunami hazards. The 
root causes of the vulnerability originated in the contacts by Western people with the 
indigenous Mentawai early in the 19th century. After Indonesian independence, the root 
causes became more prominent when the Government of Indonesia banned the traditional 
belief practices. In line with the ban, the Government started a new program (PKMT) that 
resettled the indigenous people and introduced new ways of living which caused a number 
of dynamic pressures, channeling the vulnerability of the local community. These pressures 
exist as the results of the population growth, poverty, the lack of capacity of the local 
government, and deforestation and have created fragile livelihoods and unsafe conditions 
for the local community of Mentawai.  
The local community tends to live in the coastal zones where they can carry out fishing. In 
fact, the Mentawai Islands are situated in the Mentawai Segment where the Indian-
Australian Plate subducts into the Eurasian Plate. This subduction zone often creates 
earthquakes that could trigger tsunamis. The islands are also next to the Mentawai Fault 
Zone that could deform and create tsunamis. Besides, the mangroves are found only in 
certain particular places to protect all the coasts from tsunami waves. Moreover, the 
human, social, and political resources in Mentawai are limited to support the welfare of the 
local community. Therefore, the local community of Mentawai has become vulnerable to 
tsunami hazards. 
In order to understand how this vulnerability will be juxtaposed with the local community of 
Mentawai, it is important to design a research study. Therefore, the next chapter will 
discuss which research methodology will be suitable to explore the research questions as 
mentioned on Chapter 1. It will also explain how the methods will be employed to collect 





Methodology and Methods 
 
“Qualitative studies are tools used in understanding and describing the 
world of human experience” (Myers, 2000, p. 1). 
4.0. Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis explores the tsunami hazards knowledge and current 
tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. The context of the tsunami preparedness has been 
described in Chapter 2, while the reasons that Mentawai is vulnerable to tsunami hazards 
have also discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter now outlines the research methodology and 
methods that have been utilized to collect and analyze the data for the thesis. There are 
eight sections in this chapter. 
Section 4.1. Indicates the rationale of why a qualitative and case study is suitable for the 
research. 
Section 4.2. Explores a number of methods and procedures that are designed to gather 
the data and how the designs are employed in the field work. 
Section 4.3.  Explains my position in collecting and analyzing the data, and in writing the 
thesis. 
Section 4.4. Describes how the data collection process in the field works. 
Section 4.5. Explains how the data triangulations, through interviews and observations, 
are gathered. 
Section 4.6. Shows the data analysis processes that are conducted from the transcribed 
verbatim interviews through to presentations of the findings. 
Section 4.7. Demonstrates the implementations of the ethical considerations of the 
research. 
Section 4.8. Summarizes the chapter through a concluding remark. 
4.1. Research design and its specific context 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the aim of this study is to provide new insights from 
the explorations of tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness measures in Mentawai. 
For this purpose, it is important to link the explorations by analyzing the social, cultural, 
economic, political, and environmental objects or practices within the community. This has 
allowed me to explore these features in a natural setting without any manipulation of the 
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people’s behaviours. In order to achieve this, I designed this study as a qualitative research. 
Qualitative research is commonly considered interpretative research that uses many kinds 
of methodological approaches to explore and explain social relations and reality. According 
to Winchester and Rofe (2016), it is also associated with revealing human environments and 
human experiences with many conceptual frameworks. More specifically, Pawson and 
DeLyser (2016) argue that only qualitative research can capture the human realities of 
anxiety, frustration, and loss of security that lie behind statistical figures. Lastly, Adams, 
Khan, Raeside, and White (2014, p. 26) state that it “employs methods of data collection 
and analyses that are non-quantitative, aims towards the exploration of social relations, and 
describes reality as experienced by the respondents”.  
Qualitative research takes various approaches in exploring social phenomena. One of these 
is a case study method. Stake (2008) argues that a case study identifies and explores a 
specific case as “a ‘functioning specific’ or a ‘bounded system’” (p. 199). Moreover, 
Schramm (1971) argues that a case study has the essence to try to highlight for a decision or 
even a set of decisions, why the decisions are taken, how the decisions are implemented 
and what results are expected. Also, J. Baxter (2016) states that it explores in-depth 
nuances, contextual influences, and explanations of a phenomenon. Based on the above 
definitions, I conducted a qualitative research program for the following reasons.  
Firstly, I focused on investigating one particular community: the local community of 
Mentawai. This community consists of the indigenous people of Mentawai and out-coming 
people who have lived in Mentawai from Sumatra and other parts of Indonesia. This mixed 
community is unique since the indigenous people have experienced significant changes over 
the decades, while the out-coming people have reinforced changes amongst the indigenous 
people by bringing formal education, health services, and modernized influences. As 
discussed also in the previous chapter, the indigenous people of Mentawai lived in the 
jungles as fruit gardeners and hunters, but external influences forced them to move to the 
coastal areas and become fishermen and gardeners (Erwin, 2007; Hernawati, 2007; 
Schefold, 1988; Sihombing, 1979). However, because of their origins, the indigenous people 
had limited access to tsunami hazard knowledge, even though the islands are prone to 
tsunamis (Ambikapathy et al., 2010; Borrero et al., 2006; Natawidjaja, 2007; Prawirodirdjo 
et al., 2010). Similarly, the out-coming people were also vulnerable to tsunamis. They mostly 
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gathered and built some small towns in the coastal areas because here they could easily 
access economic resources such as buying the fish and crops from the indigenous people, 
while the indigenous tend to live in the dusun. Because of the poor infrastructure and 
accessibilities to information such as tsunami knowledge, the out-coming people also had 
little knowledge about tsunami hazards. This is in line with what Liamputtong (2013) 
mentions that a case is a unique aspect of whatever object or event is under scrutiny. 
Moreover, the object of qualitative research can be an individual, a group of people, an 
institution, or a community. As Yin (2014) expands and contributes to Schramm’s definition, 
a case study is about “cases of ‘decisions’ as the major focus of a case study includes 
‘individuals,’ ‘organizations,’ ‘processes,’ ‘programs,’ ‘neighbourhoods,’ ‘institutions,’ and 
even ‘events’” (p.15)., Therefore, a qualitative case study was a suitable method to 
scrutinize the unique community of Mentawai.  
Secondly, I aimed to make the findings generalizable and replicable across the whole 
community of Mentawai. However, this required me to analyze the study findings in a 
comprehensive way. Generalizability and replicability are essential components of a case 
study in order to understand the phenomena. These findings can potentially contribute 
valuable knowledge to the community and build new insights about the whole community. 
Yin (2014) and J. Baxter (2016) agree that the findings of a case study are generalizable and 
replicable across populations. This process is based on assumptions that representative 
samples (participants) are not too dissimilar from the whole population (Myers, 2000). 
Therefore, in order to make generalizability and replicability of the findings across the 
community of Mentawai, I also accommodated the secondary statistical data from the 
district level.  
Thirdly, I expected to provide some previously unconsidered and surprising facts from the 
very limited knowledge that currently exists about hazards knowledge and preparedness in 
Mentawai. It also enabled me to provide a number of new insights on how a local 
community forms their own prevention and preparedness measures for potential tsunamis, 
what were the problems they faced and what potential solutions could be developed. From 
my observations, only one Masters Student has conducted social research related to 
tsunami knowledge in a particular village: Saibi Samukop village, in Siberut Island. This 
research aimed to develop a better understanding of how past and contemporary 
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construction of knowledge of earthquake and tsunami risks was achieved (Rafliana, 2015). 
Comparatively, my study covered three different islands of Mentawai, in which the 
participants originated from 19 dusun in nine villages from South and North Pagai and 
Sipora Islands. As Gerring (2007) states that a case study may show a “lightbulb moment” , it 
is believed that this study may provide some unexpected facts from the local community of 
Mentawai regarding knowledge of tsunami hazards and tsunami prevention and 
preparedness measures. The findings may provide clear “lights” of phenomena within the 
community. 
Lastly, I provide potential public policies related to the issues at the community and district 
levels on tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. Through my “how” research questions, I 
anticipated an in-depth description of contemporary real-life situations regarding the topics. 
Yin (2014) mentions that a case study is a suitable approach to explore the implementation 
of a “program”. A public education program on tsunamis had been implemented in the local 
community of Mentawai previously. Through this current study, we can see how far that 
program has been implemented. The findings will provide a number of inputs to develop 
future public policies. As an employee in BNPB, I will have a good understanding and 
knowledge of what happens at the community level. Schramm (1971) argues that a case 
study can be a good method to provide constructive inputs for policy and decision makers, 
rather than to scientists. Therefore, in the future I could propose a reform or review of the 
existing tsunami preparedness measures at the community and district levels in Mentawai.  
4.2. Method and procedure designs 
After discussing the suitability of a qualitative case study for this research, this section will 
outline appropriate methods and procedures. A case study depends on numerous sources 
of facts and data collection methods and procedures (Iacono, Brown, & Holtham, 2009). 
According to Thomas and Bryan (2011), there are three main methods used to collect the 
data in a case study. Firstly, it is common to collect words as the main data by interviewing 
individual(s) or group(s) of people. Secondly, it is important to use words, images, and/or 
numbers from questionnaires, observations, and image-based methods. Lastly, numbers can 
be used to collect data by measuring and testing objects, reviewing official statistics and 
other numerical data (Thomas & Bryan, 2011). The data collection methods were conducted 
using the first two methods, i.e. interviews and observations. Nevertheless, in order to have 
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a clear understanding of the context, I also used a number of data triangulations to 
corroborate the evidence from the interviews and observations as well as the data from 
secondary sources. 
It is appropriate to collect data for qualitative research from participant(s) in natural 
settings, i.e. in their “real life” environments in order to have more accuracy in reflecting 
"real life" behaviors, rather than “contrived or manipulated” behaviours (Liamputtong, 
2013). Therefore, participant interviews always take place in community settings, in 
locations that researchers identify as having relevance to their research questions. In order 
to gather the data, it is important to select the research participants by undertaking a 
number of participant recruitment processes.  
4.2.1. Selection criteria 
In order to explore the social phenomena of this case study, I determined certain 
characteristics of the participants. I formulated the participants’ characteristics, according to 
my need to achieve the aims of the study. Generally, the characteristics were adult males or 
females over 18 years old who lived in the Mentawai District. The potential candidates could 
be the indigenous people or the out-coming people who have lived in Mentawai before the 
2010 tsunami. The key characteristics of the participants were as follows:  
 having experience of the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami, or/and 
 living on the coast of the Mentawai islands during the research.  
 
In qualitative research, the determination of research participants can be conducted 
according to the needs of the researcher(s). This method is called purposive sampling. 
Because I have determined the aim of this study as mentioned in Chapter One, I used 
purposive sampling to identify the above characteristics of the candidate participants. 
According to Creswell (2013), Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim (2016), and Longhurst (2010), 
purposive sampling is a non-random tool to carefully select available participants in order to 
provide insightful information or experience. Researchers can select their participants based 
on their needs and set out to find the participants who can and are willing to provide the 
information (Creswell, 2013; Etikan et al., 2016; Longhurst, 2010). Therefore, purposive 
sampling is important in ensuring that researchers are able to use effectively limited 
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resources as well as to determine information-rich participants to reach the aims of the 
study. 
I considered that the above characteristics would be able to provide me with the rich data I 
required for the depth of analysis needed and for the development of my thesis as a whole. 
Although the number of research participants was limited, I designed the research to allow 
for generalizability and replicability of the findings across the community of Mentawai. 
Bryman (2008) argues that purposive sampling allows picking homogeneous cases to 
decrease disparity. Therefore, I could recruit a homogeneous group of participants in order 
to be able to generalize the findings to the wider community of Mentawai through this 
purposive sampling. 
Additionally, purposive sampling also allowed me to obtain assistance from people known 
as gatekeepers in order to reach the candidate participants. According to Creswell (2013), 
purposive sampling enables the researchers to access gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are the 
persons who can provide the candidate participants to researchers. Furthermore, 
gatekeepers can create participants’ confidence to contribute to research. Therefore, the 
purposive sampling allowed me to have assistance from the gatekeepers to access to the 
research participants and to build the participants’ confidence to partake in this research.  
For this purpose, I built up layers of contact persons, because I originally knew little about 
Mentawai. The layers were obtained by asking the research participants to show a potential 
dusun to which to go. This method is known as the snowball method. According to Parfitt 
(2005), a snowball method will build-up layers of contacts for interviews by asking a 
participant to show another potential participant. Furthermore, Atkinson and Flint (2001) 
argue that snowball sampling is often used as a response to overcome the problems 
associated with sampling concealed populations. In many cases, these populations can be 
the victims of discrimination, or isolated people who are difficult for researchers to access. 
But for the sake of this research, these populations were the 2010 Mentawai tsunami 
victims who might have moved to the middle of forests. In addition to this method, research 
participants are involved in the research process by referring other people who have the 
same characteristics of the research interest (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Mack, Woodsong, 
MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2011). This will increase the credibility of the research. 
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Therefore, in order to increase the credibility of my research, I have used the snowball 
methods to build-up the layers of the contact persons in order to attain the particular data 
required from particular groups; in this case, the victims of the 2010 tsunami are considered 
as the concealed population. 
 
Figure 4. 1 
A summary of the methodology that are employed in this study 
 
Figure 4.1 indicates the summary of the methods for this study. Firstly, I chose a qualitative 
research method in order to explore the social relations about the tsunami preparedness in 
Mentawai. I designed a case study to deeply explore the social phenomena from its context 
within the local community of Mentawai. In order to find the data, I selected a purposive 
sampling to achieve the intended aim of the study. Through the purposive sampling, I also 
intended to obtain the data from the victims of the 2010 tsunami in Mentawai by building 
up the layers of the people contacts. This method is known as snowball method. 
As a snowball method has been employed to this study, gender and age of the participants 
were less significant by comparison. This method allowed a head of dusun as a gatekeeper 
to choose a candidate participant. This would also influence the decision of the gatekeepers 
whether or not to choose new out-coming people into the community. As the result, it was 





4.2.2. Recruitment process 
Once the selection criteria were setup, the above methods were applied in the field. I 
decided to start the research interviews in North Pagai, then South Pagai, and lastly Sipora 
Islands. I visited Sikakap Town in North Pagai first. After my arrival, I contacted a person who 
worked at the Sub-District Authority of Sikakap who provided me with a list of villages and 
dusun to choose potential research sites from (as purposive sampling). From there, I then 
went to several dusun in North Pagai to carry out the investigations. After interviewing in 
North Pagai, I continued with participants in South Pagai. Because accommodation was only 
available in Sikakap, I stayed there. From the islands, I continued on to Sipora. Because no 
direct ferries were available from Pagai to Sipora, I had to go back to Padang, and the next 
morning I went to Sipora. Mostly I hired a motorcycle to reach the target participants. 
I went to Makuket Dusun, Matobe Village (North Pagai Island) about 10 km from Sikakap, to 
recruit the first participant . The selection of this dusun was based on the suggestion of the 
contact person from the Sub-District Authority of Sikakap as, according to him, these people 
had been involved in the community-based program for tsunami preparedness. Firstly, I saw 
the head of Makuket Dusun (as the gatekeeper) to inform him of my purpose. The head of 
the dusun then appointed one of the dusun members who was suitable to participate in the 
research. I believed that one participant from each dusun would be sufficient to gain the 
data. After meeting with the potential participant, all the interview procedures were 
employed as discussed after this section.  
After finishing the interview, I asked the participant to identify the next dusun where I could 
interview, thus enacting the snowball method. The first participant named Berkat Baru 
Dusun in Sikakap as the second dusun that I needed to go to, to recruit another participant. 
In short, this process was applied to the rest of the participants in the South Pagai Island, 
North Pagai, and Sipora Islands.  
It is important to mention that when I saw the heads of dusun often they were at their work 
(in the garden or on the coast), at home, or at kedai kopi (traditional coffee/tea kiosks). So, 
they often designated someone else (who was qualified to be a participant) nearby to be 
interviewed. I generally found no particular difficulties in meeting the participants.  
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In brief, the way I obtained the participants was in accordance with what the cited scholars 
suggested. I wanted the participants to provide the data that I needed through purposive 
sampling by requesting that the heads of dusun as the gatekeepers appoint the participants 
(Creswell, 2013; Etikan et al., 2016; Longhurst, 2010). To find certain victims of the 2010 
tsunami (can be considered as the concealed population), other participants showed me the 
next dusun to go to, demonstrating the snowball method in action (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; 
Mack et al., 2011; Parfitt, 2005). Therefore, I believe that these methods allowed me to 
gather credible research data. 
4.2.3. Semi-structured interviews 
Generally speaking, the main forms of qualitative interviews fall into the following 
categories: unstructured, structured, and semi-structured interviews. I used the semi-
structured interview to collect the field data. The reasons that I chose this were as follows. 
Firstly, a semi-structured interview was suitable for my research as it enabled me to provide 
a list of the issues to be freely explored. As semi-structured interviews require some degree 
of predetermined order (Dunn, 2016), I had prepared several questions prior to the 
interviews. Secondly, since this kind of interview maintains flexibility (Creswell, 2013; Dunn, 
2016), I could also add some questions from the valuable findings from the previous 
interviews and observations. Furthermore, Creswell (2013) argues that this allows 
participants to discuss general topics at the beginning, and then switch to the main topic. 
Moreover, it can allow for further opportunities for the participants to elaborate on any 
new line of inquiries (Waliman, 2005). Lastly, R. Edwards and Holland (2013) explain that it 
enables one to have an interactional dialogue between the researcher and the participant, 
within a fluid and flexible structure.  
4.3. My position 
Because of the involvement of social interactions, it is important to avoid researcher 
subjectivity in qualitative research. Therefore, the objectivity of researchers becomes an 
important issue. According to Dowling (2016), objectivity has two components: the personal 
involvement of the investigator and the participants; and the independence of researchers 
from the object of the research. Similarly, Iacono et al. (2009) argue that subjectivity can 
arise from two sources. One is that subjectivity may be driven by the influence of 
researchers leading participants’ behaviors to what the researchers intend. The other is that 
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subjectivity may arise through the impact of the researcher’s own beliefs (Iacono et al., 
2009). It is, therefore, important to note that researchers are required to have integrity in 
conducting their research.  
In order to maintain my integrity, I conducted several activities. Although objectivity is an 
ultimate prerequisite, and interpretations should avoid subjectivity (Stake, 2008), certain 
efforts can reduce subjectivity. Firstly, I recorded all the interviews and wrote them in 
transcriptions. As part of the data analyses, I read the transcriptions many times until I 
established the real meanings in each of the interviews. Secondly, I conducted a number of 
triangulation activities such as observing several objects and activities. Shenton (2004) 
argues that the role of triangulation can reduce the effect of subjectivity. In following 
chapters, I also discuss the facts from the observations to corroborate the evidence. In 
addition, I enrich the field findings with secondary data and other literature. MacCoun 
(1998) warns that researchers should be wary about jumping too quickly to conclusions to 
avoid subjectivity. Although objectivity is often considered elusive (McNeill & Chapman, 
2005) and hard to capture (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2011), the above activities 
should decrease my subjectivity to the data. 
It is also important to mention that while I was in the field, I often obtained privileged status 
by being from a Batak tribe. Historically, since 1932, many priests of Batak origins have 
become missionaries in Mentawai (Sihombing, 1979), and many Batak people have lived 
and mingled within the local community. This made it easy for me to associate with the 
community members at the first stage. Although some of them hesitated when receiving my 
objectives to interview them, they mostly welcomed me and received my offer to be a 
candidate and participant of the research. In addition, I brought with me a local person who 
could understand the situation in Mentawai. This person was chosen by the officer from the 
Sub-District Office in Sikakap. 
During the research process, I also maintained my role as a critical advocate of tsunami 
prevention and preparedness measures and tools to develop community resilience to 
tsunami-induced disasters. As an ex-middle manager in BNPB, I tended to support every 
preparedness measure at the individual, household, community, and district levels. 
However, I continued to maintain myself in a “critical” position right through the 
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development of the measures. Therefore, I could identify both positive and negative aspects 
from the field by using academic approaches and literature, and hence, avoid biased 
conclusions. In addition, the research process required me to maintain certain interactions 
with the local community members. It is advised by Yin (2011) that researchers refer 
themselves as “insiders”, “locals”, or those who sympathise with the participants’ living 
conditions. Therefore, at some stage, I put myself in the position of one who sympathised 
with the participants’ living conditions; that is, of being threatened by potential tsunami 
hazards. However, I also put myself in a critical role in order to maintain my objectivity as an 
“outsider” so as to ensure the quality of the research findings. 
4.4. Data collection 
Qualitative case study may require in-depth interviews to gather the data. In order to do the 
interviews, it is important to carry out certain processes to have good interviews.  
4.4.1. In-depth interview processes 
A face-to-face individual in-depth interview is suitable to collect primary data for a 
qualitative case study. Dunn (2016) suggests that the face-to-face interview is a procedure 
to collect the data through spoken conversations or expressions of ideas or beliefs from one 
person or a group of people. Below are several reasons why I chose the interviews. First and 
foremost, as mentioned above, I intended to investigate a certain topic, which is the 
tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. This specific topic could be covered typically in the 
interview sessions. As Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) argue, in-depth interviews are issues 
oriented to yield the exploratory data from the perspective of selected research 
participants.  
Secondly, I also intended to explore a particular experience of the 2010 tsunami in 
Mentawai from the perspective of the tsunami victims. The in-depth interviews were useful 
to dig up the experiences and the particular knowledge of how they escaped from the 
tsunami waves. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) and Winchester and Rofe (2016) argue that 
in-depth interviews in qualitative research can reveal people’s thoughts, ideas, memories, 
behaviours, and motivation. The interviews are useful to access exclusive knowledge or 
practices from marginalized or special groups of people. 
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Lastly, the in-depth interviews enabled me to obtain the data from the participants because 
I could interview them in their familiar surroundings such as at home, at the garden, or at 
the kiosk. The interviews also enabled me to tape all the conversations with the 
participants’ permission. Scholars such as Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011), Opdenaker (2006) 
and Waliman (2005) also support my reasons. An in-depth interview yields exploratory data 
under an investigation that is not linked to particular settings (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; 
Waliman, 2005), and can be taped (Opdenaker, 2006). 
It is important for researchers to consider all processes of the interviews from beginning to 
end. As Legard, Keegan, and Ward (2003) suggest, researchers should be aware of the 
interview processes from the arrival, introduction to the research, the beginning, during, 
and ending and after the interview. During the field research, I normally greeted the 
potential participants by saying “Halo, apa kabar?” (Hello, how are you?). I then introduced 
my field assistant and myself. After saying a few words about my purpose and explaining 
that I got his/her name from the head of dusun, I often let my assistant talk more in the 
local dialect or local language to make the potential participants less worried or suspicious. 
This also put them at ease, helped them relax, and built their trust. After they had a clear 
understanding of my purpose, I respectfully requested them to become one of my research 
participants. At this stage, no potential participants showed that they were unhappy or 
forced against their will to participate in the research. I then requested them in polite way 
to step away a little to have some privacy. 
In the next step, I tried to introduce my purpose in more depth. I also made sure to explain 
that they could withdraw and not answer the questions if they felt uncomfortable. I also 
mentioned that all questions would be in Bahasa. However, if they could not speak in 
Bahasa, or inserted the local dialect into their conversations, that would be fine. I told them 
that I would directly ask my research assistant to translate it if I found any difficulties with 
understanding the interviews. I also spoke briefly about my questions on the interview. 
After having a clear idea that they had no objection to participating, I then handed the 
Information Sheet for the research. I encouraged participants to read it first, and waited for 
their response. However, in many cases, I read the Sheet clearly and slowly for them, 
because they did not want to read it. I suspected several reasons why they were reluctant to 
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read. They might be reluctant to read a long three-page document, seldom read, and/or had 
some difficulties in reading and understanding what they read.  
After they understood what they or I read, I then asked them to sign a Consent Form. 
Mostly, they did not want to sign the Form. The main reason was they were suspicious of 
‘something’ such as some kind of hidden agenda behind this form that might have 
repercussions in the future. They genuinely intended to participate in the research, yet felt 
uncomfortable signing a document they possibly didn’t really understand or trust, even 
after providing their participation. The other reason was they were working on the coastal 
areas or in their garden when I asked for the interviews. However, they usually agreed to be 
interviewed by giving oral consent. In this stage, two candidates objected to the interview 
and did not want to give their oral consent. I then asked the head of dusun to appoint 
someone else to participate. The same process was applied and after they gave their 
consent, I also asked their permission to put the audio tape recorder on to record the 
interview. They all agreed to taping the interviews. 
As suggested by Englander (2012), a preliminary meeting is a chance for researchers and 
research participants to build a trusted relationship. This also will allow participants to 
briefly understand research procedures. After obtaining their consent, I still held myself 
back from not asking the core questions of the interview. As a native of Sumatra, I followed 
the best code of conduct when dealing with Indonesians from Sumatra. Indeed, in order to 
interview the participants in an effective and respectful way, and as is a common habit in 
Indonesia, the first thing I did was to familiarize myself as “a guest” with each participant. 
During the “familiarization” activities, I started “chit-chats” about general issues such as 
talking about their family members, about eating habits, etc. Alternatively, when they were 
at their work I asked them about their garden or the fish catch. It took about three to five 
minutes. This also enabled me to have more chance to prompt or encourage the 
participants for any more interesting information. 
After some general talk with the participants, I began the interviews through key themes of 
my research questions. Each key theme question was followed by the next questions from 
my list or by probing the participants’ opinions. I actively explored the ideas, thoughts, and 
perceptions. Many times my assistant also actively translated several local words. At this 
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moment, two interviews were discontinued because I saw their emotional expressions on 
their faces had changed. This was potentially caused by the questions that I raised 
reminding them of the 2010 tsunami so I, therefore, stopped the interviews and nullified all 
information that they had given. I then asked the research participant to name one dusun 
person for me to interview. 
Before ending the interview, I indicated that the interview was about to finish. At this stage, 
I allowed the participants to raise any questions related to myself and my study or any 
issues related to the interview questions. Mostly, they asked me about my study or my 
family, and I always responded to all the questions.  
To end the interview, I handed participants the Debriefing Sheet Form to read, but often I 
read it for them. I then switched the audio tape recorder off. I offered my thanks for their 
participation. I often stayed a little longer to discuss general topics before I left.  
Generally, the main core of the interview took approximately 60 minutes. But, since I 
needed some time before and after the interview, I occasionally needed longer. The 
interview was conducted once with each participant and was not repeated for participant 
checking. According to Dunn (2016), participant checking may be needed for the research 
participants to vet or authorize the interview for some qualitative research. Here, after the 
interviews were transcribed, the transcripts were given back to the participants for further 
comments and/or corrections. However, I did not do this participant checking process. 
There were several reasons for this. Firstly and mainly, the participant checking could cause 
the participants to become embarrassed, perplexed, or to hesitate. They could feel 
confusion about the research I was doing. Similarly, they could feel a sense of hesitancy for 
what they had said. In fact, generally, it is not polite to reflect what someone has said in 
Indonesia.  
Secondly, as I witnessed prior to the interviews, the participants were reluctant to read the 
Consent Form and the Information Sheet. I then assumed that they would be reluctant to 
read the transcript. Indeed, mostly the number of pages of each transcript is more than the 
Information Sheet. Lastly, I had limited time and effort to do participant checking. 
Geographically, the location of each participant was very far away and not easy to access. In 
fact, I completed the transcripts after I came back to UC.  
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4.4.2. Recruited research participants 
The code, sexes, ages and locations of the research participants are shown on Table 4.1. 
Twenty participants took part in the research and they lived in 19 dusun from nine villages in 
Mentawai. Among the participants, there were 11 males. I considered that 20 participants 
would provide me with sufficient data for the study.  
Table 4. 1 
The code, sexes, ages and locations of the research participants,  
 Mentawai District, West Sumatra 
 
As Bradshaw and Stratford (2010) and J. Baxter (2016) argue, in a qualitative case study, it is 
important to highlight the depth of understanding and contextualized understanding of the 
cases. Moreover, J. Baxter (2016) suggests that in order to obtain the contextualized 
understanding of a qualitative case study, it is important to involve multiple sub-units of 
No Name Code Sex
Age (years 
old) Dusun Village Island
1 Community Member No.01 Male 39 Berkat Baru Sikakap North Pagai
2 Community Member No.02 Female 50 Berkat Sikakap North Pagai
3 Community Member No.04 Male 41 Passibuat Taikako North Pagai
4 Community Member No.05 Female 35 Makuket Matobe North Pagai
5 Community Member No.07 Female 40 Sabeugunggung Betumonga North Pagai
6 Community Member No.09 Male 53 Sabiret Malakopa South Pagai
7 Community Member No.11 Male 54 Eruparaboat Malakopa South Pagai
8 Community Member No.12 Male 60 Munte Kecil Malakopa South Pagai
9 Community Member No.13 Female 41 Parourogat Malakopa South Pagai
10 Community Member No.14 Male 39 Belaraksok Malakopa South Pagai
11 Community Member No.15 Female 42 Lakkau Bulasat South Pagai
12 Community Member No.16 Male 28 Tuapeijat Tuapeijat Sipora
13 Community Member No.17 Male 31 Gobik Bosua Sipora
14 Community Member No.18 Male 49 Basua Utara Bosua Sipora
15 Community Member No.19 Female 45
Nemnem Leleu 
Utara Nemnem Leleu Sipora
16 Community Member No.03 Male 39 Seay Baru Sikakap North Pagai
17 Community Member No.06 Female 50 Passibuat Taikako North Pagai
18 Community Member No.08 Male 41 Taikako Taikako North Pagai
19 Community Member No.10 Female 35 Sikakap Tengah Sikakap South Pagai
20 Community Member No.20 Female 40 Sagitsi Utara Nemnem Leleu Sipora
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cases (e.g. newspaper, policies) into the study. This argument suggests that no particular 
number of samples adequately is needed to participate as long as the context of the 
research is fulfilled. Therefore, I believe that the number of the participants in this study 
was sufficient and adequate to emphasize the context of the study, because from them the 
contexts of the research were sufficient to answer the research questions. 
Below is the map where I interviewed the research participants. From a total of 20 
participants, seven participants were from South Pagai, eight from North Pagai, and five 
from Sipora (Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4. 2 
The participants came from several dusun in the islands of Sipora, North and South Pagai. Each number refers to 
the Name Code column from Table 4.1. 
 
To enrich the findings, I will also include statistical data and exclusive reportage of the 2010 
Mentawai Tsunami in the thesis. In addition, to strengthen the credibility of the research 
and to avoid subjectivity, I also conducted a number of interviews with “non-community 
member participants” and a number of observations to corroborate the findings. This 
process is known as data triangulation.  
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4.5. Data triangulation 
I found that the data from the community member participants were voluminous and rich. 
However, it was important to integrate this data with data from other resources. This 
method is called data triangulation. Data triangulation can strengthen a study by using 
several kinds of methods or data (Lichtman, 2006). Often, qualitative researchers use a 
triangulation method to avoid researchers’ subjectivity. The term “triangulation” has 
multiple meanings in the social sciences. It can refer to the use of a combination of methods 
of investigation, data resources, or a process of data verification (Ayoub, Wallace, & Zepeda-
Millan, 2014). The main idea behind triangulation is to enrich the field data by utilizing 
multiple methods, data resources, theories, and/or observations. Therefore, researchers 
can better explain and overcome limits and subjectivity. More importantly, data 
triangulations corroborate facts from various sources to provide enlightenment on a theme 
or perspective (Creswell, 2013). It is also said that data triangulations are processes to 
repeat data collection and to critically assess what is being said by the research participants 
(Stake, 2008). When investigators discover facts that substantiate research themes from 
other sources of data, the triangulated methods can provide findings that are more 
objective. As briefly mentioned above, I also conducted data triangulations to avoid my 
subjectivity on the data through the interviews of the non-community member participants 
and through some observations. 
4.5.1. Triangulation through non-community member participation  
Triangulation can be conducted by interviewing some external research participants i.e. 
stakeholders or experts who can be substantial and reliable for data triangulation. They can 
provide more data to strengthen or even to counter the findings from the research (Ayoub 
et al., 2014). Therefore, I employed this argument in my research. I identified some external 
research participants and interviewed them. These were selected from:  
 local government officers of the Mentawai District  
 local NGOs that had ever and/or still worked for the local community of Mentawai 
 social researcher(s)/lecturer(s) 
 geodetic researcher(s)/lecturer(s) 
 
In order to recruit them, I conducted several steps. To begin with, I submitted the letter 
from BNPB with the supporting documents to the institutions. After several days (roughly 
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three days after the submission), the institutions would appoint one of their staff to be 
interviewed. Nevertheless, in order to shorten the time, I often went directly to the 
institutions one day after submitting the letter. In many cases, this method worked very well 
and I could interview them earlier. I suspected this privilege was because 1) I enclosed 
enough supporting documents, and 2) besides being a student, I am a government officer 
too. 
Table 4.2 indicates the non-community member participants. There were three officers 
from the local government of Mentawai, three activists from local NGOs, and seven 
researchers or lecturers from the University Andalas (Padang, West Sumatra) , BPPT 
(Jakarta), LIPI (Jakarta) and ITB (Bandung, West Java). 
Table 4. 2 
The codes and institutions of the non-community member participants 
 
I believed that the above participants enriched the data that I had obtained from some of 
the community members in Mentawai. Their expertise and experience of working with, for, 
and about Mentawai provided clear understanding of the research topics.  
4.5.2. Triangulation through observations  
It is also important to provide complementary evidence to the field research through 
observations. Kearns (2016) argues that observation is an in-depth interpretation of a 
particular social-temporal context of interest through a direct experience. For the purpose 
No Name Code Institution Place
1 Government Officer, No. 01 Kantor Bupati, Local Government of Mentawai Sipora Island
2 Government Officer, No. 02 Bappeda, Local Government of Mentawai Sipora Island
3 Government Officer, No. 03 BPBD, Local Government of Mentawai Sipora Island
4 NGO Activist, No. 01
Center for Disaster Risk Management & 
Community Development Studies (CDRM & CDS) North Pagai Island
5 NGO Activist, No. 02 SurfAid Padang, West Sumatra
6 NGO Activist, No. 03 Yayasan Cipta Fondasi Komunitas North Pagai Island
7 Researcher, No. 01 Andalas University Padang, West Sumatra
8 Researcher, No. 02 Andalas University Padang, West Sumatra
9 Researcher, No. 03
The National Agency for the Assessment and 
Application of Technology (BPPT) Jakarta
10 Researcher, No. 04  the Indonesian Academy of the Sciences Jakarta
11 Researcher, No. 05 the Indonesian Academy of the Sciences Jakarta
12 Researcher, No. 06 Bandung Tecnology Institute (ITB) Banding, West Java
13 Researcher, No. 07 Bandung Tecnology Institute (ITB) Banding, West Java
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of this study, I undertook a structured observation of a number of important features. 
According to Thomas and Bryan (2011), structured observation is where an observer only 
watches for particular kinds of events, behaviour or situations. Because of no interventions 
or questions during the observations, this method allows the observer to make their own 
assumptions of the observed event, behaviour or situation that can contribute to primary 
data collection (Yin, 2014). Firstly, I had a chance to observe the dusun people from Passibut 
in Taikako Village, North Pagai Island conducting an earthquake and tsunami simulation. The 
data can be obtained by observing individuals’ activities in one community (Creswell, 2013; 
Remenyi, 2012; Thomas & Bryan, 2011). During the simulation, I recorded the event from 
what I heard on the voice recorder and noted some important parts. This voice record was 
then typed into the transcription as part of the study. To make the observation more 
complete, I also took some notes and photographed pictures for the specific scenes of the 
simulations.  
Secondly, I observed and made some notes regarding the conditions of the evacuation 
routes and evacuation signage from several dusun. I also took some photographed pictures 
as evidence. Lastly, I observed the billboards for tsunami preparedness campaigns. As the 
billboards were placed at several strategic points such as the traditional market, sea 
harbour, and roads, I noted the text and pictorial messages on the billboards. The above 
observations were proper, because the data can be obtained by looking at physical objects 
and environments (Creswell, 2013; Remenyi, 2012; Thomas & Bryan, 2011). Later on, I 
raised a number of questions based on the observations with some of the research 
participants and non-community member participants. 
To do the observations, I watched and took the field notes from a distance without direct 
involvement with activity or people. I also took some photographs to show evidence. Noting 
what the observations were about and taking some pictures of the observations are good 
ways to avoid missing some details during the observation (Liamputtong, 2013; Remenyi, 
2012). Therefore, the results from the observations can be integrated together to promote a 
greater understanding of the cases (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014).  
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4.6. Analysing data 
It is important to note that analysing text and other forms of data is challenging for 
qualitative researchers because the data is voluminous and rich. As M. Q. Patton (1980) 
explains: 
“The data generated by qualitative methods are voluminous. I have found 
no way of preparing students for the sheer massive volumes of 
information with which they will find themselves confronted when data 
collection has ended” (p.297). 
As a novice in qualitative research design, I realized that the data I had gathered from the 
field were voluminous, diverse, and complicated. I needed a model as a guide to analyse the 
data. From the many models of analysing qualitative research data, I found that the Data 
Analysis Spiral Model (See Figure 4.2) was a suitable guidance to analyse the data that I had 
collected. This model , originally developed by Creswell (2013) has a systematic procedure 
from data management to data visualization of research findings. From the texts or images 
gathered from the field study, the steps of the procedures are: to conduct data managing; 
reading and memoing; coding and interpreting and lastly representing and visualizing.  
From the analysis of my field data, I used the above steps. It is important to mention that 
the steps of data managing, reading and memoing, and coding and interpreting were 
conducted in Bahasa. The reasons were firstly it was easier to proceed with the steps, 
because I am an Indonesian native, secondly, to avoid unnecessary translations since not all 
the data would be used, and lastly to capture the real meanings of the data. However, for 
representing and visualizing the data, I presented the findings in English.  
4.6.1. Data managing 
After finishing the field data collection, I firstly transcribed verbatim each tape of the 
interviews into narrative forms and saved them as soft copy document files on my desktop 
at the UC. All pictures taken from the field were also moved into the computer. In order to 
manage my data, I organized the files and pictures according to the island where the 
participants lived as the main organisational units.  
4.6.2. Reading and memoing  
I read each file several times until I obtained the sense of the interview. I also marked and 
noted some interesting parts of the interviews. I found it convenient to write the memos 
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into Microsoft Word. The memos were about exploring the possible viewpoints and 
connections from the readings across the files. As Charmaz (2006) and Clarke (2005) 
mention, no best approach can produce good memoing and researchers can use pen and 
paper, a computer program, or a voice recorder. These processes helped me to feel more 
immersed in the interviews.  
4.6.3. Coding and interpreting the data 
The next step was to code the data from the transcribed files. The substantial data were 
coded according to the sub-research questions. I manually coded the data with codes such 
as ‘RS1Sub1’, and ‘RS2Sub3’. RS1Sub1 meant that the data were suitable to place under 
Research Question No. 1 and the Sub-Research Question No. 1. RS2Sub3 meant the data 
were suitable to put under Research Question No. 2 and the Sub-Research Question No. 3. 
The codes made it easier for me to interpret in the future. The codes also reduced potential 
contention regarding the interpretations of the data and reduced the volume of the data. As 
Creswell (2013) states, the process of coding is “winnowing” the data where researchers 
should sort only important information.  
I completed the coding process with the assistance of a computer using a simple word-
processing package (Microsoft Word). Miles and Huberman (1994) and Weitzman and Miles 
(1995) advise that researchers do not use any software beyond a word processor, otherwise 
there will be a number of obstacles in analysing the data. However, Weitzman and Miles 
(1995) also mention that the coding process is ultimately determined by the researchers 
because there is no ideal method to do the coding process. I agreed with Weitzman and 
Miles (1995) and decided not to use any particular software for analysis. The main reason 
was I would need some time to learn and familiarise myself with any form of data analysis 
software until well into the coding process. I therefore manually coded the themes and 
patterns into Microsoft Word. Gorden (1998) suggests that the coding process can be made 
by labelling the certain text data into different numbers, colours, or geometric shapes. I 
then numbered the data because it was more convenient to use numbers than the other 




The next step was to interpret the findings into broader meaning based on hunches, 
insights, and intuition. I connected the findings to a number of academic references, 
triangulated data, or existing data such as from the Statistical Agency of Mentawai. 
Similarly, Creswell (2013) argues that researchers might link their interpretations to broader 
research literature. In many cases, I also provided my personal views to enrich the 
interpretations. Mostly, my personal views were inserted into the quotes of the 
participants. There are several reasons why I inserted my personal views into the findings: 1) 
to connect the statements of the participants to my questions; 2) to determine the 
appropriate meanings of the participants’ statements; 3) to probe the statements.  
4.6.4. Representing the data 
The last step is representing the data. For this step, I will present the data through written 
means. Pawson and DeLyser (2016) argue that the presentations of the data should 
embrace robust thinking, good preparation, and apparent structure with basic academic 
fundamentals. Therefore, I will represent the findings in mainly Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
As Stiles (1993) suggests, qualitative research seeks knowledge that extends and increases 
the tenet of human presence rather than prediction and control. Therefore the conclusions 
and products of qualitative research may be better judged for their implementations and 
has “a little-used epistemological space between that of received-view science and that of 
history and biography” (Stiles, 1993, p. 598). From this argument, it is not critical to 
represent the data or findings on maps because the participants did not represent particular 
dusun as the research will be applied into whole dusun in Mentawai. However, in order that 
thesis readers can identify where the participants are from, I have constantly put the Name 
Code of the participants at the end of the interviews. The readers can refer each code to 
Table 4.1 “The code, sexes, ages and locations of the research participants, Mentawai 
District, West Sumatra” and to Figure 4.2 “The participants came from several dusun in the 
islands of Sipora, North and South Pagai. Each number refers to the Name Code column 
from Table 4.1.”.  




Figure 4. 3 
The data analysis spiral from Creswell (2013) that has been employed into the research 
  
The above figure indicates several steps that I have conducted in analysing the data. Firstly, I 
managed the transcribed data into soft files and units and to have clear understanding of 
the data, I read and memoed the data into certain notes. I then coded the data in 
accordance with the suitable sub-research questions. Lastly, I will present the data as the 
findings in the next chapters. 
4.7. Ethics for the research 
An ethical consideration is critical as a substructure of a research. It also becomes the 
research process for qualitative research. Therefore, before, during and after the data 
collection it is important to adhere to the ethics.  
4.7.1. Human ethics committee 
Following research proposal approval in 2013, ethics approval was obtained on 7 February 
2014 from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee with ref No: HEC 
2013/164 (Appendix 4.1). Ethical requirements concerning confidential, anonymous, 
protecting actions from discomfort has been highlighted. The research participants were 
given printed and voiced explanations regarding the study. 
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4.7.2. Ethical considerations  
A number of ethical considerations arose during the field research. Before the interviews, 
candidate participants were informed about the nature of the research and the intended 
use of the findings. They were also informed that the interviews would be audio-recorded. 
Their consent was important to be obtained after I had read the Information Sheet and 
explained it clearly. They were also assured of the confidentiality of their personal 
particulars and the information they would provide. As mentioned in the previous section, a 
number of the participants could only provide their consent orally. Before the interviews, I 
always introduced myself and explained my position and purpose of visit. Ethics was also 
considered in the observation process in Passibuat Dusun, in Taikako Village, North Pagai. 
The consent of the local community members of the dusun was also obtained orally after a 
clear explanation of their roles in the research.  
The ethical consideration of research participants is also important after the interview. The 
data with identifying information that has been collected from the field study is securely 
stored in an organized fashion with the possibility of retrieval using my desktop in the 
Department of Geography, UC. The desktop is protected with a secure password known 
only to me. All data generated are backed up daily as protection from loss from hardware 
failures, fire, theft, etc. into the personnel UC email account that only I myself can access. 
Lastly, during the data analysis, I also adhered to the ethical considerations by concealing 
the participants’ names with their initials, as seen in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Therefore, on 
the report, the readers will only see ‘Community Member’, ‘Researcher’, ‘NGO activist’ and 
‘Government Officer’ followed by two digit numbers. I believe that this will ensure that the 
participants’ identities are concealed. 
4.8. Conclusion 
In order to conduct this study in the Mentawai islands, I have designed a qualitative case 
study with a number of scientific rationales. This study was also designed with a purposive 
sampling and a snowball method in order to gather the specific data to achieve the intended 
aim. My position as a researcher was also clearly addressed, as objectivity is ultimately 
needed to avoid subjectivity in qualitative research. This study had also allowed me to 
collect the data through face-to-face in-depth interviews. However, in order to avoid 
subjectivity of the evidence from the participants, triangulation methods were implemented 
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through the inclusion of interviews from various sources of participants, direct observations, 
and archival photographed pictures. This also allowed me to analyse the data with a 
systematic approach by using the Data Analysis Spiral. Lastly, the ethical considerations 
were adhered to in the field research.  
This chapter is the last chapter of Part 1. This part has discussed a number of rationales to 
conduct this study and formulated a specific research questions to lead the direction of the 
study. It has also discussed a number of key frameworks and concepts which would 
employed in the study. In addition, this part has also explored how the local community 
becomes vulnerable to tsunami hazards by tracing a number of factors of rooted causes, 
dynamic pressures and living in an unsafe location. Lastly, this part has discussed the design 
of the study to collect and analyse the data.  
The next part will be Part 2 which mainly presents the research findings. The research 
findings will be analysed and presented by juxtaposing a number of academic views and 
















PART 2: RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
CHAPTER 5 
Tsunami Hazard Knowledge and Preparedness in Mentawai before the 2010 
Tsunami 
 
“We, the Team Nine feel like bringing a death message, but the scientific 
findings must be delivered [to the public] so that we get prepared to face 
the disaster” (Wahyu Triyoso, 12 October 2010, the Daily Singgalang)  
5.0. Introduction 
Having discussed in the previous part about the rationales, context, and methodology of this 
study, now Part 2 contains exploration of the results and analyses of the research findings. It 
consists of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 that analyse and present the study results. Generally, 
Chapter 5 presents the results and analyses of how tsunami hazard and preparedness 
knowledge was explicitly exposed to the research participants before the 2010 Mentawai 
Tsunami (the Tsunami) occurred. While Chapter 6 demonstrates how the preparedness 
measures are applied in the community of Mentawai. 
Chapter 5 will give one characterisation of the specific context of knowledge management 
on tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. Its main proposition is to understand how the local 
community of Mentawai prepared for the potential tsunami hazard after the explicit 
knowledge was delivered to them. The field study findings elaborate and identify the 
community’s knowledge from pre- and during the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami (the tsunami). 
There are six sections in this chapter, as follows: 
Section 5.1. Defines hazard knowledge into knowledge. 
Section 5.2. Demonstrates how knowledge management is used to analyze the field 
research findings. 
Section 5.3.  Explains a number of the macro factors that influenced the tsunami hazards 
knowledge in Mentawai. 
Section 5.4. Identifies knowledge providers within the community of Mentawai to 
transfer the tsunami hazards knowledge. 
Section 5.5. Explains how the tsunami hazards knowledge is shared. 
Section 5.6. Discusses how tsunami hazard knowledge is internalized by the local 
community of Mentawai 
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Section 5.7. Briefly concludes an exclusive reportage on the earthquake and tsunami  
Section 5.8 Concludes the chapter. 
5.1. Defining hazard knowledge 
Experts have defined numerous definitions of knowledge. Jashapara (2011) defines 
knowledge simply as an actionable information. However, this definition implies making 
better decisions and providing an effective input within an organization or community. 
Therefore, knowledge becomes more complex than this simplistic notion. Mohanty, Panda, 
Karelia, and Issar (2006, p. 1) also define knowledge as “the fact or condition of knowing 
something with a considerable degree of familiarity through experience, association, or 
contact”. In addition, Davenport and Prusak (2000, p. 5), define knowledge as “a fluid mix of 
framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provide a 
framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates 
and is applied in the minds of knowers.”  
In disaster preparedness, understanding disaster hazard knowledge becomes important. 
Alam (2016) argues that the improvement of hazard knowledge may create an increase in 
risk perception and preparedness. It also enables us to explore innovative means by which 
communities at risk can become more involved in developing appropriate risk reduction 
strategies and opportunities (Turnbull, Sterrett, & Hilleboe, 2013). Through hazard 
knowledge, it is considered that the inclusion of individuals and community members in 
disaster preparedness activities may increase. This knowledge can be applied as the basis of 
disaster mitigation and preparedness measures (Pathirage, Seneviratne, Amaratunga, & 
Haigh, 2015). In terms of practices and contexts of disaster preparedness, the knowledge 
can improve the planning and implementation processes, and program acceptance, 
ownership, and sustainability. It can also increase commitment and effort in conducting 
disaster preparedness measures from various kinds of people.  
5.2. Knowledge management on tsunami preparedness 
Since Knowledge Management (KM) was introduced in 1990s, KM has gained increasing 
importance in a business strategy. However, Iverson and McPhee (2002) argue that there is 
no consensus among scholars on the best way to implement KM or even to define it. 
Furthermore, Roberts (2010) argues that applying KM in a community context becomes 
more attractive and challenging. Community is much broader than a team or project groups 
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established for a specific purpose. It is also ill-equipped to manage heterogeneous 
community members. But scholars have distinguished two basic approaches to KM: 
information based known also as an object and people based, known also as a process.  
As an object, KM concentrates more on high technology solutions that could ignore tacit 
knowledge because it removes social context. Moreover, it can be seized, deposited, and 
reused by using a technological solution. It also more focuses more on “the right knowledge, 
in the right place, at the right time” (Seneviratne, Baldry, & Pathirage, 2010, p. 380). 
Whereas “the right knowledge” for some people may be different from that for others. 
Consequently, information-based KM pays significant attention to the implementation of 
repositories to capture, store, control, manage and reuse structured phenomena (Chatti, 
2012; Iverson & McPhee, 2002). 
On the other hand, as a process approach, KM stresses the importance of the individuals in 
working within KM processes and acknowledges the inputs from them. It is also inherently 
tied to social and contextual phenomena (Iverson & McPhee, 2002) and (Chatti, 2012). It is 
also supported by Ribeiro (2013) that this approach enables community members to foresee 
their problems so that they can respond to any potential change in the problems. 
Furthermore, this approach is also applied and adapted according to community members’ 
experiences. Meanwhile, manuals and operational standards are not always sufficient 
during emergency situations, KM is useful where several senses are to be utilized 
simultaneously, when skilful behaviour is involved, or when understanding social 
relationships is crucial (Lundvall, 2000). Lastly, KM with a process approach enables the 
clarifying of the importance of interactional and informational views of making knowledge 
more effective. 
In order to integrate both types of KM, Chatti (2012) defines that knowledge management is 
a concept that enables the turning of information into actionable knowledge through 
effortless measures. Subsequently, the knowledge can turned into a usable form to be 
applied for human benefits. The definition elaborates some processes that are involved such 
as skilfulness, invention, expansion, dissemination, transfer, sharing, and application. 




KM has pivotal roles in confirming the people can access trustful and accurate tsunami 
information. The accessibility to information in KM is ensured through an effective process 
of lesson learning (Seneviratne et al., 2010). For the purposes of analysing my field study, 
this chapter builds on these sights of the process approach knowledge management. 
Mohannak and Hutchings (2007) have designed a cross-cultural and institutional framework 
of knowledge management with three dimensions. The first dimension is at the macro level 
where the application of knowledge management is influenced by several factors in a 
community. These include the institutions and the socio-economic and educational 
conditions of the community. The second dimension is the availability of knowledge 
providers within the community. It is also considered that the providers have the ability to 
transfer new knowledge. Lastly, how the community responds to the new knowledge that 
that been transferred is also included.  
5.3. Macro level of knowledge management on tsunami hazards 
As briefly drawn above by Mohannak and Hutchings (2007) a district pattern of a social 
system consists of public and private institutions, political, economic, and social and 
educational factors. These factors are related to public and community institutions in 
particular social-cultural contexts. Based on the field study that was conducted in Mentawai, 
below are the significant findings that were related to the knowledge transfer about 
tsunami preparedness measures. 
5.3.1. Public and non-governmental institutions 
Decisive and clear decisions by government authorities protect their community members 
from unexpected tsunamis. Effective institutional policies are critically important to 
influence public programs on tsunami hazards and preparedness for the community 
(Seneviratne et al., 2010). However, it was shown from the field research that the district 
government of Mentawai had implemented few efforts to support the knowledge transfers 
o tsunami hazards and preparedness before 2010. The participants provided some reasons 
why the district government paid low attention to implementing public programs at the 
dusun level. One of the reasons was the difficulty in accessing the remote areas.  
 “...But indeed [I have to acknowledge] this area is too difficult [to get 
access to]. [The islands are] far away from one another. So, it is too difficult 
to manage it. [Still] some people [stay] in the jungles or on the tips of the 
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islands where [the people] are just difficult to reach. The local government 
[‘s capacity] is also limited...” (Community Member No. 3)  
“...[J]ust if the government [officers] often visited us in the villages to see 
[our condition], the local community would have the spirit [to do 
everything]. [They] do not [need to] care only for the people in the towns. 
But we who stay in the village [remote areas] also need care” (Community 
Member No. 06). 
As my experience of collecting the data, often I had ride the motorcycle for over 1.5 hours 
(about 15 km) to reach one dusun from another. The dirt roads were very bad to ride on, in 
particular after heavy rains (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5. 1 
One of many muddy points in the road from Sikakap to Taikako (North Pagai Island) 





Figure 5. 2 
One of many muddy points in the road from Tuapejat to Bosua (Sipora Island) 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
From the district government perspective, another reason was the government was 
complacent about the fact that the indigenous people of Mentawai had no experience of 
tsunamis.  
 “No literature and no oral stories about it [tsunami occurred in 
Mentawai]. ... [T]he government saw no need for necessary actions ...” 
(Government Officer, No. 03). 
In fact, in 1797 and 1833 there were two earthquakes that generated the tsunamis that 
reached and devastated Sumatra. It is understandable that there are no oral stories about 
tsunamis among the indigenous people of Mentawai because at the time they lived in the 
jungles and experienced no effects from the tsunamis. However, the 1833 tsunami was 
noted by a number of Dutch residents in Padang (West Sumatra) (Natawidjaja, 2007). 
Natawidjaja (2007) believes that the same tsunami also devastated the Mentawai islands.  
It is important to involve the governance system in order to strengthen knowledge 
management in transferring tsunami hazard knowledge to the community. As the district of 
Mentawai is led by a local government leader known as Bupati, I found a single document 
was issued as a public policy to strengthen public education on tsunami hazards. Normally, 
an official document that is signed by a bupati can be effective to implement a public 
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program. The heads of villages and dusun will take necessary actions as the document 
instructs. As the district consists of 266 dusun from 43 villages, the heads could have been 
powerful people to support the programs before the tsunami. 
In the rarity of the district government implementing the tsunami education in the 
community , the roles of the local NGOs are important for the community. Many 
participants acknowledged the existence of the NGOs in Mentawai to provide public 
education on tsunami hazards. However, no reliable data indicated when and how many 
NGOs started working on the transfer of explicit knowledge of tsunamis in Mentawai. Two 
participants mentioned that Surfaid International initiated efforts in 2004 right after the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. It is also stated on its website that Surfaid International is a 
non-commercial benevolent agency. It focuses on improvement through such means as the 
self-reliance of isolated people through surfing. This organization was legally registered in 
New Zealand and founded by Steve Hathaway and Phil Dreifuss and worked for tsunami 
education in 2004 in the western islands of Sumatra including Mentawai (Surfaid, 2015). 
One of the participants mentioned:  
“Surfaid [International] came to Mentawai because when some Australians 
[in fact, they are New Zealanders] surfed in the Mentawai beaches they 
saw a lot of the children’s graves. They then knew it that the children died 
of malaria. Finally, they [Surfaid International] started working on health 
[in Mentawai]. After they saw the Aceh Tsunami, and they realized that 
Mentawai is prone to tsunami, they also work for [a knowledge transfer 
on] tsunami.” (Researcher No. 4).  
The NGOs also found a number of difficulties in implementing the program. The main reason 
was that accessibility to dusun was very poor. Using small boats (tronton) to go from one 
place to another was possible; however, it cost, in many cases, three times as much as using 
motorcycles. In addition, the gasoline price was commonly found to be three times higher 
than that in Sumatra. Therefore, the lack of public transportation and roads made the 
implementation of the program very expensive.  
 “[You can] imagine trying to visit a very difficult area to get access to. 
Because of almost no access to Mentawai [dusun], the people [NGOs] spent 
[a lot of] money on transportation fares more than on the programs. This 
made us seldom go to the same dusun more than a couple of times” (NGO 
Activist, No. 02). 
108 
 
The data from the district government indicates that in 2010 only 7 per cent of the total 
length of the roads was in a good condition. This had surely negatively affected NGOs’ 
implementation of their programs.  
Briefly, we can see that before the 2010 tsunami the district government of Mentawai and 
the local NGOs faced difficulty in implementing their public education programs, especially 
for tsunami education. The reasons were the inaccessibility of the dusun and the false 
complacency of the government about the tsunami occurrences in the past.  
5.3.2. Social and educational factors 
One of the common social factors used to explain a condition of a community is poverty. 
Poverty has many dimensions and manifestations but is always related to the underlying 
structural inequities and inherent advantages that come from less access to public goods 
and other resources (Philip & Rayhan, 2004). Furthermore, Martine and Guzman (2002) 
state that poverty takes place as the result of historical processes from resource losses. In 
addition, Darmanto and Setyowati (2002) argue that besides geographically, Mentawai is 
also socially marginalised. BPS Mentawai (2012) reported in 2011 that the North Siberut and 
South Siberut Sub Districts had high percentages of poor households in the coastline areas 
in the Mentawai District, consecutively 28.60 % and 25.71 %. These households had incomes 
below IDR 600.000 per month (Kamal, 2013). The above income was equal to USD 64.84 
(based on the assumption of the economic macro from the Central Government 2011, USD 
1= IRD 9,250). In other words, there were many households that had incomes of less than 
USD 2 a day, where the minimum income of a household should have been USD 3.80 daily in 
the Mentawai District (Kamal, 2013). This condition could worsen knowledge transfer efforts 
to the community since the community is focused more on their work rather than caring for 
their own safety. 
The education level of a community will also influence the knowledge transfer. Morin, 
Coster, Paris, Flohic, and Lavigne (2008) argue that enhancing education is a key to 
developing tsunami preparedness among coastal people. From the research findings, the 
NGO activists had tried to explain the tsunami hazards in a simple way. Although the NGOs 
had no adequate tools which could assist them to address the occurrence of earthquakes 
and tsunamis, they used simple, daily tools from the dusun, for example, a bucket or tub 
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filled with some water. When the water became calm, they used one of their fingers to 
ripple the water’s surface. The finger symbolized an earthquake and the small induced-
waves were the symbolized waves of tsunamis. However, they often found some 
unexpected responses from the community. 
 “My own experience when I was working for my previous job in one 
NGO…… after I explained [how the occurrence of tsunamis was], a sudden 
voice sounded mentioning ‘[if] the Lord’s hand touches the sea, [it] will 
create big waves’. [After I heard it] I felt like [crying]…” (NGO activist, No. 
01)  
The low level of education could be associated with the level of knowledge acceptance in in 
related to tsunamis hazards by the local community of Mentawai.  
In views of the simple ways of the local community’ thoughts and inadequate educational 
tools, the NGO participants assumed that what they explained to the community could have 
made some misunderstandings. A concept of how wide earth was, for instance, was beyond 
off their thoughts. Moreover, a phenomenon of how different plates of the earth collided 
could be a nonsense for them.  
“Ever one of participants said ‘how come the soil grounds move and fight 
each other’. So, [it just is too] difficult to explain it” (NGO activist, No. 03) 
Therefore, the participants concluded even the people that had been reached out; most of 
them might still not understand what tsunamis were. Even more they could have had 
misunderstanding and created new myths related to tsunamis.  
It is necessary to increase a community’s level of education for children as well as 
community members. As reported by the BPS Mentawai (2012) in Table 5.2, there was a big 
gap between urban (97.16%) and rural (85.2%) in the number of people over five years old 
who can read Latin letters. The table also indicates that there were big differences in the 
percentages of males and females who could read Latin letters in these areas. Surprisingly, 
over 40 per cent of the population who lived in urban areas also could read Arabic letters, 
and 13 per cent other letters. Moreover, the illiteracy rate in Mentawai was high (13.27%). 
The difference in the illiteracy rate between urban (2.84%) and rural (14.31) was very 
significant at more than 9 %. However, in urban areas the illiteracy difference between male 
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(5.45%) and female (0%) was also significant. Conversely, the illiteracy rate in rural areas for 
females was much higher (17.07%) than for males (11.82%).  
Table 5. 1 
Percentage of population over 5 years old able to read  
Latin, Arabic and other letters 
By sex in Mentawai, 2012 








   
  
Male 94.55 40.14 16.2 5.45 
Female 100 42.82 10.52 0 
Sub-Total 97.16 41.42 13.46 2.84 
Rural 
   
  
Male 87.38 2.62 0.38 11.82 
Female 82.79 2.34 0 17.07 
Sub-Total 85.2 2.49 0.2 14.31 
Total 86.29 6.03 1.4 13.27 
  Source: BPS Mentawai (2012) 
 
Furthermore, the NGO participants explained that many of the local community members 
reluctantly participated in any meetings of the tsunami education programs. They found it 
difficult to create any detailed plans. They just worked rather than to try to find their own 
problems and solutions. 
 “They chose to work rather than gaining much useful information to their 
own safety. I was also pessimistic with the attitude that they had showed 
at the time. Low [level of] education, difficult economy and low 
participation had influenced to what we had delivered for them”(NGO 
Activist, No. 01) 
Lastly, according to one of the participants, those who had participated in the NGO 
programs often only passively listened. They would have received whatever had been 
explained or conducted and not try further actions. It was hard to develop some advanced 
actions for their own solutions to their own problems. The participant indicated that the 




The above findings indicate that social and education factors also affected the ability of the 
local community of Mentawai to understand the explained tsunami hazards. Low education 
status and other commitments meant the education efforts were unmet. 
5.3.3. Economic factors 
Low economic factors hinder explicit knowledge being transferred to and shared with the 
community. As the field study reveals, the NGOs stated that the local community preferred 
working rather than capturing explicit knowledge of tsunami preparedness. One of the 
research participants from an NGO states some reasons why it is difficult to transfer the 
knowledge to the local community of Mentawai.  
“They are difficult to push. They have had less motivation to do things, 
except working in their gardens or the sea. Only that [working] is their 
life” (NGO Activist No. 03). 
The above interview indicated that their low economic status was a big challenge for the 
knowledge providers to transfer knowledge of tsunami hazards and preparedness. Pathirage 
et al. (2015) also reported that low economic status worsens the implementation of disaster 
preparedness program in a community. In order to see an integrated assessment of one 
community, we can use a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy and education, 
and standard of living through the Human Development Index (HDI). Figure 5.3 below 




Figure 5. 3 
The Human Development Index by District in West Sumatra, 2012 
Source: the Kementerian Kesehatan (2013), Depkes (2014)  
In 2012, the HDI score from Mentawai was only 69.26 meaning it was the lowest amongst 
the districts in the West Sumatra Province, and far below Bukit Tinggi (79.07), the highest in 
the province. The HDI of Mentawai was not only below the average in West Sumatra (74.7) 
but also the national (73.29) (Depkes, 2014; Kementerian Kesehatan, 2013). From this, it can 
be concluded that in 2012 Mentawai still had the lowest index among the districts in the 
same province. Owing to the unavailability of the same data, we can draw a similar 
conclusion that before the tsunami, the HDI from Mentawai was also below the average of 
West Sumatra Province. It can therefore be taken that that there have been no significant 
changes before and after 2010 in the community.  
In conclusion, the macro level of knowledge management was influenced by the district 
government of Mentawai and a number of local NGOs, social and educational conditions, 
and the economic status of the local people in Mentawai. The local government and NGOs 
had tried to implement the tsunami education programs to the people; however, the 














































The people also found it difficult to understand the tsunami hazard concept, although the 
NGOs had tried to explain it in a simple way. This may be related to their low educational 
status. In addition, the people also gave little attention to the programs. Lastly, their low 
economic status ensured the people had other priorities rather than making the programs 
succeed. 
5.4. Micro level of knowledge management on tsunami hazards 
In order to transfer knowledge, it is important to have knowledge providers. Knowledge 
providers are responsible to explicitly transfer knowledge in order for the knowledge to 
become an asset for a community (Mohannak & Hutchings, 2007). The providers can also 
train some community members as cadres to share the knowledge to other community 
members. However, these tasks may become challenging when the providers have different 
backgrounds or ethics from a community. Or it will also be more difficult when the providers 
regard themselves as different or, even worse, higher than community members 
(Mohannak & Hutchings, 2007).  
From the research, several knowledge providers were also found in Mentawai. They were 
the NGO activists and the district government officers that implemented the tsunami 
education programs. Some research participants argued that the knowledge providers had 
transferred knowledge mainly about what earthquakes are, how tsunamis occur, how they 
prepared themselves for tsunamis and who and what should be saved in the event of a 
tsunami. However, one of the participants from the researchers criticized the unclear 
knowledge materials that had been transferred to the community. It is also said that 
because of the uncertainty of tsunami occurrences in terms of time and place, the 
knowledge providers had never informed the local community when and where potential 
tsunamis would hit the Mentawai District. This might have created misunderstandings in the 
local community, which thought that tsunamis always occurred during daytime and never at 
night time.  
“… [A]ceh occurred in the morning, Pangandaran [the 2006 Pangandaran 
tsunami] occurred in the afternoon, and [we] never said [to the local 
community that tsunamis] could occur at night. So, [it was] always 
recorded in their memories of the real events and what [the NGO and the 
government] communicated….” (Researcher No. 05). 
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In transferring explicit knowledge to the community, the knowledge providers should work 
together with the community members. As this study research revealed that the knowledge 
providers had a series of meetings with the dusun people. During the meetings, the 
providers had explicitly transferred the above knowledge. However, most of the participants 
claimed that the meetings with the government and NGOs were very rare but useful to 
increase or to add their knowledge.  
The participants from NGOs also agreed with these claims. Several NGOs had intervened in a 
few areas of the local community, even though they had faced difficulties with access to the 
areas due to their being no proper public transportation and roads available. This difficult 
access made it very expensive to implement some programs. It was also mentioned that at 
the time only a few NGOs worked on tsunami programs.  
The study also reveals that the local community preferred to be assisted and facilitated by 
NGOs rather than the district government. However, to some extent, the NGOs also needed 
to restrain themselves and transfer the knowledge to the community in a sensitive way. 
“I prefer it if NGOs come to us. They are more patient. They also take care 
of us. They sometimes stay with us for one week and sleep in one or two 
homes here. If the government [officers] come, it is only for a short time. 
Never sleep here. [They] come in the morning, go back in the afternoon” 
(Community Member No. 12). 
“Sometimes NGOs help us, too. They explain many innovations. For 
example, we know now how to plant chillies. However, we [I] cannot [use 
my time] fully [on it] and [the chillies] are only planted in the plastic 
[polybags]. But [so] sometimes, it just bothers us. NGOs that come here 
seem like to force me to plant chillies, corns or whatever. [As you know] to 
plant them is very tiring….” (Community Member No. 04). 
Besides the local government and NGOs, some other channels were identified such as mass 
media and newcomers. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the media influence our daily lives. 
Media are channels of communication that transmit information in a number of modes or 
forms to large numbers of people. They can be as windows into society and reflect 
phenomena in society (Subiakto, 2001). TV is an audio-visual medium that has a wide out-
reach to communities. It has penetrative power that can influence attitudes, perspectives, 
life styles, orientations, and motivations of communities. Generally, TV is informative, 
educational, and recreational. By watching TV, people can see or know the outside. To 
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comprehend the roles of TV in informing the people, the study revealed that the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami on TV provided the deepest impact on their knowledge about 
tsunamis. Apparently, the roles of TV especially for some males were unused before the 
tsunami occurred.  
“When the Aceh tsunami [the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami] hit. It was very 
big [waves]. I had not seen anything like that before. I also just heard the 
word ‘tsunami’ [for the first time]. I had never heard that before” 
(Community Member No. 02). 
Surprisingly though, some participants said that the local adult males seldom watched 
television programs including news programs or educational programs. The reasons were 
that very few families had television sets and they had chosen other activities instead. They 
also preferred to do other activities rather than watching TV because they claimed at the 
time watching TV was the females’ and children’s business. 
“I seldom watch [TV programs]. It is very common here; watching is for 
adult females and children. They say the TV dramas are very entertaining. 
These kinds of programs are not for us [adult male business]” (Community 
Member No. 16). 
“The [female] people do not like to watch news programs, but only 
dramas” (Community Member No. 07). 
Radio is also important to inform a community about a disaster. Radio is one of the most 
effective platforms, especially in pre-disaster situations in sharing knowledge in a tsunami 
prone community. Radio enables listeners and broadcaster(s) to communicate in an 
interactive way, but only one participant mentioned knowing about tsunamis from radio 
programs. There were three radio stations in Sipora and one in North Pagai. They also 
mentioned that very few local people could access the radio because the electricity was 
limited and the dry cell batteries were relatively expensive for them. 
Another way to raise public awareness or to increase public knowledge on tsunamis 
preparedness is through newspapers. As a serial publication, newspapers encompass news 
on current special and general events (Bucher, Büffel, & Wollscheid, 2005). They can be 
used to distribute knowledge to communities. The field study revealed that only one 
participant who stayed in Tuapejat (where information access is relatively easier) reported 
knowing about tsunamis preparedness from the newspaper(s). As I observed, the national, 
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provincial or local papers were not easy to obtain but are available in Tuapejat (the district 
capital) and Sikakap (the biggest towns in North and South Pagai). It is also important to 
note that the newspapers are available to the community the day after the scheduled ferry 
arrival from Padang City. Meanwhile, the local community has little access to some online 
local portals.  
From the NGOs’ perspective, in order to obtain tsunami hazard knowledge, the local 
community preferred watching educational films to other kinds of educational media. 
Moreover, the NGOs argued it would be more effective and efficient to use compatible tools 
in Mentawai. Owing to its difficult access, they suggested bringing a laptop, LCD, CD and a 
screen to disseminate the information. This finding was consistent with Yayasan Minang 
Bahari (2006) findings where the local community preferred these media as an effective way 
to share the coral reef information in Siberut. However, the NGO participants also had 
concerns about the limited electricity available. It was also said that colourful leaflets with 
pictures were useful for them.  
“…[T]hey don’t like reading. In fact, we still found many of them could not 
read at all. Thus, don’t expect too much that they will read your messages” 
(NGO Activist No. 03). 
Additionally, it is also thought that some habits of the community could hinder the 
knowledge acceptance. It was confirmed by one of researchers that when the 2010 
Mentawai earthquake shook, some of the local community just ignored the potential harm. 
They just paid no attention to it and continued watching a drama program on one of the TV 
stations, while another station had announced a warning about a potential tsunami in the 
Mentawai region.  
“[Many people] watched TV together in one house; [almost] half of the 
dusun people watched a TV drama. Watching it made [them] forgets [about 
potential tsunamis]” (Researcher No. 02). 
In fact, the Minister of Communication and Information (the Republic of Indonesia) had 
formulated a ministerial regulation No. 20 of 2006 on Tsunami or Other Disaster Early 
Warning through Broadcast Institutions in Indonesia. This regulation clearly states “Public, 
private, community and pay broadcast institutions in Indonesia shall broadcast potential 
disaster information as a STOP PRESS”. Furthermore, this regulation also mentions, “The 
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STOP PRESS shall be broadcasted through stopping temporarily the existing program by 
sounding a high tone alarm of 1 kHz for 30 seconds and simultaneously presenting a static 
text with full screen.” In another document, Information Guide: Tsunami Early Warning for 
Broadcast in Indonesia, says the static text should contain the earthquake information, 
namely magnitude, location, depth, and potential tsunami. However, when the 2010 
Mentawai earthquake shook, only one (Metro TV) among many national TV stations 
informed the public of the earthquake possibly because they were just ignorant. In fact, 
however, this TV station only informed it with a running text, not with a STOP PRESS. Metro 
TV is more focused on news (Sudibyo, 2004) and the local community of Mentawai might 
not be interested in watching this station. The community mostly watch other TV (RCTI and 
SCTV) stations that aired dramas. 
Lastly, knowledge providers to the community are not always official. The providers can be 
other persons who bring the knowledge on tsunami preparedness to community members. 
As a community is bound by particular conditions of geography (such sea and islands) 
(Suharto, 2006), for some participants, newcomers working in Mentawai become a good 
source of tsunami information. The newcomers who mostly work as traders, fishermen or 
workers for forest concession companies seemed to know about the potential tsunamis in 
Mentawai. As I observed during my departures and arrivals to Sikakap and Tua Pejat, most 
passengers in the ferry were the Minang people who originally came from Sumatra. I 
noticed this from their local dialect.  
“[The] people who came to work here always said that tsunamis and 
tsunami threats would potentially hit Mentawai” (Community Member No. 
17) 
 
It can be concluded that knowledge creation on tsunamis preparedness for some of the 
local community of Mentawai before the Tsunami was transferred and created by the mass 
media, some individuals from NGOs and local government offices, and also the new comers. 
However, the providers faced difficulty in their tasks due to their own limitations to transfer 
the knowledge, as well as the local community’ limitations in absorbing the knowledge. 
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5.5. Community level of KM on tsunami preparedness 
It is considered that after knowledge providers transfer knowledge, knowledge receivers are 
also important to understand what the knowledge is about. In this study context, knowledge 
receivers were the dusun people who had been transferred the tsunami hazard knowledge 
and preparedness. Dalkir (2011) points out some processes of how the community captures 
and creates knowledge by identifying and codifying the existing inside and outside 
knowledge. After this phase, the community will select suitable knowledge in relation to its 
culture and share the new knowledge among the members. Once they have decided on the 
right knowledge they accept it and use it.  
5.5.1 Capturing explicit tsunami hazard knowledge  
Knowledge capture at the community level emphasizes how individuals gather information 
and build a new knowledge. Therefore, community members will interact with other 
members or groups in the community. The members can capture knowledge from media, 
books and peers (Wiig, 1993); however, this kind of knowledge is more explicit and it is also 
important to make tacit knowledge explicit by documenting or creating directories to foster 
knowledge sharing (Dalkir, 2011). 
The field study revealed what the participants had captured from the knowledge providers. 
In the context of knowledge management, knowledge that is explicitly delivered is known as 
explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is a knowledge that is tangibly captured. This 
knowledge can be in the forms of words, audio-visuals, or pictures and is related to the 
ability to disseminate, to reproduce, to access and to re-apply amongst individuals and 
groups. It also needs creativity to change knowledge from invisible knowledge to visible 
knowledge by using systematic transformation methods (Huang, Wei, & Chang, 2007). So, 
explicit knowledge can be captured from individuals, experiences, mass media or materials 
such as book or leaflets or electronic devices. 
From the interviews of some research participants in Mentawai, the tsunami hazards 
knowledge had explicitly transferred from TV programs.  
“When the Aceh tsunami hit. It was very big [news] in TV. I had not seen 
anything like that before. I also just heard the word ‘tsunami’. I had never 
heard that before” (Community Member No. 02). 
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As explicit knowledge may be in a written form, it can be delivered through special 
procedures to perform a given activity (Sanchez, 2004). Related to the explicit knowledge of 
tsunami hazards and preparedness in Mentawai, the field research indicates that such 
knowledge was found in a public elementary school in Sikakap through several sessions of 
training and simulations. The knowledge providers used articulated information, drawings, 
tools, and procedures to explicitly deliver the information on tsunami hazards and 
preparedness. 
“The children have [several times] got training in the school. ..,[S]o when 
an earthquake occurs, the children [have been mentioned] not to be panic” 
(Community Member, No. 02).  
 
For the dusun people, the knowledge providers from NGOs and the district government had 
transferred explicitly tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness.  
5.5.2. Sharing the knowledge 
After knowledge has been captured, community members need to share the knowledge 
with other members. In order to do this, the members are needed to provide some training 
on what and how to share the knowledge on tsunamis preparedness (Dalkir, 2011). The field 
research also disclosed that some NGO activists had recruited some in the local community, 
known as cadres in order to share the knowledge before the tsunami with other community 
members. The NGOs trained the cadres and provided some information materials. However, 
according to participants from the NGOs, there were many people who could not be 
reached because of the lack of capable persons, geographical and demographical conditions 
and financial support. Even so, they also claimed that the quality of the knowledge on 
tsunamis preparedness was still low because the cadres could absorb and deliver only basic 
information. 
5.5.3. Internalizing the knowledge 
Currently, the most dominant concepts of knowledge are the notions of ‘explicit and ‘tacit 
knowledge (Awad & Ghaziri, 2007; Dalkir, 2011; Jashapara, 2011; Nonaka & von Krogh, 
2009; Tsoukas, 2005). As briefly mentioned above, commonly, explicit knowledge is the 
knowledge that a knower owns and that is able to be articulated and distributed to others. 
It can be modified and transmitted in various forms such as words, pictures, audio-visuals 
(Dalkir, 2011). This knowledge is related to the ability to disseminate, to reproduce, to 
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access and to re-apply amongst individuals and groups. However, despite it being formed or 
articulated in a particular format, knowledge is never completely explicit. 
Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that is not easily expressed in words, text, or drawings. It 
is inside the head of the knower as their property and they find it difficult to externalize it to 
other persons. Tacit knowledge includes non-verbal experiences and non-expressional 
actions. According to Lundvall (2000)and Kumar and Chakrabarti (2015), tacit knowledge can 
be linked to intuition, emotions, beliefs, values, perceptions, and feelings (the cognitive 
dimensions) and know-how, know-why, experiences, and hard-to-pin-skills (the technical 
dimensions). Tacit knowledge is also related to the ability to adapt and to deal with new and 
exceptional situations. Furthermore, tacit knowledge may be more valuable when being 
more difficult to articulate. It is also observable because it includes non-verbal experiences 
and unexpressed actions. It also requires the beginning to the end of processes of 
knowledge (Bechina & Ribiere, 2012). In some cases, tacit knowledge has its roots in 
complexity and in variation in quality.  
The study found that mostly the research participants had heard the first time about 
tsunamis after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami had been widely and explicitly televised. 
However, a few of them never heard or knew about tsunami until they experienced the 
2010 Mentawai Tsunami. The participants indicated that they heard about tsunamis mainly 
through the television broadcasts, followed by the activities of the local NGO activists and 
district government officers. The following interview shows that tsunami hazard knowledge 
became explicit from TV news.  
“Before that [the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami] we here had never heard 
from TV about it. [I] never thought that there was such a thing. [It was] 
impossible that the seawater [waves] was so high all of a sudden and came 
on to the land for hundreds of metres. I never thought that before. 
However, it was a fact, [and then] we thought that one day it might come to 
Mentawai. The Aceh tsunami… [I] think that tsunamis might come down 
here into Mentawai or Padang. So, at the time there were [a lot of] 
rumours [those tsunamis] would hit the Mentawai [Islands]” (Community 
Member, No. 17). 
The above interview indicates that the participant understood that the Mentawai islands 
could be devastated by tsunami hazards triggered by earthquakes. The people have often 
experienced earthquakes due to the islands’ position next to the active subduction zone 
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(Natawidjaja, 2007; Philibosian et al., 2014; Prawirodirdjo et al., 2010). When they lived in 
the interior, they believed that earthquakes (teteu -known also as grandfather or 
grandmother) always brought many blessings to the people’s lives (Delfi, 2013, 2014). 
However, after they had been exposed explicitly the tsunamic devastation, they became 
perplexed. They never knew how such devastation could occur as it was in such contrast to 
what their traditional beliefs led them to expect.  
“The Mentawai people had no traumatic [experiences of earthquakes]. 
They welcomed any earthquakes by saying ‘hopefully, this shock will bring 
blessings [to them]’. Indeed [they received] many [blessings]. [Durian trees 
produced] a lot of durians. But now [what we believed was just contrary to 
today’s reality]….” (Community Member, No. 18). 
 
“Their belief said ‘teteu is your grandmother but also mainly your 
grandfather’. [And] this grandfather could twist [from his sleeping]. 
Therefore, that is an earthquake. [As believed] a grandfather would never 
harm his grandchildren. If a grandfather comes, grandchildren should be 
silent and do nothing” (Researcher, No. 1). 
In fact, Delfi (2013) found that in Mentawai the old traditions always related that the 
relationship between the people and nature would be harmonious as long as they 
conducted their traditional-belief practices, Arat Sabulungan. This animistic belief is that 
each thing has a ”spirit” that exists either in the sky, sea, earth, or the jungle (Coronese, 
1986; Mulhadi, 2008; Salmeno, 1994). It is a social system of knowledge, values, norms, and 
regimes to understand the environments that involve in the interaction shapes among 
humans, animals, trees, soil, water and air and man-made things (Mulhadi, 2008). The 
indigenous people always used particular leaves of trees and specific animals that were 
found in the jungles. Therefore, it was important for them to live in the middle of the jungle, 
so they could easily conduct their rituals. 
As discussed, explicit knowledge can be delivered through many forms including practical 
procedures (Sanchez, 2004). With regard to the explicit knowledge on tsunami 
preparedness in Mentawai, the findings also indicated that such knowledge had been 
delivered to public elementary schools through several tsunami simulations. Simulations, as 
practical procedures, may significantly contribute to this process and enhance individuals 
skills and thereby create tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). The findings revealed 
that the children in schools had been explicitly exposed to tsunami hazard knowledge. It 
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also indicated that the children were advised not to panic when an earthquake occurred. 
Further investigations showed that several local NGO activists had worked in several 
elementary schools in Mentawai. The activists had presented regular activities to inform the 
students and teachers about tsunami hazards. 
We can see that before the 2010 tsunami some of the people in Mentawai had special skills 
that might help them escape from the tsunami waves. The people had internalized the 
tsunami hazard knowledge by integrating their existing skills in order to escape from 
potential tsunamis in the future. These findings reflect what Nonaka and Konno (1998) 
discussed in that the internalization process creates a new concept of how to do something 
and of how to apply this to a new strategy. Therefore, a new strategy to escape from 
tsunami hazards can result from the integration of new concepts with existing skills.  
The internalization of knowledge conversion is related to the process how explicit 
knowledge becomes tacit knowledge within the individual(s). According to Nonaka and 
Konno (1998), there are two dimensions of internalization processes. Firstly, explicit 
knowledge needs to be actualized in actions and practices. This process requires explicit 
knowledge as concepts to be actualized as strategies, tactics, innovations, improvements, or 
intuitions. From the field research, one participant climbed a coconut tree when the 
tsunami occurred as he had tacit knowledge regarding the tsunami. The other showed their 
tacit knowledge. 
“...The wave was so high and I was taken by the water somewhere [I did 
not realize anymore]. There was some wood which hit me and I stayed 
with it for hours...”(Community Member No. 14). 
Secondly, explicit knowledge is embodied by using simulations or experiments to create 
learning by doing processes. This process entails new methods or concepts to be learned in 
virtual situations (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). This is when an individual internalizes what they 
have learnt by directly enacting a simulation of a new method. This learning by doing 
process creates new insights within the individual and becomes tacit knowledge (Osatuyi & 
Andoh-Baidoo, 2013). From the field research, the above process was found among the 
elementary students in Mentawai. Before the 2010 tsunami, a number of the local NGOs 
had trained the students through simulations in schools. It was believed by the NGO 
activists that when a tsunami occurred the students would have the knowledge to escape 
123 
 
from the potential tsunami waves. The children would run directly to higher ground to 
escape from the tsunami waves.  
However, when the 2010 tsunami occurred the children also became victims of the tsunami. 
Although they had been trained to run away from the coastal areas in the school setting 
they were never informed and trained that tsunamis could occur during the night. The 
children, including the adults did not understand the severity of the situation so did not 
apply or indeed generalise their knowledge to this particular situation and make plans to 
escape. Instead, they stayed in their homes and kept watching TV and ignored the 
earthquake that would trigger a massive tsunami. Moreover, the children, including adults, 
were never informed tsunamigenic earthquakes.  
5.6. Implications of knowledge internalization to tsunami preparedness 
The internalization can be processed through actions and practices as well as simulations. 
The processes require a decision by the individuals to make better choices. Based on the 
new decision, they will act and perform that the explicit knowledge begins very slow and 
deliberately adjustable. However, with repetitiousness the process progressively becomes 
automated into their daily activities (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). As the implications of the 
processes, tacit knowledge gradually is formed and skills are created. Consequently, 
individuals can increasingly do complicated activities in unexpected conditions. 
The Sophocles’ quote from 400 BC: “One must learn by doing the things, for though you 
think you know it, you have no certainty, until you try” is useful to elaborate what many 
people from Mentawai did who had an experience of the Tsunami. After having known 
several tsunami occurrences in Aceh and Nias, some of the participants still did nothing to 
save their lives. Especially for the community in North and South Pagai, the 2007 Bengkulu 
Earthquakes should have been serious warnings for them, as these quakes had created 
damage to their property and, in the future, a similar event could hit them worse. The local 
government and some NGOs had persuaded those who lived in the red zone for tsunamis to 
move but only few of the community members responded by moving to safer places. 
Therefore, the tsunami became a real test case for those who had known about tsunamis 
earlier from cadres and/or the knowledge providers or other channels of communication. 
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A number of significant findings from the study showed that the local community fell into 
two categories in responding to explicit knowledge. One contained those who moved their 
settlement to a new one and the other contained those who kept living in their old 
settlements. Below are detailed explanations of the categories.  
5.6.1. Moving to safer places.  
After acquiring explicit knowledge, community members need to use it for their own 
interests. In terms of tsunami preparedness, people who live on coastlines should move to 
safer places. Indeed, Bryant (2008) argues that not all locations along the coast may be 
affected by tsunamis including high coastal landscapes. Therefore, it is certainly necessary 
to move the people who live on either the coasts to higher landscapes or far inland. As this 
study revealed, there was a number substantial findings found in the Malakopa Village 
(South Pagai Island), as illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
a. Moving to higher grounds 
The study also reveals that all the community of Dusun Malakopa moved 1.5 to 2 km to 
uphill. When the Tsunami hit, the waves only reached the old settlements, which lay near 
the coasts. Thus, they were all safe.  
“Yes, I felt it [the 2007 earthquake]. And it was much bigger than the 2010 
earthquake. That was why we [I] did not pay much attention to it [I 
thought] because the 2010 earthquake [had] very small shakes. Indeed we 
[I] felt it. But we [I] did not think if it would have triggered a tsunami” 
(Community Member No. 01). 
“….. [T]hat time [the 2010 Mentawai tsunami] was at night. The moon was 
clear. I remember it clearly. Some [his neighbour friends] had gone to 
sleep. But some had not yet. I myself had not yet because I was working at 
the time. I was working at the time, not sleeping. Suddenly the earthquake 
shook. I thought it was only a short while. But this one was lengthy. 
Actually [it was] not too big. I felt that the earthquake was not like usual 
earthquakes. But indeed [it was] lengthy. I then realized it could be 
dangerous. ‘It could create a tsunami’ I thought. I finally woke my wife and 
my children. My wife had actually been awakened, too because the bed 
was shaking around. My house was made of wood and the sound was loud. 
So we all [my family and I] were cautious. Indeed, my dog barked 
anxiously. My neighbours had also gathered and waited for any 
development. Some went down to see whether the sea tide was low. Some 
of them said the sea went down to a small level. But the others said there 
was no low tide. Suddenly, five minutes later the sea roared. It was never 
like that before. We ran away directly to save our lives. It was fortunate 
the moon was clear… [F]inally we arrived at a secure point. [It was only] 
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100 metres distant and we could have been hit by the tsunami if we had 
not run very quickly. My family was safe. My neighbours were also safe…” 
(Community Member No. 17). 
 
 
Figure 5. 4 
The people from the Malakopa Village had responded differently to the explicit htsunami hazard knowledge and 
applied the knowledge in some different ways.  
 
b. Moving farther inland 
However, the above move seemed for some only to involve their houses but not their way 
of living. The people from Dusun Belaraksok (Malakok Village), for example, who had moved 
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about 8-10 km inland, still had small huts next to the coasts. They lived down in the gardens 
next to the coast and did the same jobs, namely gardening and fishing. Often they slept over 
in their huts during weekdays and went up to their new settlements over the weekend. 
Therefore, when the Tsunami hit the islands, some of them lost their lives. One of them 
participated in the field research as follows: 
“I had an experience of the 2010 tsunami. It was the 25th of October at 
the time. The problem [that I faced] was that it was not easy to find 
things to make a living with. My wish was we [I] could have caught some 
fish that I could sell it to fulfil my needs. In the afternoon I went down [to 
my garden next to the sea]. I [then] asked my wife to come along with me 
to fish. We had a house-like hut. [Suddenly] an earthquake took place but 
the shock was not too strong. But I made sure my wife was all right. My 
wife said ‘Let see the net, maybe some fish are trapped.’ We both went 
down to the sea, and then we pulled over the net. At that time, I saw 
[suddenly] the seawater lessened [significantly]. Then my canoe was 
aground. I could see the stones on the edge of the shore [not in the water 
anymore]. [Having] realized the seawater had lessened, we both left the 
canoe. [We both] ran. 
I shouted to inform the other friends to run away to higher ground 
because the seawater had lessened. Before [I arrived at] my hut, a [huge] 
wave hit my hut. My hut was only 50 metres from the shore. My wife and 
I were separated. The wave was so high and I was taken by the water 
somewhere [I did not realize anymore]. There was some wood which hit 
me and I stayed with it for hours. The waves came three times. I didn’t 
know where my wife was. There were three waves in the tsunami. Some 
of my friends climbed up a tree.  
After it was dry, we went to a hill. The people were shouting that they 
were safe. I could not shout because I had swallowed a lot of [sea] water. 
Then my wife came to the hill. She asked me [if I had seen] my in laws.... 
In the morning, we gathered and realized that some of us [who went 
down to the coast from my dusun] were lost. Some were hit by some 
trees, others by their house wood. In the morning [after the sun rose] I 
realized I had lost my niece and my brother. There were 28 people [from 
my dusun]. Some people who also died lived in the Sibegeu Islands 
[smaller islands next to the North Pagai Island]. One of them was my son 
who was 18 years old. Therefore, there were three people from my 
family who died [because of the tsunami]. At night, they didn’t work, but 
they stayed in the Sibegeu Island. [However] the earthquake was small” 
(Community Member No. 14). 
5.6.2. Living in the same place.   
After gaining some knowledge of tsunamis, some local community members did not use this 
explicit knowledge to move to the safer place. The People from Munthe and Purourougat 
dusun (Malakopak Village) chose to stay in their existing settlements, instead. This study 
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reveals why they upheld this decision. However, they claimed to be able to increase their 
own sense to anticipate tsunamis, while others took passive action. 
a. Using Own Sense  
Those who relied on their own sense tried to compare the magnitudes of the 2010 
earthquake with the 2007 earthquake. They concluded that the 2007 earthquakes were 
much bigger in terms of shaking than the 2010 earthquakes. This conclusion made them 
more complacent and they did hardly anything to prevent potential harm. Their wait-and-
see actions caused them much harm because some of the neighbours lost their lives. 
According to Howes and Classen (2014), using one’s own senses is inadequate to rely on 
solely. Indeed, senses may be trained; however, much of it is the result of social 
conditioning. Therefore, relying on own senses for experience of whether earthquakes could 
trigger tsunamis or not could be dangerous for individuals. This concept also applied to the 
experience of one of my participants. 
“... Because the weather was [too] clear to do fishing. So, around 9 pm an 
earthquake [shook]. The shake was not too powerful. That’s why we didn’t 
run away and was not the same with [the shakes of] 2007 [earthquakes]. 
So, around 09.30 pm, another shake came again, [but] the shake was not 
from an earthquake. The shake came along with the tsunami. At the time, 
there were five of us at home. My father was at home. The two of three of 
my kids were also at home. My wife and I [were also at home]. [When I 
saw the tsunami came] I held one of my kids and my wife held the other 
one. [Luckily] my oldest son slept over in my brother’s. I thought my oldest 
son did not save. My father died and my both of my kids died also [because 
of the tsunami]. Their mother [my wife] also died. So, four of my family 
members died [because of the tsunami]. At the time [when tsunami came, 
we] had no chance to run away. Maybe we [I only had time] to run up to 
my yard. Before the wave came, my house had moved away because of the 
water. [My house] had moved away up to the edge of the river. So, even if 
we had had time to go down [from my staged wood house], the house 
would had hit us. Maybe, all of us would have died” (Community Member 
No. 13). 
The danger of using own senses to measure the magnitude of earthquakes is also 
mentioned by one of the researchers. He argues that since tsunami earthquakes, in 
particular, have small, lengthy shakes, using own senses would be fatal. 
“So, in the context of tsunami earthquakes, the 2010 [Mentawai tsunami] 
gave a clear message to researchers to provide clear information to 
community. Because it was wrong to tell the community about [lessons 
128 
 
learnt] from the 2007 earthquakes by training them to sense to feel big 
earthquakes and then to run. With [human being] sense it would be 
difficult to persuade [the community] to run as [the community] had 
compared it [the 2010 Mentawai Earthquake] to the 2007 earthquakes. 
Precisely, the weak shake is the danger of tsunami earthquakes, because 
these earthquakes occur in shallow, sedimented [segments]. [They will 
make] small, lengthy shakes. The rupture process would be longer and 
slower but are very effective to produce high frequency waves. So, this 
gave us a home work so that local community does not use their sense 
anymore but instead the government needs to install instruments” 
(Researcher No. 06). 
b. Passive action 
Oliver-Smith (2002) states that passive actions resulted from inappropriate human actions 
related to economic reasons such as building houses on flood plains and fault lines. 
However, involving the political-economic perspective will change this attitude to positive 
ways; thus, community groups will be more active in preparedness measures. The study also 
finds out why some participants took passive actions in responding to the tsunami potential. 
They thought a death was fate and there was nothing they could do to prevent it. This 
attitude was mostly based on their low economic condition because some thought that to 
be safe from tsunamis they would need a huge budget to move their properties to higher 
ground. Additionally, a new settlement would have to be made much further away from the 
garden and the sea for their livelihood. Lastly, the uncertainty of tsunami occurrences also 
influenced passive actions.  
“I [could] not do much. I was just resigned to it [this condition]. What was I 
supposed to do? [I] had been here, how I could move to Sumatra. [Even] in 
Sumatra [people] were hit by other tsunamis, too. So…if [I had been] hit by 









Figure 5.5 below shows the summing up of this section. 
 
Figure 5. 5 
The influence of knowledge on tsunamis to the decision of choosing settlements to live in,  
in Mentawai, West Sumatra 
 
The above Figure indicates that the research found two categories of people in Mentawai 
regarding tsunami hazard knowledge. Mainly, the participants had heard about tsunami 
hazards and those of them decided to move or not to move to the new settlements. Some 
who moved, chose to live on the higher ground close to the sea, but others moved inland 
about 8 – 10 km from the coasts. However, those who just lived inland often stayed 
overnight on the coast. The others who did not move to the new settlements intended to 
use their own senses to indicate earthquakes and tsunamis, or simply remained passive. 
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When, the tsunami occurred those who stayed overnight on the coasts, used their own 
senses and became victims of the tsunami. 
5.7. The Exclusive Reportage of Daily Singgalang 
Below is a brief exclusive reportage from Daily Singgalang regarding the prediction of the 
earthquakes from the Mentawai islands and the panic of the community in Padang City. This 
reportage was written by Edwardi et al. (2010). On 12 October 2010, exactly 13 days before 
the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami occurred, some experts on earthquakes and tsunamis, known 
as “Team Nine” conducted a workshop with some provincial senior officers from the West 
Sumatra Province. This team had warned the senior officers about a potential earthquake in 
the western coast of Mentawai. This potential earthquake could reach a magnitude of 8.9 
SR, called with Mentawai Megathrust, and could trigger a tsunami. Wahyu Triyoso, one of 
the Team Nine members said “We, the Team Nine feel like bringing a death message [to the 
public], but the scientific findings must be delivered so that we get prepared to face the 
disaster” (pp.14-15). It is good to note, however, that the earthquake the Team Nine had 
predicted was not the same with the 2010 Mentawai Earthquake.  
In fact, at the time the Team Nine gave its consent to the potential condition of Padang City 
(Padang) it the predicted tsunami occurred. They never said anything about a potential 
damage to Mentawai. The team predicted that the tsunami would reach Padang in 2.5 
hours after the earthquake with a run-up of 6 meters. The water could also reach the land 
for 2 km long. Indeed, if the tsunami occurred, it would had affected about 900,000 
population of Padang, where this number was far above the population of Mentawai, 
around 78,000 people (Pemda Mentawai, 2011). 
After this workshop published by the media to the community, several issues and invalid 
information were spread out among the local community of Padang. On 21 October 2010, 
for example, the local community was in panic due to the appearance of halo (optical 
phenomenon) surrounding the sun. The issues and hoaxes had related the optical 
phenomenon to a potential earthquake with a tsunami. Thus, the local community of 
Padang who stayed next to the coast flocked to evacuate to the higher ground. Not to 
mention, several of them also moved to other cities. This panicky situation was worsened by 
some hoaxes through social media. 
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After the Provincial Agency for Meteorological, Climatological, and Geophysical 
Management (BMKG) clarified that the optical phenomenon was not related to any 
occurrence of earthquakes, the local community started to be calm and went back home. 
But this calmness started again after an earthquake shook at 09:42 pm, 25 October 2010. All 
people of the city went down to the roads creating a huge congestion. The major of Padang 
(Mahyeldi Anysharullah) appeased the locals and persuaded not to be panic. The TV 
programs and the internet said the earthquake could trigger a tsunami. However, some 
sirens that had been planted in some bays of Padang did not sound. Nevertheless, the locals 
kept being panic and thought the sirens were not working. 
But, no one realized what happened to Mentawai. Even the national and provincial senior 
officers and the media paid no attentions to Mentawai. As evidence, on 26 October 2010 
(the day after) all local papers talked about the panics of the local community of Padang as 
this city was damaged once by a big earthquake on 30 September 2009. In fact that the 
landline and mobile communications were disconnected to Mentawai due to the 
earthquake, however, there were no concerns from the government officers and the media 
about it.  
At about mid noon, 26 October 2010, some national TVs announced “breaking news,” 
mentioning the tsunami had hit Mentawai. The TVs obtained the information via satellite 
communication. This breaking news surprised all the people. Ironically, the Regent of 
Mentawai District (Edison Seleleubaja) was in Padang to attend a coordination meeting in 
Solok City (about 65 km from Padang) and knew nothing about the Tsunami.  
In fact, several instruments of early warning had been planted in some bays in Mentawai, 
supported by the German Government. However, these instruments sent the information 
first to Germany and then to Indonesia. Meanwhile, BMKG had released a warning of 
potential tsunami 4 minutes and 46 seconds after the earthquake. But, “the local people in 
the western of the Mentawai coasts did not receive the information because of the limited 
facilities” said Sutopo Purwa Nugroho, a senior officer from BNPB. 
5.8. Conclusion 




Figure 5. 6 
The cross-cultural and institutional framework of KM 
Relationship between macro, micro, and community dimensions in KM. 
Sources: Adapted from Mohannak and Hutchings (2007). 
 
In relation to the research findings, Figure 5.6 above shows how KM was applied to analyse 
the KM process to transfer tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness in Mentawai. At 
the contextual and institutional levels, the District Government and the Parliament of 
Mentawai provided little support to implement the transfer and dissemination of tsunami 
hazard knowledge and preparedness. The findings indicate that the district government 
might have prioritised other programs rather than the implementation of tsunami hazard 
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education and preparedness programs within the community. More importantly, the local 
government thought that the tsunamis would not occur in Mentawai. This complacency 
resulted from there being no oral stories about tsunamis in the community and the 
misunderstandings about historical tsunamis that reached Sumatra. Moreover, the low 
social, educational, and economic status of the local community affected the acceptance of 
the program. The people tended to give less serious attention to tsunami knowledge and 
preparedness and to think more about their daily needs.  
The figure also shows several knowledge providers were found within the local community 
of Mentawai. They were the NGO activists, public officers, media, and newcomers. The 
findings indicated the importance of the knowledge providers who transferred explicit 
knowledge of tsunami hazards and preparedness to the local community of Mentawai. The 
community considered that the NGO activists had significant roles in this. However, it is 
important for the activists to increase their own knowledge of tsunami preparedness as well 
as their sensitivity to the conditions of the local community of Mentawai. Meanwhile, the 
local government officers also need to enhance their commitments to disseminate 
knowledge to the community. At the community level, the figure indicates the knowledge 
processes took place among the people. The people captured the explicit tsunami hazard 
knowledge and shared it with others. Some of them internalized the knowledge into a new 
knowledge or necessary actions to avoid any potential tsunamis. 
The people applied their knowledge in some different ways. Some moved their old 
settlements in to the safer hills and inland, but others just stayed in their old settlements. 
But those who moved inland often lived overnight next to the coasts to fish or garden. 
When the tsunami occurred the people who move inland but stayed overnight on the coast 
and those who kept living in their old settlements became victims. 
After the local community of Mentawai have experienced how devastating the tsunami was, 
they should be more alert to tsunami hazards in the future. They should actively figure out 
how to use their existing potential, knowledge, experience, and strategies to avoid tsunami 
hazards in the future, or at least to minimalize the impacts of them. The next chapter 
explores the current preparedness measures for anticipating tsunami hazards at the 




Current Tsunami Preparedness Measures in Mentawai 
 
“...[But] the problem would be when they are running through the narrow 
evacuation route and there is a steep bank on one side...” (Community 
Member, No. 12). 
6.0. Introduction 
After the discussion of the knowledge of tsunami hazards in the previous chapter, we 
understood that most of the field research participants had tacit and explicit knowledge of 
such hazards before the 2010 Tsunami occurred in Mentawai. It has also been explained 
that the participants have different applications of the knowledge to avoid potential 
tsunamis. Some participants responded by saying they would move to safe places close to 
their daily means of livelihood. Others said they would move inland, but they often came 
back and stayed overnight in the coastal areas for their livelihoods. The others just said that 
they would not move anywhere and would stay where they were. When the Tsunami hit 
their coastal areas in 2010, the impact of it was also different for the community. 
In response to what happened in 2010, this chapter is about the results from the second 
research question about current community preparedness measures for tsunami hazards. 
This chapter consists of five sections, as follows: 
Section 6.1. Introduces a multi-level approach to implement tsunami preparedness in 
Indonesia. 
Section 6.2. Presents and analyses the field research findings at the individual and 
household level. 
Section 6.3.  Presents and analyses the field research findings at the dusun level. 
Section 6.4. Presents and analyses the field research findings at the district level. 
Section 6.5. Concludes the chapter. 
6.1. A multi-level approach model for tsunami preparedness 
When people face uncertainty, they tend to request assistance from government, private 
institutions or other persons (individuals, family and community members) to reduce or 
eliminate the uncertainty. For many people, a tsunami hazard is an uncertain event, so it is 
necessarily important to provide tsunami information and interpretative processes of the 
event (Paton et al., 2009). Tsunami information will be one of the key resources for 
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individuals or households so they can be aware of and understand the hazard that they 
could face. Furthermore, cumulatively the community could develop the ability for specific 
knowledge and expertise to avoid or counter the problem (Paton, 2006b).  
BNPB (2013b) has introduced a model of a multi-level approach as adapted in Figure 6.1. 
This model is an ideal model to increase tsunami awareness and preparedness at the 
individual/household, community and district levels. At the individual/household level, the 
people and household members can actively increase their awareness, understand tsunami 
evacuation procedures, and provide a number of items that are needed in an emergency. At 
the community level, community members can collectively develop plans and evacuation 
procedures. They can disseminate and test the procedures by conducting education and 
simulation exercises. They may develop a system to assist the community members in the 
event of tsunamis through deployment development. Lastly, at the district level, local 
governments conduct tsunami risk assessments and regional chain warnings. Furthermore, 
the governments develop tsunami maps and evacuation plans that can be used by the 
community members. All these three levels are interlinked. 
As a number of scholars (Apatu, 2013; Carter, 2008; Reynaud, Aubert, & Nguyen, 2013; 
Scheer et al., 2011) emphasize that it is necessarily important to prioritise tsunami 
preparedness measures started from individual or household level; therefore, the analyses 
of the findings will start from the individual level (Section 6.3), followed by the community 





Figure 6. 1 
A model of multi-level approach of tsunami preparedness 
Adapted from BNPB (2013)  
 
6.2. Tsunami preparedness at the individual or household level 
Carter (2008) clearly emphasizes that tsunami preparedness efforts are inclined to become 
firmly focused on actions by individuals or household members. For someone to prepare, 
they firstly have to believe that a risk does exist. As they had experienced the Tsunami in 
2010, it was expected that the awareness in individuals or household members would be 
fully or partly formed. Therefore, this awareness could influence them to develop or 
understand the household evacuation processes and to provide domestic stockpiles.  
6.2.1. Individual or household awareness 
LaBerge (1998) claims that awareness in an individual occurs when "an experience" 
becomes "my experience". It is very clear that when an individual has “the experience” of 
something, they will give a different meaning and attention to it. As awareness of tsunami 
hazards might increase the skill in avoiding tsunami waves, it is necessary to maintain or 
raise awareness over time. There are certain techniques to develop effective awareness in 
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individuals, namely enhancing personal efficacy (Paton, 2006b) and protective behaviour 
(M. L. Edwards, 1993).  
a. Personal efficacy 
Bandura (1998) claims that personal efficacy is an individual’s belief in their capability to 
generate specific degrees of achievement which utilize influence over hazardous threats. 
Mastery of experiences is the most effective approach to build robust personal efficacies. 
Therefore, personal efficacies entail experiences to solve impediments or problems through 
persevering actions. This claim is consistent with what I found in the field research, as 
follows: 
“If I am at the shoreline [when an earthquake shakes], I will run away to a 
secure place....[I] will run as fast as I can. At any rate, if an earthquake 
shakes, I will run [no matter how]. But, if I am at the sea [to catch the fish], 
I would keep staying there”. (Community Member No. 17) 
 
The above quote shows a strong determination to avoid the tsunami waves. The experience 
of escaping from the tsunami by running away to find a secure place has provided the 
research participant with strong personal efficacy in facing the same problem in the future.  
In addition, strong personal efficacy can also be obtained by conducting certain training. 
(Gelkopf et al., 2008; Smith & Woodworth, 2012). Individuals or household members need 
to be encouraged continuously, so that they have the capacity to master specified actions. 
Through mastery actions, they may also potentially mobilize better actions. Moreover, they 
may maintain their efficacies to develop certain skills. In relation to the field research 
findings, no specific individual training was found that could build personal efficacy for the 
participants themselves as well as for their family members; whereas, the Government 
encourages individuals to increase their efficacy to escape from any potential tsunamis. 
However, some of the participants can easily climb coconut trees or run away in the dark in 
the jungle or along small grassy tracks because they are used to it. These kinds of abilities 
are formed by the daily experiences of living that could help them to escape from tsunami 
waves.  
“…[I] have known the road that we [I] used to step on. So, even [if] it is in 
the night, we [I] have known [memorized how to reach] the small roads. 
We [I] can run” (Community Member, No. 01). 
138 
 
In short, personal efficacy among the participants is mostly formed by their daily activities. 
Their daily activities enable them to have the ability to create personal efficacy to avoid the 
potential hazard in the future. However, self-efficacy by training needs to be concerned 
about the near future. 
b. Protective behaviours 
It is possible to reduce risks by undertaking protective behaviours. Protective behaviours 
allow an individual to identify conditions in which their personal space and sense of safety 
may be compromised. They are the preventive actions of someone to counter potential risks 
from certain problems or hazards (Natawidjaja et al., 2006; Nelan & Grineski, 2013; Reynaud 
et al., 2013; Scheer et al., 2011). There are three kinds of protective behaviours when 
someone takes a risk, namely, individual risk assessment, an understanding of risk proximity 
and the capacity to react. 
Firstly, individual risk assessment is how someone assesses that the risk as important or 
hazardous for them. It can also be said that this kind of assessment is the probability of a 
specific individual becoming a victim as a result of exposure to tsunami waves (Nelan & 
Grineski, 2013; Reynaud et al., 2013; Scheer et al., 2011). Similarly to the situation of the 
local community of Mentawai before the Tsunami, some of the participants thought that 
tsunamis only hit other people, but not the Mentawai people. Unfortunately, after having 
such a tragic learning experience, some participants still ignore their own safety by looking 
at the sea level as an earthquake is shaking. The reason is just to see if a tsunami is coming 
or not. They argue that if they always run away after earthquakes, they would pay less 
attention to earthquakes in the future. However, tsunamis could reach the shores in less 
than ten minutes after earthquakes (BNPB, 2013a).  
“….[T]hen I would look at the sea [to know whether it] has lessened. I 
would try [to look at it for] some moments there [to confirm] whether a 
tsunami would come or not. Because my fear is if [the tsunami] does not 
happen, while the people have been at the evacuation point. So if the same 
cases repeatedly take place, [where] in every earthquake, [the people] run 
away, the people would pay no attention anymore [if a real tsunami 
comes]” (Community Member, No. 04). 
It seems that the above participant tends to risk his own and others’ safety by assessing the 
sea surface after an earthquake. His action is potentially jeopardizing himself and others, 
because he builds a perception that tsunamis only occur after the sea surface subsides. In 
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fact, the earthquakes in Mentawai can generate tsunamis before the people recognize that 
the waves have reached them. 
Secondly, the understanding of risk proximity is the way someone rates the risk of potential 
impacts on their valuable goods. In the event of a tsunami, many cases are found where 
someone takes risks to save their belongings (Nelan & Grineski, 2013; Scheer et al., 2011). 
The field study also disclosed some different potential actions by the participants about 
taking risks in relation to valuable property. Some participants would not save their 
valuables such as birth or education certificates just before a tsunami was about to hit the 
area.  
“I don’t think [I should save my child’s education certificates]. Nowadays 
certificates [mostly elementary to high school certificates] have no use. 
The most important is firstly to save ourselves. Why bother to think of 
other [things]” (Community Member, No. 19). 
“I have nothing to save except my life. What is [my] property [it is 
valueless]” (Community Member, No. 16). 
On the other hand, to anticipate the potential loss of valuable documents, one of the 
participants has placed them in his hut in the jungle. This hut is believed to be out of the 
reach of tsunamis waves, thus, in the event of a tsunami he would not take a risk for the 
documents.  
However, another participant seems to be willing to take a risk to save her valuables, even 
though she has placed such valuable documents and property in an easy to reach place for 
when an emergency situation occurs.  
“Actually the certificates and other important documents have been placed 
in a particular point [at home]. If the earthquakes take place, I [can easily] 
take them with me” (Community Member, No. 05).  
Another participant would also take risks to save his belongings. He would save his pigs if a 
tsunami was about to come. I noticed that the pig cages are placed above the sea next to his 
house. Pigs are part of the Mentawai culture and they become additional income for some. 
Almost every cultural and religious ritual uses pigs for sacrifices or as parts of communal 
meals. 
“…. I would strive to open the cages so that they would find out their way 
out to be saved. It would be a pity if they were dead like that. My pigs are 
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important [to me]. You can imagine, my children can go to school because I 
also have had [sold] some pigs. If I had any chance, I would let them out” 
(Community Member, No. 02). 
It is interesting to know that some of the participants would prioritise their own safety 
rather than save their belongings. However, some others would take any chance to save 
their valuable belongings. Whereas, as the above scholars warn, taking such a risk would 
potentially jeopardise their own lives.  
Lastly, the capacity to react is the way someone has the opportunity to control or avoid 
certain risk. In the tsunami hazard context, the capacity to react is more to avoid rather than 
to control the risk (Nelan & Grineski, 2013; Reynaud et al., 2013). This argument is also 
found in the field research where the participants will avoid the risk by taking some urgent 
actions. Mainly, the participants would run on foot or use a motorcycle to avoid the hazard. 
“Then we [I] would find out a safer point to gather, then to try to run to the 
evacuation point until it was quite safe. Maybe after one hour in the 
evacuation point, [to make sure] it’s safe” (Community Member, No. 02). 
Two other participants said that they would climb up the coconut trees to avoid tsunami 
waves. Many coconut trees have sufficient height to take the evacuees above the level of 
tsunami inundation and have the strength to resist the effects of tsunami waves in 
Mentawai. I then reminded them that the Tsunami uprooted many coconut trees on the 
coastlines.  
“This is [my] safest way. [I have] no choice any longer. In the 2010 
[tsunami] indeed many coconut trees were uprooted. But those [the trees] 
were precisely on the shorelines. We [I] would not climb on the edge, 
[instead] a little further [from the edge]” (Community Member, No. 19). 
I could say that during the field research, all participants had the capacity to avoid tsunami 
hazards by running away from the coasts on foot or motorcycle or by climbing coconut or 
other trees. This kind of capacity is important in order to avoid the hazard in the future. 
Although plentiful evidence shows that coconut trees can save tsunami survivors; however, 
as Forbes and Broadhead (2007) remind, the bending of a coconut tree from the forces of 
the tsunami waves can reduce its mitigation capacity. In general, we often find a wide 




In conclusion, the research participants have certain levels of individual or household 
awareness of tsunami waves in the future. Some have strong self-efficacy from their 
experiences of escaping from the Tsunami as well as of performing daily work that increases 
their ability to escape the waves. For others, however, personal efficacy by training is 
important to be carried out in the future. Meanwhile, some participants also have strong 
individual protective behaviours in avoiding tsunami hazards. However, others would still 
take risks in order to save their valuable belongings. Therefore, it is important to inform 
individuals and increase their awareness of the tsunami hazard. 
6.2.2. Evacuation procedures 
There are three important elements to address in relation to evacuation procedures: 
namely an evacuation plan, household exercises, and tsunami tendenko. As this section 
focuses more on individuals’ and household members’ preparedness measures, this sub-
section will explain the roles of household members for other members. 
a. Evacuation plans  
A recent study from American Samoa suggested that the factor most necessary in order to 
escape from tsunamis is a household evacuation plan (Apatu, 2013). An evacuation plan can 
be guidance for affected people from their current position to run away through evacuation 
routes towards evacuation points before the first tsunami wave hits them. Reynaud et al. 
(2013) and Scheer et al. (2011) mention that an evacuation plan can be invoked if warning 
systems signal, so that the people respond properly to save their lives from the incoming 
tsunami waves. Therefore, a household evacuation plan is a critically important plan in 
which a member or members of a family know what to do and where to go in the case of a 
tsunami, to make the evacuation process as efficient as possible. 
As the tsunamis are potentially triggered by earthquakes in Mentawai, a number of 
messages are needed to inform the household member about the household evacuation 
plan: 
1) Drop, cover and hold on 
This protective action can apply to those who are indoors and outdoors when an 
earthquake shakes. It is recommended that one drop to the floor with their hands 
protecting vital organs and knees to prevent movement and falls. From this position, 
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they can crawl a short distance to the nearest cover to protect themselves from 
falling and moving objects, if they are in range of such objects. Furthermore, they 
should hold their position until it is safe to move (Wood, 2015). 
 
2) Move to higher ground 
Soon after the shake stops, the household members should move to higher ground 
nearby. Those who are using a motorcycle to evacuate should consider the 
motorcycle’s condition, the availability of gasoline and collapsed or damaged roads 
(Wood, 2015). 
  
3) Stay on the higher ground until it is safe 
It is critically important to make sure the household members come back to the 
house after the local authority gives an official confirmation of the safety. In the 
absence of the confirmation, however, they could come home one or two hours 
after the earthquake. As the Mentawai Islands are geographically close to the 
earthquake sources, a tsunami could only occur a few minutes after an earthquake.  
Unfortunately, the field research in Mentawai revealed that no participants have a 
household evacuation plan. The main reason is that they do not understand the importance 
of it. Another reason is they do not know how to carry out the plan. In addition, they believe 
people can do things to protect themselves. The other is they believe that earthquakes are 
not their problems. 
The lack of understanding of the participants seems more likely to create the absence of an 
evacuation plan at the household level. Whereas, as Apatu (2013), Reynaud et al. (2013) and 
Scheer et al. (2011) mention, having an evacuation plan would help them remember where 
to escape to if a tsunami comes.  
b. Household exercises 
In order to escape from and understand where to go in the event of a tsunami, individuals 
or family members should be trained. More importantly, a family needs to have its own 
exercises to ensure all family members, particularly the children and persons with special 
needs, understand the procedures on where to go in the event of a tsunami (Johnston & 
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Dudley, 2009). However, the field research reveals that no participants had conducted a 
household exercise. Even worse, the children are not told about the procedures at homes.  
One participant tended to leave the household exercise to his child’s school activities and 
NGO’s activities.  
“I think [my children] have done it [the simulation] at their [elementary] 
school. And if NGO [activists] come down here, we [the dusun people] will 
do it together. I think it is enough to redeem my worry [about tsunamis]” 
(Community Member No. 02). 
Interestingly, it seems that tsunami simulation exercises have been introduced in Mentawai 
at the elementary school and I found that one elementary school in Sikakap has regularly 
conducted an earthquake and tsunami exercise. This activity is supported by an NGO. 
Unfortunately, at the household level, the participant as a parent leaves it as part of the 
education process only, without being followed up at home.  
Another never thought that household exercises were important to increase tsunami 
preparedness.  
“Ah, I never do it [a household exercise]. Because, [I] never thought to do 
it” (Community Member No. 05) 
The other assumes that his family members would find their own ways to escape from 
tsunami waves. 
“....[B]eside I think [everybody] knows where to go if an earthquake 
[shakes]” (Community Member No. 03) 
The above quotes signify that some of participants had not realized or still ignore their own 
safety regarding the tsunami hazard. Since most of the participants had not realized the 
necessity of a household exercise, therefore, it is important to ensure all family members 
understand the procedures on where to go in the event of a tsunami. However, the failure 
to adopt household plans and exercises might reflect tsunami tendenko. 
c. Tsunami tendenko 
Tsunami tendenko is necessarily important to every person. Tendenko (a Japanese word) 
means ‘go separately’. It is a maxim that expresses “the individual is not to stay and help 
others, but to run and preserve their life instead” (Kodama, 2015b, p. 361). Therefore, every 
person in a community should know what to do and where to run in the event of a tsunami, 
144 
 
to self-evacuate and reach an evacuation point. By conducting tsunami tendenko, “the 
rescuer” and “the rescued” will avoid the deaths of the rescuer and the rescued. Therefore, 
every person who experiences the event of a tsunami should immediately run to save their 
own life rather than helping or waiting for others in order to avoid potential deaths of “the 
rescuer’ and “the rescued”. 
This maxim is still debatable and not widely adopted in Japan. However, Kodama (2015a) 
identifies two main criticisms of tsunami tendenko that should be carefully considered. One 
is that tsunami tendenko increases egoism. As this maxim seems selfish and immoral, a 
concern with saving individuals’ lives collectively maximises the total number of lives saved. 
Kodama explains it through the table below.  
Table 6. 1 
The Tsunami Dilemma 
  A does not search for B 
(runs for his/her life) 
A searches for B 
B does not search for A 
(runs for his/her life) 
Both likely to survive 
(tsunami-tendenko) 
B likely to survive, A 
likely to die 
B searches for A 
A likely to survive, B 
likely to die 
Both likely to die  
Source : Kodama (2012) 
Table 6.1 illustrates what might happen if tsunami waves are about to attack a settlement 
and potentially kill the inhabitants, unless they run away soon. It will be a lose-lose situation 
if A and B choose to seek and wait for each other. They will be more likely to die from the 
tsunami. However, if one of them chooses to evacuate, he/she will be more likely to be safe. 
More importantly, if both decide not to search for each other, but to self-evacuate, both are 
more likely to be safe (tsunami tendenko) (Kodama, 2012). 
The other criticism is that psychologically people find it problematic to comply with the 
maxim. It is natural for people to tend to save others in dire need. There are some 
possibilities of associations between “the rescuer” and “the rescued” in the event of a 
tsunami. Firstly, the rescuer might not know if the rescued has saved themselves because 
they can evacuate. Secondly, the rescuer might not know if the rescued has been saved, as 
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they cannot evacuate themselves. Lastly, the rescuer might know the rescued could not be 
saved and cannot evacuate (Kodama, 2015a). 
However, the field study showed some findings contradicting the tsunami tendenko maxim. 
All participants from among the community members mentioned they would save others in 
the event of tsunamis. They would save particularly the children, pregnant women, their 
family members and elderly and sick people. 
“[If a tsunami is about to occur and I am in my garden] I would try to come 
to my dusun. Because [my] children are there” (Community Member, No. 
04). 
Generally, family links in Indonesia are very close. Similarly, in Mentawai a family usually has 
siblings staying nearby. For many, neighbours are important as the participants mentioned 
below: 
“Of course [I would save them]. All here are like brothers and sisters. So, 
the sadness of one is ours, too. For example, my neighbour [very close to 
my house] is my brother. Next to him is my brother’s father in law. In that 
corner is my father in law. So the family [from my side] has eleven 
[families] here. So, we are here to care for one another” (Community 
Member, No. 13). 
“……[I]f no neighbours, whom do we [I] ask for? It is the neighbours who 
are also my brothers and sisters. Mostly in this dusun there are siblings. It 
means kinsmen, in laws, uncles, nieces. All are related. So if you asked if it 
is important, it is [very important]” (Community Member, No. 19). 
I then asked them if they directly knew the number and the places of the elderly, the 
pregnant females, or the sick people in the dusun. Generally, they could not answer directly 
and needed some period of time to identify them. This means that they would search the 
places or houses to find those people to save. By searching, they would waste the time 
necessary to save themselves.  
“[While he tried to remember by starting counting and pointing to the 
houses] saying there are seven elderly people that cannot walk. [They] 
need assistance. But I don’t know if any are pregnant here. But there is no 
big [mature] pregnancy here now” (Community Member, No. 13). 
It was also revealed that they would save the vulnerable people by using pickaback, sarongs 
and straight branches of tree (pillars) to carry them, or giving rides on motorcycles. 
However, the sarongs and the pillars are stored in the Satlinmas posts or in the house of the 
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dusun head. This also means that they need more time to get those tools. Satlinmas stands 
for Satuan Perlindungan Masyarakat =Community Protection Task Force). Satlinmas is a 
group of the local community members that have been trained to take care of any impacts 
of potential earthquakes and any potential tsunamis caused by an earthquake, in particular 
at night-time in one dusun.The main tasks of the Satlinmas are readiness to provide 
information and to provide assistance to others if earthquakes and tsunamis hit. 
In conclusion, the study found that no participants conducted household evacuation plans 
and exercises and tsunami tendenko. Contradicting tsunami tendenko where the affected 
people should run away from the coast to avoid the tsunami , the participants would even 
come to the dusun close to the coast to assist the others. Indeed, tsunami tendenko seems 
to be not easy to apply to adults due to strong kinships in the community. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the participants to consider their own safety from tsunamis through having 
household evacuation plans, conducting regular household practices and considering the 
tsunami tendenko. 
6.3.3. Domestic stockpiles 
A recent study conducted by Arlikatti et al. (2010) in India identifies ten types of tools or 
facilities that a household needs to prepare for tsunamis, namely: shelter, a portable water 
supply, illumination, packaged foods, cutlery, waste disposal, portable cooking equipment, 
washing devices, dish washing, and transportation. All these ideal domestic stockpiles, 
however, seem not to be applicable to the local community of Mentawai, since some of 
them are naturally available and are just not needed. Therefore, only some of the items are 
pertinent to this study. 
a. Stockpiling a shelter 
Stockpiling a shelter is an incremental process, which could support accommodation for 
family members potentially affected by a tsunami hazard. The process considers the security 
of land rights, providing materials to build the shelter or using a built-up shelter, and 
developing and maintaining a coordinated, integrated, and comprehensive inter-sector 
(Kelly, Nunes, & Centre, 2012). In connection with the field research, it is common in 
Mentawai for one household to have “two houses”. One “real” house is used for daily living 
in and the other is a “hut” that is used for temporary shelter. Therefore, if one household 
has a “real” house next to the coast, this household usually has a hut in the jungle. Likewise, 
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if another household has a “real” house in the jungle, a hut will be built next to the coast. 
Therefore, if they evacuate from a tsunami, they will have a shelter in the jungle. Or in the 
case that they do not have one in the jungle, they can easily build a temporary shelter since 
many trees are available there. 
b. Food preparation 
Experts say that it is important to prepare foods, especially non-perishable ones. These 
easily prepared foods should be enough for at least a three-day supply for evacuation. 
Naturally, in the jungle of Mentawai many foods are found. As the local people normally 
also plant some kumara, taros or bananas in the jungle, therefore, it seems that food 
supplies in the case of evacuation are not problems for the local community for a few days. 
In fact, there were two participants who stated that there has been a mutual agreement by 
two different dusun to keep planting and caring for some kinds of crops such as kumara, 
taros and bananas in the forests. The reason for this is if any tsunamis hit them, emergency 
foods are available. They also agreed that the dusun people only take some of them except 
in an emergency.  
“...[B]ut if there is any earthquake [followed by a tsunami], we can directly 
use the huts and kumara etc. [We have] hoes and other tools there [in the 
jungle]. Now, every dusun has their own garden above [in the jungle]...” 
(Community Member No. 18). 
“We have a community garden with a lot of banana trees. We have 
[developed] this garden after the Tsunami. It is not very wide, but [what 
we want to plant] depends on us [all community members]” (Community 
Member No. 07) . 
It is good to know that in some dusun the people have planted some crops for a time that 
they might need them. It is also interesting that the dusun people have a mutual agreement 
to take care of the plants and take them only when they need them in emergency 
circumstances.  
c. First aid and other supplies 
Many experts and institutions suggest that a household stockpile contains a compact kit 
with first aid or other important tools. The stockpile usually consists of whistle, antibiotic 
ointment, bandages, iodine, and a folding pocketknife. However, I found no participants 
who had such supplies. However, I am confident that the local community could use some 
natural herbs from the jungles as medicine for injuries. My confidence is also confirmed by 
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the findings of the Ministry of Health which conducted a survey on Siberut Island in 2014. 
Mostly the participants from that survey said that they often use natural herbs to heal their 
injuries (Agung, Purwaningsih, Zamzami, & Rahanto, 2014). 
In short, the study revealed that the key elements for the local community of Mentawai to 
be prepared for a tsunami hazard are the experiences of daily living and the Tsunami, and 
the natural condition of Mentawai. However, some other elements such as protective 
behaviours and evacuation procedures that can be increased through some training or 
information dissemination to the individuals are needed. These efforts are believed to make 
the community preparedness stronger in the future. 
6.3. Tsunami preparedness at the dusun level  
Based on the model in Figure 6.1, three elements are important for the local community at 
the dusun level to prepare them to be resilient in the face of a tsunami hazard. These are 
plan and evacuation procedures, education and simulation exercises and deployment 
setting.  
6.3.1 Evacuation procedures 
The purpose of an emergency plan and evacuation procedure is to serve the local 
community engaged in a potential tsunami response within the locality. Its aim is to increase 
the local community members’ and stakeholders’ resilience by ensuring all community 
members understand what to do and where to go. At this stage, the local community at the 
dusun level might conduct many activities. The community could develop or design a dusun 
committee to prepare a series of preventive activities; determine a particular point as an 
assembly area for the community; plan an education and training session for the community 
members or cadres or build physical structures to facilitate the community to escape. 
Scheer et al. (2011) argue there are three critical elements that should be available in the 
community in order to maximize evacuation processes, namely tsunami hazard maps, 
evacuation areas and evacuation routes and signs. 
a. Tsunami hazard maps  
It is important to identify some factors that could enable or hinder evacuation processes in 
an area. A tsunami hazard map ideally shows all things that potentially facilitate or obstruct 
ways to escape from the tsunami waves and the potential inundation area of a tsunami. To 
149 
 
develop this map, technical skills and time are required. Topographic data, all buildings, and 
information about potential tsunamis are needed (Samant, Tobin, & Tucker, 2008).  
However, at the community level like a dusun or village in Mentawai, those data and 
technical skills are not available. In the absence of such data and skills, Cadag and Gaillard 
(2012) suggest developing a participatory map. Participatory mapping is a method where 
members of a community are encouraged to develop and use a map or maps in order to 
communicate their knowledge and ideas more clearly (Forrester & Cinderby, 2012). This 
simple map only requires local community participation and the identification of the most 
needed information and data in the community. Patras and Koutis (2010) identify a number 
of steps to develop participatory mapping, as follows: 
1. Gathering and preparing the community for the mapping activity. 
2. Determining the purpose(s) of making a map for the participants. 
3. Collecting information from the participants. 
4. Creating the map on drawing paper(s) and determining the legend. 
5. Analysing and evaluating the information. 
6. Displaying the developed map to the community. 
The study has unveiled that no dusun has such tsunami hazard maps. One participant 
acknowledged that the dusun people once gathered and developed a map in order to 
decide where the evacuation route would be built. Since then, no maps have been 
developed and displayed.  
“We once made a map before the [dusun] people decided where the 
evacuation route would be built. But, since then ....[I don’t know where the 
map is]” (Community Member No. 04). 
In addition, one participant from an NGO mentioned that some dusun have made tsunami 
risk assessment maps. The participant mentioned that the maps had been developed 
together with the dusun people. However, he could not show me the physical evidence of 




b. Evacuation routes and signs 
As a continuous and unobstructed path of exit from any point within a community to a place 
of safety (Pu & Zlatanova, 2006), an evacuation route is needed in order to escape from 
tsunamis. In determining the evacuation route, it is important to consider the fastest way to 
reach the evacuation point. In relation to the field study, all dusun next to the shorelines, 
have one or two evacuation routes. Some participants feel satisfied that they have these 
evacuation route(s) in their dusun.  
“Now there is an evacuation route built by the government. [I] could run 
faster if any tsunami. I feel a little bit relieved.” (Community Member No. 
12) 
Some others, however, need more evacuation routes to be built because for them it is too 
far to reach the evacuation road if a tsunami is about to come.  
“Actually, if [it is] possible, [for more evacuation routes to be built] next to 
[several] households. The evacuation route [that we have now] was built 
almost in the middle of the kampong [dusun]. But from the end [of the 
dusun] if [someone] runs they will also need time. So, there should be 
more” (Community Member No. 06). 
One participant who is an elementary teacher is confident that her children would run away 
up to the hill in the event of a tsunami, through the small evacuation route next to her 
school. However, she also raised the issue of inappropriate evacuation routes.  
“... [But] the problem would be when they [the elementary students] are 
running through the narrow evacuation route and there is a steep bank on 
one side [they could have fallen]. This could potentially become a problem. 
They should have put a hand rail so that no people would fall when 
running” (Community Member, No. 02). 
 
Other participants are pleased to have the evacuation route(s) built. They would use the 
route with their motorcycles to evacuate, but also mentioned the same problem of the 
narrowness of the evacuation routes.  
“…[I]t [the route] is a small alley. [I believe] if in a panic [situation] we 
would be stuck there. [I believe] my motorcycle will be the first before 
others. So, it would be possible to come again to help some” (Community 
Member, No. 03). 
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A local community needs to maintain evacuation routes. In some cases, a route could 
become inaccessible due to, for example, road works. Moreover, putting something on the 
routes will reduce the road capacity, and even worse will block the way when they are to be 
used (Nelan & Grineski, 2013; Reynaud et al., 2013; Scheer et al., 2011).  
From the field findings, it is regrettable that in some dusun the evacuation routes are used 
for other purposes or just carelessly abandoned. During my visit to Dusun Berkat Baru in 
Sikakap, North Pagai, the evacuation route was blocked by some motor cycles (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6. 2 
Some motorcycles were parked next to the evacuation route that would 
potentially block the evacuation process if needed 
Source: Courtesy of CDRM & CDS taken during the field study 
 
It was also found that other evacuation routes in Dusun Makukkuet (Matobe, North Pagai) 




Figure 6. 3 
The evacuation route was blocked by a water pipe to flow clean water the 
several households nearby in Dusun Makukkuet 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
In addition, the route in Dusun Pasibbuat (Taikako, North Pagai) is too steep to be climbed 
and is greatly eroded by rain water (Figure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6. 4 
The evacuation route is steep to climb and eroded from  
the rain in Dusun Passibut 




One participant from Dusun East Sikakap (Sikakap, South Pagai) found that often the 
evacuation route in his dusun is used for other purposes.  
“..... [someone] uses it [to dry the crops] like that... Indeed the evacuation 
route becomes a good place to dry cocoa beans or coconut. Because the 
place [the route is concrete] is dry and hot in the sunshine...]” (Community 
Member , No. 08). 
Evacuation route signs use a symbol that direct people to a pre-defined evacuation route 
away from potential tsunami areas. Scheer et al. (2011) argue that evacuation signs should 
be the most visible way to educate the local community about evacuation routes and 
evacuation points. The signs are generally arrow directions: left, right, veer left, veer right 
and ahead. These signs may be added with simple, but clear messages such as “tsunami 
evacuation route” with wave-like pictures.  
In addition, Scheer et al. (2011) claim that additional supplementary text is needed to 
maximize the evacuation signs. This complementary text would advise the local community 
where to go when a warning sounds. The text should say the name of assembly point; how 
far the evacuation sign is to the assembly point; and which direction will lead to it. In fact, 
BNPB (2013a) has provided standard evacuation route signs (shown in the next section).  
In some dusun that I went to, I found that the evacuation signs were designed in different 
ways from the standardized design. The evacuation signs in Dusun Malakopa (Malakopa) 
(Figure 6.5), Dusun Tuapeijat and Dusun Berkat (Sipora), Dusun Sagitsi Timur (Nem Nem 
Leleu), and Dusn Gobik (Bosua) were slightly different from the national design standard, 
but still contained the basic information of the standardized design. Below is one example of 




Figure 6. 5 
The evacuation route sign mentioning “the tsunami evacuation route” is 
placed next to the evacuation route. It gives the message and shows the 
direction to the evacuation point in Dusun Malakopa 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
There were some other signs with different designs from the national standard. In dusun 
Sibabai and Berkat Baru (Sikakap), the evacuation route sign was smaller in size, had smaller 
written messages, and different colours (Figure 6.6). 
 
Figure 6. 6 
The evacuation route sign is placed next to the evacuation route and is 
different from the standardised design in Sikakap. 




In Dusun Pasibbuat, the evacuation sign was also found to be of a different standard as well 
as the main message being unclear and almost unreadable anymore (Figure 6.7).  
 
Figure 6. 7 
The evacuation route message is faded and unreadable 
as found in Pasibbuat 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
However, it was also found that there were no evacuation signs in Dusun Makukkuet 
(Matobe, North Pagai) and Dusun Asahan (Bulasat, South Pagai). One participant said: 
“There are no evacuation signs found here, because the people have no 
particular fund [to provide them]. Because the people have [too] little 
money. But actually, if the people had high awareness, they [we] would 
have provided the money to make the signs.” (Community Member, No. 
06) 
It is clear that no actions have been taken by the dusun people to develop the evacuation 
signs because of poverty. However, if they commit to collecting money little by little, they 
could acquire some.  
c. Evacuation points 
BNPB (2013a) emphasises that evacuation points or safer areas are designated inside or 
outside locations of the community, which are on higher ground or inland from coastal 
waters for evacuated occupants. Evacuation points, also known as assembly points, are 
considered to be easily accessible points. They are often positioned at a reasonable range 
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that people can reach in a timely manner from the point of departure. All research 
participants that lived in the dusun which is next to the shorelines said that each dusun has at 
least one evacuation point. According to my observations of some evacuation points in 
Mentawai, the evacuation points are mainly located in the dusun at approximately 15 m 
above sea level. They can accommodate the dusun people if evacuation occurs since they are 
relatively wide and flat. However, some evacuation points are neglected and overgrown with 
grass.  
d. Emergency messages or signs 
People who live on the shoreline have to be aware of the signs of potential tsunami 
occurrence. In general, there are two basic indicators to indicate tsunami waves could hit 
the shores, namely 1) earthquakes and 2) abnormally rapid retreat or draw-down of the sea 
(Scheer et al., 2011). However, often people fail to recognize the signs due to, for example, 
an earthquake shaking when people are sleeping, some children never having experienced 
earthquakes, or the earthquake is too small or too far away to feel. Meanwhile, modern 
communication technology does not always exist in a community. Therefore, a mutual 
agreement among community members is important to decide how to deliver the warnings. 
It is also imperative to involve community members in identifying the best communication 
mechanism and strategies. Community members can design warning messages based on 
custom to ensure others receive and understand them.  
King (2006) reminds us that there is no assurance that the community will receive, accept, 
and respond homogenously to a warning sign or an emergency message pattern. According 
to Drabek (1969) there are three general patterns of an early warning process, namely 1) 
warning by authority; 2) warning by peer (friend); and 3) warning by mass media. In the 
absence of early warning patterns by authority and mass media, such as those discussed in 
the previous chapter, it is necessary to rely on the warning pattern by peers. Thus, the local 
community needs to decide how the emergency messages or signs pattern will be used and 
understood by members of the community.  
In relation to the field study, recently the local people from some dusun in Mentawai have 
developed and used kentongan or tutuko in the local Mentawai word to communicate an 
emergency to the others. Tutuko is a traditional simple communication gong that is made 
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from bamboo or timber. In some areas in Indonesia, tutuko is used to define signal long 
distance communication and danger signs. Tutuko size ranges between 40cm in diameter 
and a height of 1.5 metres and is often identified with time immemorial communication, a 
tool that is often used by people living in the countryside and mountains (Mei et al., 2013; 
Restyandito, Chan, Mahastama, & Saptadi, 2013). Usually, a tutuko is placed in a posko (a 
public post for watching the area situation in a village). However, I found that the tutuko in 
Dusun Pasibuat was of smaller size and produced a smaller sound than those of the bigger 
tutuko (Figure 5.8). I suspect that when it is activated in the event of a tsunami the local 
community might not hear the sounds, in particular at night time. 
 
 
Figure 6. 8 
Small tutuko in a simulation exercise in Dusun Pasibbuat 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
It is also a concern of one of the participants. Instead of using the tutuko, he preferred using 
a handy, mobile loudspeaker.  
6.3.2. Education and exercise activities 
As tsunami warning cannot replace tsunami education for individuals and communities, a 
comprehensive approach to educating the community is important. This approach consists 
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of having face-to-face or group meetings, providing education materials and conducting 
simulations exercises. This approach should be implemented continuously and 
simultaneously. 
a. Tsunami education programs 
Community education is vital, especially in the event of local tsunamis. As local tsunamis can 
reach shores before the authority’s warning reaches the community, it is important to 
educate the local community through setting up tsunami education programs. However, it is 
quite different to provide education for those who live in remote areas as mentioned on the 
previous chapter.  
A tsunami education program is a program to improve individual and community members’ 
knowledge about tsunamis and to ensure they take appropriate actions while preparing for 
and responding to future potential tsunamis. Program activists need to take tsunami 
information and communicate it effectively so all targeted individuals or communities 
understand the issues and, as a consequence, are motivated to take necessary actions 
(Bernard, Dengler, & Yim, 2007). The field study also revealed that some participants 
acknowledged that the visiting program from the NGOs and the local government is less 
suitable to educate the local community about tsunami preparedness. The visiting programs 
only allow them to visit the community a few times yearly and it is also revealed that they 
need a more comprehensive and intensive education program. Such a program empowers 
the participants to discover their problems and the potential solutions on the preparedness. 
In addition, the program also enables the local community to obtain some training and 
practices to avoid harm from earthquakes and tsunamis. Lastly, the young people are also 
involved in this program (Bernard et al., 2007). 
b. Dissemination of tsunami education materials 
Dissemination of tsunami education materials is one of the main key ways to prepare a 
community for a tsunami hazard. In order that the community has access to the materials, it 
is crucial to distribute tsunami education materials to them. There are many kinds of 
materials that could be accessible to the community such as tsunami module sets, booklets, 
banners, trivia worksheets, games and puzzles (UNESCO, 2006). Similarly to the study 
findings, some NGOs have also developed some banners and plastic-printed billboards with 
tsunami information and warnings on them in some dusun in North Pagai (Figure 6.9). 
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However, some participants do not understand all the messages written or pictured on the 
billboards. Some English words, abbreviations, and pictures are found and they are not 
easily able to understand or digest.  
“I understand if the words are in Bahasa. But, [unfortunately] there are 
some in English…… [I]f I see the pictures of some persons I understand 
what they are doing [on it]. But, there are some pictures that I don’t 
understand” (Community Member, No. 06). 
 
 
Figure 6. 9 
Some of the messages on the billboard are not understandable.  
Some words are in English and the map is too small to identify the Mentawai Islands 




After clarification related to the billboard design, one participant from the NGO revealed 
that the NGO that produced it did no assessment of the design prior to printing. The NGO 
took the pictures and the messages from someone’s PowerPoint presentation. Indeed, the 
participant understood that the readers of the billboards might have no clear understanding 
after reading the billboard. In fact in order to make education materials effective, it is 
necessary to conduct an assessment of designs or formats and contents (Keo, Keynes, & 
MacLeod, 2003). 
“…..But sure [I believe] some are illiterate. But others can explain it to 
them. That’s the reason to focus on some pictures on it” (NGO Activist, No. 
01). 
c. Simulation evacuation exercises 
A tsunami simulation evacuation exercise is one of operation-based exercises to test 
community capability to respond to earthquakes and to evacuate to safe areas or assembly 
points. This exercise is necessary to raise awareness of tsunamis by involving all affected 
community members and using all potential resources. It is also thought that the exercise 
will identify the needs for the community to be better prepared (UNESCO, 2011a). The 
exercise development process (as shown on Figure 6.10) is designed to be flexible for 
whoever will use it to satisfy their unique needs. 
 
 
Figure 6. 10 
Exercise development process 
Source: UNESCO (2011) 
 
 
I had one chance to observe a tsunami simulation exercise during my field research in 
Mentawai, conducted by an NGO in Dusun Pasibbuat, Taikako, Sikakap. The aim of this 
simulation was to test the community preparedness on tsunami hazards. The observation of 
the simulation is contained in Box 6.1, while some interviews from two simulation 
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participants are placed below. These interviews revealed a clear understanding of how the 
simulation exercise proceeded.  
From the interviews, it was found that the analysis of the needs to conduct an exercise and 
the design of the exercise came from the NGO that works for the local community. As 
mentioned in Box 6.1, the NGO mainly dominated the design of how to do the simulation 
exercise. This is understandable as the dusun people have no experience of such an activity, 
but it would be good to discover what the local people thought or wanted to do. However, it 
is clear to me that why the NGO activists tended to tell all the people what to do was 
because hardly any dusun members gave their opinion. Therefore, all scenario flows were 
the NGO’s idea or design. 
During the conducting of the simulation, the dusun people participated. However, as I 
observed, I found some “unnecessary actions”. Firstly, one of the exercise participants had 
to look at the sea surface and then tell the others to run away since a tsunami would 
potentially occur. It seems that in the event of tsunamis, the dusun people had to rely on 
that person’s information before they ran away, whereas, tsunamis could reach the shores 
in less than ten minutes in Mentawai. Moreover, the “appointed” person may not be in the 
dusun when an earthquake strikes.  
I then tried to have clarification of the ‘looking at the sea surface’ action from the NGO 
activist. His response was that he prefers to avoid boring the community and rather ensure 
their safety,  
“Because [we] indeed need to make sure no tsunamis come. The problem 
is, if each earthquake occurs, and then [they] run [to the hills] but there are 
no tsunamis, they will feel ‘tsunamis never happen’. So we need to make it 
sure first” (NGO Activist, No. 01). 
My further question was: “If earthquakes occur at night time, how do the people see the sea 
in the dark?” His response contradicted the above statement. 
“If at the night [an earthquake shakes], ya [they should] directly run away 
to an evacuation point [without looking at the sea surface]” (NGO Activist, 
No. 01). 
Secondly, some people were instructed to take “action” as the “vulnerable” such as the 
blind, lame, pregnant, and wounded. However, further research showed that currently 
162 
 
there were no blind, lame and pregnant people in the dusun. Since this simulation would 
test the community preparedness, the local people should have identified and prioritised 
their own actions to reduce their own risk (Mukhier, 2012).  
“We had been taught [before the simulation] that someone ‘A’ acted like 
that and someone “B” acted like that. So step by step they had been 
informed to be the ‘pretend’ persons” (Community Member, No. 04). 
Lastly, prior to the execution of the simulation, an unofficial conversation with the head of 
the dusun revealed that the evacuation point was not the church and the evacuation route 
was not the dirt road to the church. The real, approved evacuation route was situated in 
middle of the dusun, among the houses. I had checked it and found some parts of it were 
too steep to be climbed by some people, particularly pregnant women or children. The 
evacuation point was wide and flat around 25 m at the sealed surface. There were two small 
houses in it that could be used if needed for the babies or the injured, for example, before 
external assistance came in an emergency. 
Using non-mutual agreement regarding evacuation routes or points could perplex the local 
community. The NGO activists as the facilitators should understand this situation, so in the 
event of tsunamis in the future, all local community members would run towards the agreed 
points through the agreed routes. However, in fact during the simulation, the NGO activists 
suggested using a different route, since the developed evacuation route in the dusun had 
improper conditions as shown in Figure 6.4. Similarly, the dusun people also needed to 
criticise the improper instructions from the activists or the dusun people needed to restore 
the route before the simulation. Therefore, constructive interactions between the local 
community members and the NGO activists are necessary.     
“No [I did not suggest using the evacuation route and point]. I wouldn’t feel 
alright if I had have suggested it. It had been some people from the NGO 
who worked [on the scenario]. They should have suggested it [since the 
NGO activists had known much about tsunami preparedness]” 
(Community Member, No. 04). 
In terms of evaluation of the simulation, no community members said anything related to 
the exercise. In fact, the NGOs activists gave chances to the members several times. 
Unfortunately, the activists did not provide other ways for the members to express their 
feelings, opinions, or feedback, such as providing something to write or to draw on.  
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However, one of the participants stated in the interview that in the future they could have 
some simulations with more real actions, tools, and the usage of approved facilities. 
“[The earthquake and tsunami] simulations like this [that the NGO just 
designed for them] are also good, Sir. Because we [I] know what we should 
do [now]. But maybe it will be good [to have] like-real simulations. Some 
people are still in the gardens. Some others are somewhere else…. [A]nd 
then next, what should the people do. Not a simulation where we are 
gathered like today. So, it is really where the people are in that time when 
an earthquake shakes” (Community Member, No. 04). 
Additional to the above information, out of 20 research participants, ten had participated in 
the simulations and two of them had participated more than once.  
“Here [in Sikakap] two [earthquake and tsunami] simulations have been 
conducted. But I only watched [the last one]. But if [the simulations 
repeatedly] are done, does it [mean that] no more tsunamis will hit us?” 
(Community Member, No. 03).  
The above interview shows that in particular area(s) in Mentawai the tsunami simulation 
exercise has been conducted more than once. However, seemingly the participant feels the 
exercise now has no meaning for him.  
The rest never participated in the simulations. My further question was about why they 
were never involved. The reasons were: 1) they did not go to church at the time the 
simulation or training invitation was announced; 2) they were too busy working; 3) there 
were no simulations in their dusun. 
“What can I say, Sir. We [I work] in the garden with my three children. 
Actually, having seen [the impacts of] the tsunami in 2010 in the other 
dusun, we [I] want also to do the prevention [preparedness]. But [it is] 
hard on my family economy. If we [I] don’t work where do my [family’s] 
foods come from? [Nowadays] all are expensive” (Community Member, No. 
05).  
Box 6.1. 
Observation of the simulation exercise in Dusun Pasibuat, Taikakto 
After having an official invitation from the head of Dusun Pasibbuat, Taikako, 
Sikakap on Sunday, 18 May 2014, about 75 out of 225 people of dusun Pasibbuat 
attended the earthquake and tsunami simulation on 24 May 2014. The CDRM 
activists (an NGO) divided the attending people into two groups. One group 
consisted of 12 selected persons who were guided by two NGO activists. This 
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group was separated from the other and discussed what they should do during the 
simulation. The discussion was about the group tasks at the simulation. The group 
also prepared some tools such as a tutuko (a bamboo pipe with a small hole which 
was hit to produce sounds), some wooden pillars with two sarongs, a first aid box, 
some A3-sized papers and ballpoints. The NGO activists briefed the group.  
The other group consisted of some elderly persons, adults, juveniles, and children. 
The group was guided by some other activists explaining about earthquakes; how 
to prevent injuries in earthquakes; and how to escape from any potential tsunamis 
triggered by earthquakes. The activists also taught a familiar song to the 
community with the lyrics changed. The lyrics are as follows (with some 
movements): 
 
If any earthquakes come, cover your head (with both hands on the head) 
If any earthquakes come, go in under the table (they make a move to go below the 
bench) 
If any earthquakes come, go away from glass 
If any earthquakes come, run away to a clear point 
 
The activists paraded the song with some movement followed by the second 
group. They repeated singing and parading it until the group did it correctly and 
fluently.  
After hearing some explanations about earthquakes and tsunamis, and practising 
and parading the song for around one hour, the two groups were ready to do the 
simulation. Two members of the first group then explained the detailed scenario to 
the other group. The step-by-step actions were explained in the local language. 
After all messages had been delivered, they all went out of the church and took 
their positions in some houses in the dusun.  
Suddenly, someone hit the tutuko several times symbolizing that an earthquake 
had just taken place. At this moment, the people seemed watchful with fearful 
faces. After about a minute from the first sound, the tutuko sounded once more 
reminding someone to look at the sea level. The appointed person ran to look at 
the sea and then told the tutuko hitter that the sea level was down. The tutuko 
sounded for the third time meaning that all people should run to the “appointed” 
evacuation point through the “appointed” evacuation route. I watched them 
running up to the church. 
The “vulnerable” were acted as a pregnant mother (with a tag on her chest with 
“PREGNANT”), a blind person (with a tag “BLIND”), an injured (with a tag 
“INJURED”) and an elderly person (with a tag “ELDERLY”). Those “vulnerable” were 
assisted by some members of the first group. The injured and elderly were brought 
to the evacuation point by using the two wooden pillars inserted into the sarong. 
The first group members also made sure all the people were at the evacuation 
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point at this time.  
During the simulation, other NGO members also spread out to monitor and record 
every session of the moves that the people did. One took some pictures of the 
people. Another was time watching with a stop watch. 
It took only around five minutes to do all the core simulation. After that, the 
activists evaluated what was right and not right. They also explained some 
additional information regarding the simulation. However, no one from the second 
group talked about their experience, even though a chance was given. 
 
 
The above simulation exercise was supported by an NGO, called the Centre for Disaster Risk 
Management and Community Development Studies (CDRM&CDS) from Nommensen 
University (Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra). One of the aims of the NGO is to recruit and 
train the local community and volunteers (Satlinmas) to adapt disaster preparedness 
measures into their daily activities. In 2013, the NGO recruited and trained 16 groups of 
Satlinmas from 16 dusun in North and South Pagai Islands where these dusun are close to 
the coasts. In addition, each group conducted one simulation exercise for the dusun people. 
The other aim of the NGO is also to reach out to the elementary schools in those areas and 
train the students about the evacuation processes in the event of a tsunami (CDRM & CDS, 
2014). 
6.3.3. Emergency deployment  
An emergency deployment is defined as a readiness by trained persons or specific tools to 
deploy if any tsunamis occur in a tsunami prone area. Therefore, it is important to have in 
advance trained personnel and a ready stock of supplies. The situation regarding community 
volunteers will be addressed below since first aid and other supplies have been addressed in 
the section above.  
Letz (2006) argues that community volunteers support the local community in effective 
ways and lead the local community in taking proactive steps to mitigate potential risks. 
However, it is important to ensure the ownership and sustainability of this community 
volunteerism by recruiting, mobilizing, enabling and training local volunteers. Community 
volunteers can participate in different tasks such as in awareness raising, training, risk 




According to some of the participants, there are some dusun where Satlinmas have been 
formed and this is also worthy of appreciation. Satlinmas are for the community and by the 
community to take care of any potential earthquakes and tsunamis, in particular if they 
should occur at night-time. However, the participants also reminded the community that 
they should support Satlinmas, and Satlinmas members have a high commitment to 
participating in them.  
According to one participant from an NGO, Satlinmas members have certain tasks that they 
agree on. They are: 1) to gather ideas, opinions or suggestions from the community 
members and pass them on to the chief of the dusun; 2) to provide a roster for the adult 
males from the dusun on duty to watch for any potential harm in the night,; 3) to give an 
emergency sign to others if necessary, and 4) to provide necessary assistance to others 
before and after a tsunami. In order to carry out these tasks, the participant also mentioned 
that the NGO has trained the Satlinmas members on certain subjects such as to look at the 
sea level when an earthquake shakes, to sound the tutuko as an emergency sign, to help 
vulnerable people, and to give basic medical care.  
It was acknowledged by two participants that every night two or three adult males would be 
on duty to watch for any potential harm. Satlinmas members wrote the roster every week 
on the Satlinmas board in the dusun. However, after finishing the interview, I went to check 
the board in Dusun Pasibbuat (Village Taikako) and Dusun Matobe (Village Matobe) and 
found no written roster on the board.  
At the dusun level, a number of tsunami preparedness measures have been conducted in 
Mentawai, even though the improvement of the efforts in quality and quantity is still 
needed. The evacuation signs and routes have been found in certain dusun that are close to 
the coasts; however it is necessary to consider that they should be clearly visible and 
unblocked. Similarly, education and exercise activities are also found, but they are still 
limited for some dusun. The involvement of the community volunteers is also useful to 
watch any unexpected circumstances, but they also need clear procedures to do their tasks. 
Meanwhile, one key element of tsunami preparedness seems to be seriously needed and 
this is the tsunami hazard map development to inform the local community members or 
new comers about potential hazards in Mentawai and how to escape from them. Lastly, it is 
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also necessary to revitalize the local heritage - tuddukat, and bring it to tsunami 
preparedness as a warning tool in order to sound emergency signals to the community.  
6.4. Tsunami preparedness at the district level 
In order to build strong tsunami preparedness at the district level, systematic programs or 
much effort should be provided, particularly by local government. However, for the sake of 
my study, I picked up some important points to discuss namely, disaster risk assessment, 
tsunami risk maps, and tsunami evacuation plans (BNPB, 2012). 
6.4.1. Conducting a disaster risk assessment 
BNPB (2012) defines risk assessment as an integrated mechanism to capture the 
comprehensive disaster risks of one particular area by analysing hazards, possible loss and 
capacity to cope with the potential problems. Risk assessment is useful as a scientific basis 
to develop specific action plans from public policies. Therefore, it is also important to 
integrate mainstream disaster mitigation and preparedness programs into other public 
programs. More importantly, it enables the development of community-based programs at 
village level. Lastly, it is an important tool, for example, to build evacuation routes (BNPB, 
2012). 
BNPB (2012) has conducted a disaster risk assessment measurement in the Mentawai 
District. The conclusion of the assessment is that most potential hazards in Mentawai are 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Furthermore, BNPB (2012) also reports that the tsunami hazard 
could inundate about 83,185 ha and affect a population of 11,000 (14 % of the total 
population). Similarly, Horspool et al. (2013) rate the Mentawai Islands as one of the 
districts most likely to be hit by tsunamis in Indonesia. They say that the probability of 
tsunamis with a run-up of 3 m in height hitting the district yearly is 6.9 %. Furthermore, they 
also predict a return period of a run-up 7.5 m in height in 100 years, 20.6 m in 500 years and 
42.3 m in 2500 years.  
According to BNPB (2012), there are three aims in producing the disaster risk assessment 
document. Firstly, the assessment could be used as an additional document for the local 
government of the Mentawai District to develop public policies on tsunami preparedness. 
The local government needs to synchronize all district public institutions to have the same 
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vision to develop community tsunami preparedness. However, according to one participant 
from the local government: 
“There is no synchronization...[b]ecause the main document,[RPJMD=the 
District Medium Term Development Plan)has not yet accommodated 
[what was written on the disaster risk assessment document]... Up to now 
in every synchronization meeting that is facilitated by LIPI [the Indonesian 
Academy of the Sciences], it is difficult to have a consensus [among the 
related institutions]. RPJPMD only accommodates the BPBD [District 
Agency for Disaster Management]. It should have [accommodated] all 
disaster mitigation [programs] into the related institutions. For example, if 
the District General Work Institution builds a road not only to boost the 
local economy, but also to enable [the people] to evacuate or to distribute 
assistance in any emergency” (Government Officer, No. 04) 
Secondly, the risk assessment document can be used as a foundation to develop community 
outreach for local partnership programs. As the document shows the magnitude of the 
problems occurs when the local community is threatened by tsunamis, there are many 
chances for NGOs to work in Mentawai. According to a BPBD officer, in the near future more 
NGOs will come and work in Mentawai to handle the problems. He also identified one NGO 
just started working in Siberut Island. 
“...BPBD cannot work alone. For [tsunami] preparedness, we [BPBD] is 
developing a pilot project for a “Resilient Village” in Kature Village, but 
with the assistance from ASB [an NGO] four other villages are handled” 
(Government Officer, No. 06). 
 
In a further interview, he also mentioned one other NGO that had just started working in 
Mentawai. He also identified some potential programs for NGOs such as developing a 
resilient village, evacuation shelters, a rapid emergency team, and conducting simulation 
exercises at the community level. 
6.4.2. Tsunami risk map 
Furthermore, BNPB (2012) argues that disaster risk assessment is useful to provide 
information to design disaster risk maps. These maps will show the level of the risk of 
hazards. It is also possible to overlay it on other maps such as a map of vulnerability and/or 




The development of a tsunami risk map can be used as basic information to develop a 
tsunami preparedness program such as the local government building a tsunami evacuation 
plan. Below are the maps to show the tsunami risk of the Mentawai islands. 
Figure 6. 11 indicates a number of the people’s settlements in Siberut are risky to tsunami 
hazards. Mainly, the settlements in the northern east to the southern east of the coasts 
have high risk.  
 
Figure 6. 11 
Tsunami Risk Map in the Mentawai District 




Figure 6. 12 shows that the settlements in Sipora have high risk to tsunami hazards in almost 
all around the island  
 
 
Figure 6. 12 
Tsunami Risk Map in the Mentawai District 
Source: BNPB, 2012 
 
Figure 6. 13 also shows that the settlements in both North and South Pagai have high risk to 




Figure 6. 13 
Tsunami Risk Map in the Mentawai District 
Source: BNPB, 2012 
 
6.4.3. Tsunami evacuation plan 
After acquiring the Disaster Risk Assessment Document in the Mentawai District and the 
tsunami risk map, the next step is to develop a tsunami evacuation plan at the community 
level. Under this evacuation plan BNPB (2012) prioritizes the development of the evacuation 
routes and evacuation (assembly) points.  
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a. Evacuation routes  
Based on the geographical condition of the Mentawai islands that are situated next to the 
subduction zone, BNPB (2013a) urges that the evacuation period of the community in the 
event of tsunamis is about seven minutes after the earthquakes. If the BMKG (National 
Agency for Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics) in Jakarta needs at least five minutes 
to analyse potential tsunamis after earthquakes, it will be too late to disseminate the 
information to the local government agency or to the public through TV channels. 
Therefore, BNPB has developed an evacuation plan in which the local community can reach 
the safer points in about seven minutes, while the first waves of tsunamis are predicted to 
reach the shore in about nine minutes (BNPB, 2013a). 
 
Figure 6. 14 
The BNPB has divided the Mentawai District into ten sectors in order to develop evacuation routes.  
Each sector has been determined a minimum number of the evacuation routes. 




BNPB (2013a) divides the Mentawai District into ten sub-districts as the evacuation sectors 
for tsunamis (Figure 6.14). It is planned for each sector to build particular evacuation routes 
and through these vulnerable people could reach safer points within seven minutes after 
earthquakes. However, the development of the evacuation routes is only prioritised to 
Sectors B and G (BNPB, 2013a) 
From its viewpoint, the local government has undertaken a number of efforts to increase 
tsunami preparedness. One of them is to build the evacuation routes in the community. It 
was acknowledged by one of the participants from the local government who has one of top 
positions in the Mentawai District that the development of the evacuation routes is a short-
term goal. For a longer-term goal, the local government has been persuading the local 
community to spontaneously relocate to special areas where it would rebuild and move 
some community health centres and public schools to higher ground. Therefore, the local 
people will also move next to the public facilities. 
“…..[O]ur steps are mainly short term [actions] through the district budget. 
We are building temporary evacuation routes. For example, many villages 
now have the routes up to the hills. ……. [E]xcept in the smaller islands. If 
the people stay up in the hills [when tsunamis happen] it means they are 
OK. The next step is to undertake self- relocation. We [persuaded the 
people] in Southern Tukai [in Siberut island] to relocate [by 
themselves]…... [T]he public school and the community health center will 
be relocated [by the government]. In Sukabaluan [in Siberut Island] the 
community health centre that was on the coast has been moved inland. 
[But] it needs a big budget” (Government Officer, No. 01). 
However, the local government seems not to realize what happened to the dusun people of 
Belaraksok as discussed in the previous chapter. The people had moved inlands about 8-10 
km from the coasts, but they still came down and stayed over nights in the coasts from to 
garden or to fish. 
b. Temporary evacuation points  
BNPB (2013a) identifies two potential temporary evacuation points in Mentawai. One is the 
escape hills which are good for several areas where hills are found. The other is multi-storey 
buildings. Escape buildings are important to use to evacuate the people in the short term. 
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Several private schools have two storey buildings that can potentially be used as temporary 
evacuation points.  
During the field research, I observed several temporary evacuation points in several dusun 
and was able to conclude that the evacuation points are safe for tsunami waves of 20 m 
high. They are located in flat lots up hills. However, the main problem is how to reach these 
lots. As observed in Dusun Passibuat and Dusun Matobe the evacuation points are difficult 
to reach, particularly by special needs people (as shown in Figure 6.4). Therefore, the local 
government needs to design proper evacuation routes to some dusun, so that the people 
can easily reach the evacuation points. 
c. Evacuation signs 
In the event of tsunamis, the evacuation signs are important to inform the evacuees of the 
way to temporary evacuation points. The Government of Indonesia has standardised the 
evacuation signs as pictured below. These standardised signs are developed through a deep 
assessment for the people to easily understand (Figure 6.15). However, the signs in the 
community are mainly very different from the standard. It is also important to place the 
signs in strategic ways for people to see them (BNPB, 2013a). However, during my field 
study, none of the evacuation signs was fixed to the standard.  
 
Figure 6. 15 
Standardized evacuation signs 




In fact, one participant from the local government stated that the Central Government 
never socialized the new standardization of the evacuation signs to provincial or district 
levels. 
“Indeed [I know] there is a guideline to design evacuation signs from the 
Central [Government]. But, there are never any socialization [activities on 
the new designs] to districts. The Central (Government) should have done 
it in a serious way, in particular in the tsunami-prone areas. And again, 
mostly the evacuation signs had been produced here [in Mentawai] before 
the guideline was developed.” (Government Officer No. 06). 
The above quote shows that the Central Government of Indonesia is also required to 
allocate special programs to disseminate the new guideline to the Mentawai District, so that 
the District can adopt and implement it. Moreover, it seems that most of the evacuation 
signs in Mentawai are very old, but they have not changed or replaced them.  
6.4.4. Regional chain warning 
When an earthquake shakes, it is a sign that a tsunami may occur. Therefore, a rapid 
consideration of the situation is required, in particular in the tsunami prone areas. 
Coastlines often suffer from tsunamis in a very short time. Experts (Lay et al., 2011; 
Newman et al., 2011) argue that an earthquake in the Mentawai Segment may produce 
tsunami waveswhich have very short travel time to reach the coasts in Mentawai. However, 
in view of a lack of technology in Mentawai, the Central Government has provided one 
operational emergency centre (OEC) in the capital town of the Mentawai District, Tua Pejat 
in Sipora Island. This centre becomes an implementing unit of the local government to 
facilitate operational controls and to conduct information communication systems in an 
emergency (BNPB, 2013a). The EOC centre in Tua Pejat has the minimum standard of an 
EOC according to the BNPB standard of EOC. 
As mentioned on the BNPB Head’s Regulation No. 6 of 2013, all OECs in Indonesia have the 
same frequencies of High Frequency Radio and Very High Frequency Radio. It is hoped that 
the OEC emergency warnings can be delivered to the community or vice versa, through 
other channels of communication such as community radio or Handie Talkie radio. However, 
in Mentawai one participant said: 
“I would say that [it is important] that each dusun has Satlinmas [that 
watch the situation] in the night time. They need to be trained also about 
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how to respond in such a situation. But I am doubtful too, whether they 
would understand their own tasks, [tsunami] preparedness, 
communication. [I could say] the [emergency] communication is not good 
here. Often, mobile phones have no signal. HT [Handie talkie] cannot be 
operated. No community radio, too.” (Community Member No. 18). 
On the other hand, it is also important to have a supply and distribution of a relief system. 
This system aims at quickly distributing suitable relief items to the affected areas to avoid 
further hardship and loss of lives (Balcik, Beamon, & Smilowitz, 2008). The district 
government of the Mentawai District has a similar system that provides some crucial items 
for affected persons when tsunamis or other disasters occur. However, it has been realized 
that the distribution of the items will face some difficulties due to the geographic condition. 
The Central Government has built a National Supply and Distribution Centre in Padang and it 
might be faster and more realistic to distribute the relief items from Tua Pejat to other parts 
of Mentawai.  
6.5. Conclusion 
Tsunami preparedness is one important key element for people in the event of a tsunami. A 
multi-level model of tsunami preparedness (Figure 6.1) focuses on three levels of 
approaches (individual/household, dusun, and district) and the above sections have 
addressed them in the Mentawai context. The model enhances the efforts at each level to 
be prepared for tsunamis. As often they are the main victims of tsunamis, individuals and 
household members should know what to do and where to go in the event of tsunamis. 
Consequently, individuals and household members should build robust preparedness 
measures at the dusun or village level. In addition, the whole community also should work 
hand in hand to provide community efforts. Similarly, the local government also should 
provide clear guidelines and procedures for the community to adopt and to easily 
understand.  
The study did unveil a few efforts that have been carried out in Mentawai and still more 
efforts need to be established in the future. At the individual or households level, awareness 
of tsunamis exists, particularly since some of the participants of the research experienced 
the Tsunami. Mostly the participants have understood that they live in an area of very high 
risk of tsunamis and identified several ways to escape in future events. However, most of 
them will save other people and some other things if they have the chance to do it and 
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neglect their own safety. These actions could potentially endanger their own lives. In 
addition, the study also revealed that other efforts such as family evacuation plans and 
exercise activities have never been conducted. Even worse, some participants have never 
told their younger children what to do and where to go if an earthquake strikes. Therefore, 
in the future, intensive programs to increase the awareness and knowledge of individuals 
are important. Interestingly, the study also revealed that in the event of tsunamis some 
households have a ‘temporary house” that can be used as an evacuation shelter and have 
planted some bananas, kumara, and taros for food in emergency. Therefore the individual 
or household level could stand alone and it is interrelated to the preparedness at the dusun 
level.  
At the dusun level, several activities have been implemented to increase community 
preparedness in Mentawai. The study noted that several evacuation routes exist in the 
dusun. These routes are believed to reinforce the community’s efforts to reach safer points 
from tsunamis. Several evacuation signs to reach the evacuation points were also found. 
However, the evacuation routes and signs seem neglected and no efforts have been made 
to take care of them. Similarly, many evacuation signs have been damaged and are 
unreadable. However, these signs will provide the affected people with a direction in which 
to go. The study also disclosed that education and exercise activities at dusun level are still 
low. Indeed, some NGOs have worked in the local community to educate them about 
tsunamis; however, some education materials need to be evaluated and updated. In the 
future, the local community would then find it much clearer to digest the messages. 
Similarly, the tsunami simulation exercises should have had updated scenarios and been 
conducted on a periodic basis. It is also imperative to include the community members in all 
exercise development processes. In addition, the study also uncovered that some dusun 
where NGOs work have established community volunteers known as Satlinmas which will 
provide some important information regarding tsunamis and assistance in the event of 
them. However, more efforts to empower sanlitmas are needed. They need regular training 
and updated information. Similarly, this level is also interrelated with preparedness at the 
household and at the district levels.  
The district government of Mentawai District has some key roles in amplifying the 
community preparedness on tsunamis. The study revealed that the local government has 
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conducted disaster risk assessments that have resulted in the risk index of tsunamis being 
classified as high. This means that if a tsunami occurs in the near future, it will affect many 
of the local community which has little capacity to counter it. It also found that the local 
government has provided maps of the areas that would potentially be inundated by the 
tsunami. However, these maps should have been used at dusun level to develop tsunami 
hazard maps. Furthermore, as the Central Government has established the standardised 
evacuation signs, the local government has responsibility to implement the standard to 
community level and monitor existing signs in the community. Lastly, the district 
government of Mentawai has operated an operational emergency centre (OEC). This OEC 
functions as an operational control and information communication facility in an 
emergency. However, not all dusun can reach the facility since few communication tools are 
provided.  
This chapter is the last part of Part 2. I have discussed in Chapter 5 the research results on 
the tsunami hazard and preparedness knowledge found in Mentawai before the local 
community experienced the 2010 tsunami. I have also delivered how the local community 
captured, shared, and applied the knowledge to anticipate the tsunami. In Chapter 6, I have 
described how the complexity of current tsunami preparedness is found at the individual, 
household, dusun, and district levels.  
Part Three of the thesis will focus on how the significant parts revealed previously will be 
synthesized to create a number of applicative programs in Mentawai. In order to do it, I will 
link the vulnerability of the local community to tsunami hazards, the research findings, and 
academic insights. Lastly, this will also conclude the thesis by answering the research 








PART 3: SYNTHESES, CONCEPTUALIZATION, AND CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 7 
Linking the Findings to Developing Capacity for Tsunami Preparedness in 
Mentawai 
 
“Capacity development is a central strategy for reducing disaster risk” (UNISDR, 2007a, 
p. 4) 
7.0. Introduction 
This is the third or final part of the thesis and consists of two chapters. This part will bring 
the complexity of the topics from Part 1 and the compelling findings from Part 2. Chapter 7 
outlines a synthesis based on the findings and literature reviews from the previous chapters. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates a number of applicative programs on how to develop 
capacity within the community. This is followed in Chapter 8 by the conclusions and answers 
to the research questions. 
From previous chapters, we have a clear understanding on how the local community of 
Mentawai became vulnerable to tsunami hazards. We also know their tsunami hazards and 
preparedness knowledge before the 2010 Tsunami, and after tsunami preparedness 
measures. Now, it is important to consider how to increase their capacity to counter 
potential tsunamis. This chapter mainly discusses how to develop capacity to prevent and 
prepare for tsunami hazards in Mentawai.  
There are six sections in this chapter. 
Section 7.1. Indicates the differences between capability and capacity. 
Section 7.2. Identifies several aspects that we need to consider to develop capacity 
within a community. 
Section 7.3.  Explains some definitions of coping capacity, how coping capacity is related 
to community early warning systems and their potential implementation in 
Mentawai. 
Section 7.4. Explains some definitions of adaptive capacity. 
Section 7.5. Specifies how adaptive capacity can be reached through disaster risk 
reduction processes in Mentawai. 
Section 7.6. Shows several potential means of support to develop coping and adaptive 
capacities in Mentawai. 
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Section 7.7. Simplifies the chapter through concluding remarks. 
 
7.1. Distinguishing capability and capacity  
People are often confused about the meanings of capability and capacity in their daily 
conversations. However, both terms are different, yet they are frequently used 
interchangeably. Generally, a capability is mostly related to a qualitative ability. Capability is 
“a feature, faculty or process that can be developed or improved” (Vincent, 2008, p. 460). It 
could also refer to the ability that exists in an individual or a community that can be 
achieved or improved. Bevaola, Quamrul, and Siddiqui (2010) define capability as a 
numerous series of knowledge sets that are consistently delivered and augmented from 
various sources. It tends to focus on the ability of an individual or a community to learn 
about and evolve antecedent and strategic routines. This effort acquires resources, 
integrates them together, and recombines them so that the individual or the community 
can generate value-creating strategies. Furthermore, Bevaola et al. (2010) explain that 
capability has the attributes to enable the individual or community to exploit their resources 
by implementing strategies. Therefore, capability is a quality of being capable of exploiting 
opportunities and strategies in order to have an improved ability. 
In order to achieve capability, UNISDR (2005) argues that the main key is to strengthen 
capacity. Capacity can be generally defined as the maximum amount or ability to receive or 
to contain. From this definition, Chaskin (1999) argues that the word ‘capacity’ signifies both 
the impression of containing (storing) and the notion of ability (of mind, of action). UNDP 
(2008) argues that capacity is how people, institutions, or societies in implementing utilities 
are able to resolve obstacles, establish and reach their objectives in an acceptable way. 
Furthermore, Chaskin (1999) argues that capacity implies the existence of particular 
capabilities, faculties, or powers within communities to do certain things. Capacity may have 
an impact on several aspects of community functioning, but it helps to promote or sustain 
the well-being of the community and its components such as individuals and social 
interactions. Baser and Morgan (2008) argue that capacity requires the understanding of 
what is inside the communities and what operational values can be added to the 
communities. However, capacity Therefore, capacity is the main part of capability in terms 
of being sustainable, strategic, and impactful in achieving objectives.  
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From the above discussions, I prefer to use the term and concept ‘capacity’ in this thesis in 
order to develop the abilities of individuals, community, and institutions in Mentawai to 
counter the tsunami hazards. As UNISDR (2005) argues, capacity development is, 
consequently, a part of a wider capability development that increases the quality of ability 
in the future. Because capacity is related to increasing their ability to the maximum to 
strengthen tsunami preparedness, at present the local people of Mentawai urgently need a 
number of efforts that can increase this ability. These efforts focus on using the existing 
resources and strategies that are available within Mentawai. By implementing a number of 
the below efforts to develop the Mentawai people’s capacity in relation to tsunami 
awareness and preparedness, I believe that the people will subsequently have the feature, 
faculty, process, and quality of being capable of developing or improving their capability in 
the near future. 
Therefore, from this context people need to develop their capacities in order to enhance 
their capabilities. In terms of tsunami preparedness, people can be given access to public 
campaigns and proper evacuation routes and signage, conduct regular simulation exercises 
and understand warning systems in order to increase their capacities. These efforts will 
enable the people to be more capable of avoiding or being away from tsunami waves in the 
event of a tsunami. This capability is based on their developed capacities in the previous 
stage.  
7.2. Challenges to developing capacity  
Capacity development becomes urgent within a community when a risk of a hazard exists. 
Developing capacity is a major challenge that involves much more than enhancing 
knowledge and skills. Disaster risk will be reduced if capacity exists in a community. Capacity 
will lessen vulnerability and/or widen distance from the hazard. Therefore, a probability of 
being devastated by a hazard will also decrease. From Figure 7.1, we can understand the 
relation of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability that creates an intersection of disaster risk. It 
also indicates how to reduce the intersection by developing capacity through decreasing 
vulnerability and the exposure to a hazard. The reduction of disaster risk can be developed 
through certain development capacity efforts such as boosting the people’s qualitative 




Figure 7. 1 
Disaster risk reduction can be obtained by increasing capacity to decrease vulnerability and minimizing the 
exposure to hazards. 
Source: Reese and Schmidt (2008) cited from Power (2013). 
 
Figure 7.1 indicates that disaster risk results from the intersection of the existing hazard, 
vulnerability and hazard exposure of a community. Therefore, decreasing the intersection 
by developing capacity through a number of efforts or activities is considered. This 
development will reduce the vulnerability and/or the exposure.  
Although capacity focuses on what is available within a community, external interventions in 
the form of technical assistance and functional improvements are required. Baser and 
Morgan (2008) identify five central aspects, which are challenges for developing capacity. 
Firstly, capacity is about empowerment and identity. In this context, capacity allows 
individuals, groups, and communities to grow, diversify, survive, and become more complex. 
Therefore, capacity is related to people acting together to take control of their own lives in 
some fashion (Baser & Morgan, 2008; Mulubiran, 2013). Supporting self-organization 
becomes one of the main priorities to enhance, conceive, and design sustainable activities.  
Secondly, capacity needs collective actions (Baser & Morgan, 2008). Ireland and Thomalla 
(2011) argue that collective actions generally include voluntary individuals who are involved 
in common actions to achieved communal interests. These also include forms of resource 
mobilization, collaboration, information sharing, and improvement of individuals, groups, or 
communities. In relation to tsunami preparedness, collective actions can be used to 
integrate all abilities in communities to take part in the measures. This could be the 
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involvement of community volunteerism, community participation, social networking, 
government, non-government and private activities (Ireland & Thomalla, 2011). This also 
requires strong commitments to organize and integrate all abilities in the community in 
effective ways. 
Thirdly, Baser and Morgan (2008) state that capacity as a state or condition is inherently 
embedded in a system. It requires a complex mixture of attitudes, capital, schemes, and 
skills, both tangible and intangible. It may occur as the effect of multiple interactions within 
a community (Baser, 2007). In the imminence of tsunami waves, for example, capacity could 
emerge within a community by evacuation of the affected people from the coasts after the 
tsunami warnings are received. All elements within the community can help each other all 
at once. Therefore, capacity has technical, organizational, and social aspects that could not 
be addressed through exclusively functional interventions. 
Fourthly, capacity is a potential state (Baser & Morgan, 2008). It is elusive, transient, and 
dependent to a large degree on intangible things. It is also hard to induce, manage, and 
measure. Moreover, it could disappear quickly, particularly when an individual or a 
community has never had training or exercise. Motivations to develop or to maintain 
capacity can also disappear if the expected hazards never occur for a period of time (Baser 
& Morgan, 2008; Mulubiran, 2013). Therefore, it is important to realize that developing 
capacity needs repetitive, continuous, and encouraging activities.  
Lastly, capacity is about creation of public values. According to Benington (2011, p. 50), a 
public value provides a “conceptual framework within which competing values and interests 
can be expressed and debated, in a deliberative democratic process, by which the question 
of what constitutes value is established dialectically”. Public value highlights how co-
creation of public services (education and health services) is made. Public value can be 
produced by communities and local government (Benington, 2011; Bromell, 2012). In the 
tsunami preparedness context, this requirement can be effectively formed by the 
involvement of all sectors within the community (Spahn, Hoppe, Vidiarina, & Usdianto, 
2010). Therefore, local governments can work together with local communities to provide 
public value.  
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Beside the above challenges, scholars consider that two different kinds of capacity need to 
be developed. One is coping capacity, and the other is adaptive capacity. Peltonen (2005) 
suggests that coping capacity is frequently connected to how to handle extreme events. 
Furthermore, Levina and Tirpak (2006) argue that coping capacity can be increased with 
adaptation measures in the short-term. Therefore, coping capacity is a short-time and 
immediate measure from individuals or a group of people to survive unexpected disasters 
by using or degrading their existing resources. On the other hand, adaptive capacity is how a 
system is able to adjust under existing hazardous conditions. The adjustment encompasses 
its characteristics or performance as the progress of the implementation of coping 
capacities (Levina & Tirpak, 2006). This means that adaptive capacity is an endless coping 
capacity. It also strengthens a number of coping capacities to decrease vulnerability. 
Adaptive capacity implies that an existing system has the ability to adapt to possible 
disasters by having access to available resources. It can lessen potential harm by using the 
advantage of opportunities that exist within the system or dealing with the potential 
impacts. It generally indicates and signifies that people can learn before and after a risky 
occurrence (Peltonen, 2005). Therefore, adaptive capacity refers to how a system has the 
ability to adapt the potential adverse effects by using the system function of the availability 
of and access to resources.  
In order to develop coping and adaptive capacities in Mentawai, it is important to involve 
the governance system. As mention in Chapter 5, Mentawai is led by a local government 
leader known as Bupati. This district consists of 266 dusun from 43 villages. The heads of 
dusun are supposed to have the main responsibility to develop coping capacity at the 
household and community levels as they are close to the people, while to develop adaptive 
capacity, it is suggested that the heads of villages are mainly responsible. Bupati is in charge 
to support both kinds of leadership in their tasks.  
7.3. Developing coping capacity through CEWS 
Numerous definitions of coping capacity are found in disaster management literature but 
are mostly variations on a common theme. Billing and Madengruber (2005) mention that 
coping capacity is the level of resources and circumstances in which individuals and 
communities utilize this capital and these abilities to counter risky events. UNISDR (2007b) 
defines coping capacity as “the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available 
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skills and resources, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters”. 
Furthermore, it also necessitates ceaseless awareness and appropriate governance in usual 
and emergency conditions. For the longer term, it is also associated with a disaster risk 
reduction (UNISDR, 2007b). Additionally, WHO (1999) defines coping capacity as an ability of 
people to counter stressful events and conduct rapid recovery. Therefore, coping capacity 
can be a number of efforts to empower individuals, groups of people, or communities to 
face any potentially unexpected events by using their skills and resources.  
In order to develop the coping capacities in Mentawai, I propose a community early warning 
system program (CEWS) that uses simple, traditional tools or methods. This people-centered 
program will result in accurate warnings in order to decrease the risk of mortality and 
damage to property from any potential tsunamis. According to the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFCR, 2012, p. 13), CEWS is  
“an effort by or with, but not for, a community to systematically collect, 
compile and/or analyse information that enables the dissemination of 
warning messages that when actionable can help the community (or 
others 'downstream') reduce harm or loss from a hazard (or threat) 
event (or process).” 
 
The warnings allow the people on coastlines to seek safer points in the event of a tsunami. 
However, as systems, CEWS necessitate resources, processes, and procedures, and result in 
significant impacts on potentially affected people. CEWS is a comprehensive and 
simultaneous effort within a community to avoid threats of hazards and/or the impacts of 
hazards. It also requires reinforcement from external supports such as their local 
government to maintain. However, the community itself has to strive in order to achieve an 
end-to-end effort. This effort entails a series of comprehensive elements to involve people 
who need to hear warnings. Thus the people will collect and trace hazard information (IFCR, 
2012). 
In order to achieve the end-to-end effort, BMKG (2012); Grasso and Singh (2012), Leon, 
Bogardi, Dannenmann, and Basher (2006), and IFCR (2012) identify four main foundations, 
namely risk knowledge, monitoring, response capability, and warning communication 
(Figure 7.2). Each one is interlocking and has to utilize efficient ways so that the system may 




Figure 7. 2 
The interlocked functions of a community early warning system 
Source: (Grasso & Singh, 2012; IFCR, 2012; Leon et al., 2006) 
 
The above foundations are also similar to the foundations of people-centered early warning 
from Ina-TEWS. These foundations enhance the coping capacities of the local people in 
Mentawai in order to improve current tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness 
measures and to accurately act in the event of a tsunami  
Below is a complete set of the identified foundations to connect the local community of 
Mentawai to be aware of tsunami hazards. In order to conduct this program, I would 
suggest that the heads of dusun should have the main responsibility to run the program at 
the household and community levels. The heads of dusun are also close to their people. 
However, due to capacity development, it requires the co-creation of public values, the 
involvement of the heads of villages and Bupati (the head of the district government). 
7.3.1. Risk knowledge 
Risks arise from both the exposure and vulnerability to hazards that are present in one 
community. It is important that the community understands and knows about their risks 
from certain hazards. According to Leon et al. (2006) and IFCR (2012), this risk knowledge 
can be gained by conducting a risk assessment and risk mapping. The involvement of local 
community members to develop tsunami risk assessment and risk mapping will make 
people understand and become aware of tsunamis. Therefore, the effort will also increase 
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the people’s coping capacities in the recognition of their risk and in the increase of tsunami 
understandings. 
As the research findings (in Chapter 6) indicated, risk assessments and mappings have 
existed at the district level, but not at the dusun or community level in Mentawai. 
Therefore, the head of each dusun (especially close to a coastal zone) must urgently 
persuade the dusun people to develop their own risk assessments and maps. One example 
of this activity is in Figure 7.3. below, taken from IFCR (2012). A local community in Sri Lanka 
developed a simple map to identify their risk to a hazard and their potential capacity to 
avoid the hazards. In order to support this aim, the heads of dusun require the heads of 
villages to issue an instruction for each dusun to develop their own risk assessment and 
maps. Since this kind of maps is very simple, I believe the dusun people can make them 
easily. They only need some pieces of 591 x 841 mm (A1) papers and several whiteboard 




Figure 7. 3 
The local community drawing a simple risk assessment and map of how to escape from a hazard. 
Source: IFCR (2012) 
 
The risk assessment activity can also identify people’s vulnerabilities and their potentials 
that could increase their capacities to deal with the tsunami hazard. The assessment can 
show the level of their hazard knowledge practices and may identify local knowledge or 
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practices of how to escape from tsunami waves. The research findings also disclosed that 
the research participants had misperceptions about tsunami hazards by mentioning that 
tsunamis only could hit the people in Sumatra, or tsunamis could only occur with relatively 
big earthquakes. Therefore, this activity can make their risk perceptions more realistic and 
explicitly update their knowledge by assessing their vulnerability and revealing potential and 
existing capacity. On the other hand, the activity can also capture the varieties of local and 
tacit knowledge about how they escape from the tsunami and disseminate the knowledge 
to others. If possible, the knowledge can be drawn on the maps. As Rajeev (2014) argues, 
the maps should be linked to their daily lives and livelihoods. 
The next important step is to display the maps. The maps must be accessible for most 
people to see. In Mentawai, they must be placed in public places such as the religious ritual 
places (such as churches), schools, traditional markets, and dusun posko. It is also important 
to maintain the displays and to update them if necessary. Furthermore, the disseminations 
of what the maps are about to the people, including those with special needs, children, and 
new comers, are also important. With easily understood maps, the disseminations will be 
more effective. More importantly, the local community members are encouraged to be able 
to disseminate or inform about the information on the maps to others. By doing so, the 
members will keep reminding themselves about the essence of the maps. Therefore, 
through these efforts, the local community will be empowered and will show their capacity 
through public value to actively participate. 
In brief, it is important to increase the people’s coping capacities to recognise their tsunami 
risks through the involvements of the community members to develop the tsunami risk 
assessment and mapping along with the displays of the maps in strategic places for all to 
see. 
7.3.2. Monitoring 
In CEWS, monitoring is the capacity of a system to understand potential risk from the 
existence of hazards and to predict potential harm that may attack the people, in a timely 
manner (Grasso & Singh, 2012). Communities can use their existing traditional strategies or 
methods to carry out monitoring. As the research findings showed, Satlinmas exist in several 
dusun in Mentawai. Because Satlinmas only exist in a few dusun, this system is important to 
be sustained and expanded to other dusun. It is also suggested that existing or candidate 
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Satlinmas members should be obligated to attend regular training to have basic and specific 
skills as suggested by Baser and Morgan (2008). In 2015, BNPB recruited 20-trained persons 
to assist the community to assess their risk and vulnerability in Mentawai. Those persons 
can be used by the heads of dusun to train several dusun members to have the ability to 
lead the dusun people in risk assessment. 
As we know, the earthquakes in the Mentawai Segment could probably produce tsunamis 
waves that reach the shores less than ten minutes after an earthquake (BNPB, 2013a). 
Therefore, Satlinmas members need a special skill to increase coping capacity in providing 
warnings to the community in less than ten minutes and to ensure the community moves 
away to safer points. In order to increase the Satlinmas skills, it is important to develop 
techniques to ensure all dusun people understand the warnings. These techniques must 
match the culture and customs in Mentawai (as discussed in the next section). 
It is also important to expand the Satlinmas system to other dusun in the community. The 
heads of villages and other heads of dusun should encourage the local community from 
dusun to establish Satlinmas and recruit Satlinmas members. This expansion will increase 
coping capacity of other dusun in understanding of potential tsunami risk. Eventually, by 
doing so, all dusun in Mentawai will have active Satlinmas which will contribute to saving 
lives in the event of tsunamis. Lastly, regular meetings between Satlinmas members and the 
dusun people are important to discuss and evaluate this monitoring system. The meetings 
are also important to disseminate and update new information or knowledge.  
In brief, by enhancing and expanding Satlinmas, the local community of Mentawai could 
have a new identity for developing their capacity and integrating their own potential as 
collective actions.  
7.3.3. Warning dissemination 
As briefly discussed above, local equipment can be used to pay people’s attention for 
emergency warnings. This equipment can be appropriate and effective to increase coping 
capacities in order to deliver warnings as long as a consensus is developed within local 
communities (Grasso & Singh, 2012). Hamilton (1999) as cited by Glantz (2003) mentioned: 
“predictions are not useful, however, unless they are translated into a warning and action 
plan the public can understand and unless the information reaches the public in a timely 
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manner” (p.6). This means that the most effective early warning is potentially made by and 
within the community. 
It is important for a community to develop effective CEWS by using their own resources that 
are available within the community. In Mentawai several traditional and existing local 
resources are available that can be used to produce the emergency disseminations. The 
local community of Mentawai uses tutuko to provide the emergency warnings. A tutuko is a 
gong-like bamboo or timber instrument which traditional communities in Indonesia can use 
to send a warning message to others. However, in Mentawai the tutukos are too small to 
produce warning sounds that everyone in the dusun can hear it very well. Therefore, 
alternately the people can utilize several traditional instruments to produce better sounds. 
One is a gajeuma or kateuba (shown on Figure 7.4). A gajeuma is a drum-like bamboo or 
wooden instrument that can produce louder sounds than a tutuko. One side of a gajeuma 
has a tanned monitor lizard skin or monkey skin that is beaten to produce sounds 
(Susirawati, Lumban-Toruan, & Marzam, 2013; Yogawasista, 2011).  
The research findings also reveal that there are a number of tangible products of Arat 
Sabulungan that can be used for tsunami warning disseminations. Tudukkat can potentially 
be used for warning disseminations. However, this tool (including the gajeuma) is not easy 
to find within the community because of the ban on traditional beliefs and practices in 1954 
(Delfi, 2012; Schefold, 1988). At that time, many traditional tools in Mentawai were forcibly 
burned or destroyed. Despite their current rareness, gajeuma and tudukkat can be 
potentially created by the local community since the raw materials are easily found. If the 
skins of monkeys or lizards cannot be found or used anymore due to legal restriction, they 




Figure 7. 4 
Gajeuma or kateuba is a traditional music tool from Mentawai.  
This tool can be used as warning dissemination to the community. 
Sources: Susirawati et al. (2013) and Yogawasista (2011) 
 
Another prospective tool that I identified to disseminate warning sounds is the bells from 
churches and schools or drums from mosques. Bells and drums can potentially be used as a 
notification alert to other people. Usually, in Mentawai, each church or school has a bell. 
Beating a bell tells the people that the service is about to start or the school is about to start 
or finish the lesson. Beating the drum in the mosque also tells the time for prayer. However, 
from observation in the field in Dusun Passibuat, the church in the dusun has a relatively 
small bell that can produce a warning sound to the whole dusun. I also found almost the 
same sized bell in the other dusun. However, beating the bells and drums as an alert still 
provides an integration of warning disseminations to the community (UNISDR, 2010).  
As found from the field research, some participants would make noises to attract the 
people’s attentions; therefore, it would be thoughtful to provide whistles to the community. 
Whistles are good tools to notify people if there is an alert situation. A notification from a 
whistle, when a dangerous situation is about to occur, awakens other people (Molino, 2002; 
Rogers & Sorensen, 1988). Although whistles are “unofficial warning systems” (Molino, 
2002, p. 55), they can alert people nearby. Therefore, it is important that the dusun people 
have their own whistles that they can use in emergencies. They can put the whistles close to 
themselves such as on their key rings.  
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Alternatively, the local community can also own handy, mobile megaphones, as suggested 
by one participant. The dusun people can pool money to buy one or more megaphones with 
sufficient dry batteries. Although owning a joint megaphone is doable, it does require a 
strong commitment as the community would be asked to continuously collect pennies to 
purchase the dry batteries. Placing the megaphone in the right place also requires 
consideration. Alongside the placement, it must be accessible for the people to use it and 
the megaphones must be secure from vandals and theft. 
It is also considered that the local government create a standard of pre-designated codes for 
the whole district. The purpose of these pre-designated codes is to define a means of 
notification that is reliable for tsunami hazard warnings for the local community of 
Mentawai. These uniform codes can be applied to the above tools in which the dusun 
people understand that the codes are warnings. Schefold (1991) explains that in the village 
of Sakuddei in the Siberut Island, the people still use tudukkat to inform the others of 
important messages when they are in the forest or garden. Tuddukat is a traditional tool 
from Mentawai that consists of three bladdery logs. With three different sizes, each log 
produces different sounds. By hitting the logs with a wooden stick, a person can interact 
with others by translating various rhythms and tempos (Henry, 2014).  
One of the research participants realised that tuddukat can produce louder sounds in order 
to deliver warnings to others at a distance.  
“In case of an earthquake, how can we inform [the warning message] to 
others? We need more than tutuko, but [we] need a TOA [Indonesians 
usually mention TOA to refer a brand of a handy, mobile loudspeaker]. In 
relation to traditional tuddukat, no one know how to use it here” 
(Community Member, No. 06) 
Figure 7.5 below indicates that a tudukkat consists of a set of three different long gong-like 
timbers. The short one symbolizes a “ child”, the long one represents a “father” or “adult 
male”, while the medium one (in the middle ) characterizes a “mother” or “adult female” 





Figure 7. 5 
A set of three different lengthy timbers that symbolize “father”, “mother” and” child”. 
Source: Courtesy of Rob Henry 
 
Different tones or beats that are produced from tudukkat have different meanings. The 
people can decode the messages from tudukkat such as the birth of a baby boy, an elderly 
female death, or an imminent inter-clan war or a disaster (Schefold, 1991). Therefore, it is 
important for the local government to inventory the codes that have traditionally been used 
within the community already so that particular sounds can be selected and used as the 
codes for the tsunami warnings. These codes should be socialized through several activities 
such as training and simulation exercises. Therefore, the whole or the majority of the local 
community will understand the warnings when the codes are activated. 
In conclusion, several traditional tools that exist in Mentawai match the needs of warning 
dissemination in the event of tsunamis. Although the local community needs effort to 
produce more of these tools, most of them can be created from natural materials. Through 
this need, the community can creatively develop or revitalize their traditional tools. No 
complicated skills are required to operate them. However, uniform codes are also important 
so that all community members have the same understanding of the warning 
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disseminations. The usage of traditional or simple tools and codes for CEWS will provide a 
new identity to strengthen the coping capacities of the local community in Mentawai. 
7.3.4. Response capability 
After having the above activities to develop coping capacities i.e. the increase of risk 
knowledge, monitoring system and warning dissemination, it is time to develop a response 
capability. Response capability is the integrated coping capacities of communities to be 
ready to respond to a warning so that they can save their lives in the potential disaster 
(IFCR, 2012). When an early warning sounds, communities quickly carry out a set of 
response options they have been trained for. We can see from previous chapters that there 
are several substantial findings from the research about how the individuals and 
households, the local community, and the local government respond to any potential 
tsunami hazards. Below are a number of synthesised findings and several proposed ideas on 
how to increase the tsunami response capability in Mentawai at different levels. 
a. Response capability at the individual and household levels 
At the individual and household levels, there are a number of actions proposed to develop 
the response capacity of the local community in Mentawai. The research findings also 
indicate that running fast, climbing a coconut tree, or memorizing the surroundings even at 
night are several kinds of personal efficacy. These can be useful to escape from potential 
tsunamis. However, no training was found in order to boost their efficacy during the field 
study. Apart from the above kinds of efficacy, a number of different personal efficacies may 
exist within the community. Therefore, it is suggested that the heads of dusun identify and 
inventory the dusun people’s specific efficacies to use in case of a tsunami. In order to 
strengthen their efficacy, they may need to do their own practice. For example, if someone 
has good personal efficacy in climbing a coconut tree, they can train or drill themselves to 
reach the top of the tree faster. Similarly, if someone can run at night, they can keep 
maintaining this efficacy through self-training by running at night time.  
Alternately, the local community can also develop their personal efficacy through races. As 
J. S. Becker et al. (2011) highlight, personal efficacy develops because of people effectively 
solving problems and dealing with challenges in everyday life. Therefore, it is important to 
build up and maintain the individuals’ efficacy over time as they accumulate such 
experience. The dusun leaders can easily organize a race as during the celebration of 
195 
 
Indonesia Independence Day, local communities organize a number of races such as 
climbing a fully-oily areca nut tree. On the top of the tree, several prizes are hanging that 
can be picked up by the first group reaching the top. Similarly, dusun heads, supported by 
the local community members, can organize the races, but they would focus more on how 
to build up and maintain personal efficacies. Every individual who wants to participate in the 
races keeps doing his or her own exercises. Consequently, the races will improve their 
personal efficacy which will be useful when a tsunami occurs.  
Other field study findings have identified the absence of tsunami plans and exercises at the 
household level. To cope with these problems, the heads of dusun may need to encourage 
all households to have their own tsunami plans at homes and exercise the plans on a regular 
basis. It is important to hold a series of meetings at the dusun level to inform people how to 
develop a household plan and to practise it. It may be awkward at the beginning to practise 
the household plan, but the family members will get used to it if they keep on doing it. As a 
result, they can develop their response capability to tsunami hazards. However, the family 
members may experience burnout and to avoid this, encouragements from family 
members, dusun heads, neighbours, religious leaders, and NGO activists is important. 
Alternatively, new or updated information related to tsunamis can be distributed to the 
local community.  
As scholars (Alston, 2015; Kottegoda, 2007; Mulilis, 1999) argue, gender may play a role in 
vulnerability. Women may be more at risk than men due to cultural and social constraints. 
The field findings also indicate that women are seemingly more at risk from tsunami hazards 
than the men in Mentawai are. Therefore, it is important to empower the local women of 
Mentawai through their involvement in developing household plans and exercises. As LIPI 
(2006) found, it is a common practice in Mentawai that every Saturday the household wives 
have one day off from work to go to church to discuss things such as health, caring for 
babies and children, and hygiene problems. It is suggested that the church leaders can use 
this time to discuss tsunami household plans and exercises. This will encourage the females 
to make tsunami household plans and do tsunami household exercises. This empowerment 
will contribute in a positive way for themselves as well as all family members. In addition, 
the church leaders support the NGOs and dusun leaders’ programs in order to increase the 
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welfare of the community. Therefore, it is critically important to empower the women in 
Mentawai to participate actively in tsunami preparedness measures.  
From the field findings, taking risks to save others is common among the participants. 
Despite their determination and ability to run to avoid the tsunami waves, they could 
become victims because they tend to assist others to escape from the tsunami waves. The 
local community members might not easily follow the tsunami tendenko maxim to save 
their own lives due to the solid sibling and neighbourhood linkages. Nevertheless, according 
to Yong and Indrarto (2013), there is a strong need to create a more synergetic and strategic 
approach among the teachers, community, and NGO activists in Mentawai. This approach 
can be used to introduce the tsunami tendenko maxim to the students which is to run away 
from the coast to a secure point as soon as an earthquake shakes. The school teachers can 
also keep teaching and practising the maxim with the students. I assume that the teachers 
will support this program that can save the children’s lives. Additionally, the teachers can 
also communicate it to the students’ parents through the student communication book. This 
will result in the student telling their parents that they are aware of any earthquakes and 
can find out a secure point to avoid potential tsunamis. Consequently, the parents would 
know that their children of school age would be likely to find a secure point to go to in the 
event of a tsunami. Therefore, this strategy to introduce tsunami tendenko will affect many 
people, and could save lives in the future. 
It has been also revealed from the study that a number of participants would place their 
important documents outside their main house in a safer place. This best practice can be 
expanded to others. Alternatively, they can place the documents together along with other 
important items in their traditional rattan-made baskets, opa (as shown in Figure 7.6). This 
tangible product of Arat Sabulungan, Opa, can be placed in easily accessed points at home, 




Figure 7. 6 
A woman bringing a traditional basket (opa) in Mentawai 
The local people put into it a bottle of water, bananas, or kumara. 
Source: Personal documentation taken during the field study 
 
 
It is generally known in Mentawai that pigs are important for the local community. Delfi 
(2012) found that pigs have unchangeable roles for the local community of Mentawai. As 
well as for daily needs, they are a part of cultural and religious rituals. Pigs are used for the 
bride price, fine payments, healing rituals, and peace festivals. Delfi (2012, p. 18) also found 
that even the local people who are Muslims say “Islam is my arat [culture], but is not my 
body”. This means that although they are Muslims, pigs (or pork meats) are not taboo to use 
in religious rituals. Therefore, pigs have cultural meanings for the local people, besides the 
economic aspects. As the study has revealed, saving the domesticated pigs could be 
practical for the community before a tsunami occurs. For this, I suggest that the pigs be 
placed outside the settlements. Since there is empty land in Mentawai, they could use this 
land to cultivate the pigs as long as it is not too far to feed them every day. Therefore, this 
strategy will help the people to not think about their possessions and to run as rapidly as 
possible in the event of tsunamis. 
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To conclude, it is important to conduct a series of activities at the individual and household 
levels in order to increase response capability. All types of personal efficacy of the 
individuals in Mentawai require a commitment to self-training as well as a community race 
to maintain the efficacy over time. Furthermore, each household should start to develop 
their tsunami plans and to do regular tsunami exercises. All elements within the community 
should encourage and support these repetitive and continuous activities. The 
encouragement of the household wives from the local churches, for example, will influence 
not only the women but also the whole family. Moreover, although the tsunami tendenko 
maxim is not easy to implement within the community in general, it could firstly be 
implemented in the schools. The schoolteachers and NGO activists can persuade the 
students to inform their parents that they would do the tsunami tendenko in a case of an 
earthquake. This will reduce their parents’ concern for the children’s safety. Thus, they will 
not go back to their dusun if, for example, they are in their garden. In addition, the use of 
opa (the traditional basket from Mentawai) will also useful for important documents and 
other items. This basket is placed in an easily reached point so that, in the event of an 
earthquake, a family member can quickly take the basket and run to a safe point. Lastly, it is 
important to consider a good place to cultivate pigs or other domesticated animals. So, 
when an earthquake strikes, the family members would have less concern for about the 
safety of their domesticated animals. Instead, they would consider their own safety. The 
above activities will increase the response capability of the individual and household 
members in the event of a tsunami.  
b. Response capability at the community level 
At the community level, several significant findings from the field study are also important 
to be emphasized in order to increase tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. The tsunami 
hazard disseminations through the mass media often cannot reach the community. Many 
cannot access TV programs or the radio for several reasons. The electricity coverage is very 
limited in Mentawai and is not available all day.  
Similarly, because of the reluctance to read, many people do not receive information 
through printed materials. It was also found that some other people did not move to safer 
places, although they knew the risks from tsunami waves. Additionally, the study unveiled 
that no dusun has developed tsunami risk maps, so everybody can know where they are and 
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where to go in case of a tsunami occurs. Many of the evacuation points are also neglected 
and it seems that they have not been cared for. Moreover, the evacuation signs are also 
unclear, unreadable, and damaged. Furthermore, the dusun people allow others to use the 
evacuation routes for other purposes and have abandoned the routes because of the rain 
eroding the path and grass being overgrown. Lastly, the findings indicate that more tsunami 
education programs and dissemination of tsunami education materials, higher quality, and 
quantity of tsunami simulation exercises, and higher commitments to support the tasks of 
Satlinmas are needed.  
There are a number of activities proposed in order to develop the community response 
capability and the heads of the dusun need to involve the local community, local 
government officers, religious leaders, and NGO activists. Firstly, the heads of the dusun 
should urgently invite all dusun people, church leaders, school teachers, and NGO activists 
to have a series of meetings. If possible, the heads should also invite the above partners to 
be involved in these activities. The main purpose of the meetings is to identify in detail why 
the above findings need to take place and how to solve the problems. According to Mathbor 
(2008), this step is important to identify ideas and solutions to the problems. Based on the 
outputs of the identifications, the dusun people can establish a plan that consists of goals 
and certain activities to achieve these goals. The plan should elaborate what activities and 
when, where, who and by whom and how they should be done. Once the commitments are 
accepted, all community members should adhere to their implementation, accordingly.  
Secondly, it is also considered that the community especially should support and be part of 
the Satlinmas as they have important roles in the community monitoring system. Satlinmas 
are relevant and significant to control unexpected conditions during the earthquakes and 
can activate the warning dissemination tool(s). Therefore, the strengthening and expanding 
of Satlinmas to other dusun in Mentawai is imperative to provide early warnings to others. 
The male adults can participate as Satlinmas members. To avoid the inactivation of 
Satlinmas, the heads of the dusun must fill in and establish rosters on a regular basis. The 
roster should be displayed on the public noticeboard, and Satlinmas members should 
encourage each other to do this valuable task. As Satlinmas is voluntary, according to 
Aditama, Hasyim, and Adha (2013) willingness to save human lives is the main key for this 
kind of community participation to be successful. In order that Satlinmas have the right to 
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self-determination and knowledge on the situation, the right information, and suitable 
training are also essential. Once the pre-designated codes have been determined, special 
training to develop Satlinmas’ skills in using the warning tool(s) is important. Bailey and 
Koney (1996) and Mathbor (2008) suggest that local government should support 
participatory needs through training and the provision of material, and other forms of 
assistance. 
Lastly, the heads of the dusun are required promote kerja bakti as a manifestation of Arat 
Sabulungan on a regular basis. According to Koentjaraningrat (1987), kerja bakti is a spirit 
that is manifested by individuals through collective actions for the community and without 
ulterior motives. Kerja bakti can be used to build, develop, repair, or remake the tsunami 
evacuation routes, points, and signage in dusun. With the dusun people’s commitments, the 
heads can decide the rosters for kerja bakti. Also, as the evacuation routes were covered 
with grass, the community can collectively trim the grass through kerja bakti. According to 
Ireland and Thomalla (2011), there are several collective actions that can contribute to 
developing response capacity and provide room for people to express, discuss and resolve 
their concerns. Lastly, it contributes to individuals’ empowerment to reinforce interactions 
with local leaders to provide strong advocacy (Ireland & Thomalla, 2011). Through kerja 
bakti, the community may find any other problems and the solutions to the problems in 
order to facilitate their response capability for tsunami hazards.  
Briefly, several activities can be implemented in order to increase the community’s response 
capability. Firstly, it is important to identify the potential solutions to the findings in detail. 
The heads of dusun with their community members need to set up an urgent plan so that 
the community understands what to do in the event of a tsunami. Secondly, Satlinmas 
should be enhanced and expanded in order to provide the valuable response capability to 
the whole community. Lastly, the community must be motivated to do the collective action 
of kerja bakti. Through kerja bakti the maintenance of the evacuation points, routes, 
signage, etc. can be fulfilled so that when these facilities are used, the response capability of 
the community is greater.  
c. Response capability at the district level 
All the above downstream efforts at the individual, household and dusun levels should be 
implemented in an intensive, urgent, simultaneous, and serious way. In order to achieve the 
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aim, the local government should involve local NGOs, village leaders, provincial and central 
governments, and academics or scientists. The study findings showed that understanding 
hazard knowledge is a problem for the local community of Mentawai; consequently, easily 
understood materials for tsunami hazard disseminations are needed. In order to have 
scientific-based information, the local government could consult with the seismographic and 
social researchers or experts from the University of Andalas (Padang City), LIPI (Jakarta), ITB 
(Bandung) and BPPT (Jakarta). Similarly, the government can also have meetings with dusun 
leaders, church leaders, and NGO activists to discuss the development of this program. 
Based on the information, the local government can arrange the materials that the local 
community needs to easily understand the messages. It is suggested that these materials be 
colourful and pictorial in the forms of leaflets, booklets, flipcharts, posters, and billboards. 
As Musacchio et al. (2015) state dissemination requires a match between the creation of 
knowledge and the target audience. Therefore, these materials will become understandable 
by the community and a good reference for other entities such as NGOs or people who 
conduct tsunami disseminations in Mentawai. 
The central government through BNPB has established the document concerning tsunami 
assessment risks and maps at the district level and identified the areas where evacuation 
routes are needed. Therefore, the provincial government of West Sumatra can assist the 
district government of Mentawai to support public programs in Mentawai. As the district 
government of Mentawai has financial limitations, the provincial government can build 
additional evacuation routes and provide tsunami signage as the community needs. 
Additionally, the local government may also request support from the local private 
businesses to multiply the dissemination materials and distribute them to the community. 
Even more, joint program(s) of the businesses can be provided in the sub-district(s). 
Therefore, it is important to involve other entities in order to create positive impacts on the 
community. 
The local government also needs to support all activities at the dusun level. The local 
government should urgently respond to the needs of the dusun people. Bupati can closely 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the programs at dusun level. If possible, the 
heads of villages should include the implementation of the tsunami preparedness activities 
into their monthly report to the district level.  
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It is urgently required to formulate several specific local policies from Bupati related to: 
- The determination of tsunami risk assessment and maps at the dusun level. 
- The movement of the dusun people who live in the red zones. 
- The designs, establishment, and maintenance of the evacuation routes and points 
and signage in all dusun. 
- The determination of regular tsunami simulation exercises at the district level. 
- Public programs support the tsunami preparedness measures based on the disaster 
risk assessments and risk maps. 
- The involvement of the private sector, religious leaders, teachers, and other 
elements to carry out tsunami preparedness measures. 
- The approach on how to obtain potential external and internal assistance in an 
emergency. 
With the support from the District Parliament of Mentawai, Bupati can legislate:  
- The banning of the deforestation of the mangrove vegetation and support for efforts 
to replant the mangroves. 
- The establishment of pre-designated codes for tsunami warnings. 
 
Meanwhile, the BPBD Mentawai is also required to develop a number of technical 
guidelines in order to support the community’s activities. These guidelines are about how to 
develop or do: 
- evacuation plans 
- household tsunami plans 
- household tsunami exercises 
- community simulation exercises. 
- tsunami tendenko 
- maintenance of personal efficacy.  
 
Therefore, at the district level, a number of efforts must be developed and/or strengthened 
in order to support and create the individual, household, and community response 
capability. For the efforts, strong commitments from Bupati are required by developing 
certain policies that support the community. The above efforts enable the community to 
increase their response capability and an increase in this capability will also develop their 
capacity for tsunami preparedness. As Baser and Morgan (2008) remind us, capacity 
development necessitates a complex mixture of attitudes, capital, tactics, and skills, both 
tangible and intangible; therefore, the involvement of other entities becomes important. 
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From the above explanations, we can see that this people-centered early warning system 
will also increase current tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness in Mentawai through 
the implementations of CEWS. Public campaigns on tsunami hazards are required through 
the involvements of school teachers and leaders from churches and mosques. In order that 
these people obtain correct knowledge about tsunamis, the NGO activists and government 
cadres need to train them. Also, regular and specific-skill training for Satlinmas is important 
so that Satlinmas has an ability to assist the community members to assess their risk and 
vulnerability. Moreover, it is important to use their traditional tools to produce warning 
sounds with understandable codes of the sounds. Lastly, regular tsunami simulations at the 
dusun and household levels are important to maintain their awareness and preparedness. 
Consequently, the implementation of CEWS will directly enhance the current tsunami 
hazard knowledge and preparedness in Mentawai as the requirements of Ina-TEWS as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. 
In conclusion, the implementation of all foundations in CEWS perfectly connects to the Ina-
TEWS requirements at the downstream level. The Ina-TEWS requirements are to increase 
capacities of communities regarding tsunami hazards and to ensure community members 
are safe from possibility of tsunami hazards. In order to achieve these requirements, CEWS 
has established four main foundations of the early warning system, namely risk knowledge, 
monitoring, warning communication, and response capability. These foundations will allow 
the people in Mentawai to have proper tsunami risk knowledge, reliable links between the 
warnings providers and community members, the capacity to produce timely, technically 
accurate warnings and the capability to respond to the warnings in appropriate ways. 
Therefore, the implementation of CEWS in Mentawai means that it supports the big scheme 
of Ina-TEWS to make people have proper knowledge on tsunamis and be safe in the event of 
a tsunami in a small community of Mentawai.  
7.4. Developing adaptive capacity through disaster risk reduction program 
As mentioned above, coping capacity is a series of activities to increase adaptation to 
unexpected events in the short term. However, in tsunami preparedness there is no 
particular period to determine that the coping capacity is sufficient. If we commit to coping 
capacity efforts continuously and mainstreaming them into our daily life, we can call these 
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efforts ‘adaptive capacity’. Therefore, generally adaptive capacity is a ceaseless and 
constant process.  
Scholars have defined adaptive capacity as the ability to survive or cope with unexpected 
events by adjusting institutions, systems, and individuals to any potential damage in the 
events. Jones, Ludi, and Levine (2010, p. 2) define adaptive capacity as “the ability of a 
system to adjust, modify or change its characteristics or actions to moderate potential 
damage, take advantage of opportunities or cope with the consequences of shock or 
stress”. Moreover, J. Becker, McBride, and Paton (2012) also state that adaptive capacity 
occurs when a local community uses its individuals, collective and institutional resources 
and competencies to develop its capability. This enables the community to anticipate, cope 
with, recover from and learn from their needs, before, during, or after an emergency. 
Additionally, Marshall et al. (2009, p. 5) define adaptive capacity as “the ability to respond 
to challenges through learning, managing risks, and impacts, developing new knowledge 
and devising effective approaches”. It also entails a flexibility to adopt new solutions. 
Therefore, the main key of adaptive capacity is the involvements of individuals, community 
members, and local government in processes of adjustment. The relationship should also be 
strong enough to build trust with one another.  
It is important to characterise adaptive capacity to understand how it can be influenced at 
the local level. Developing adaptive capacity becomes critical when a local community is 
exposed to external influences. It also cannot be measured directly. As adaptive capacity is 
independent and flexible, truthful and relevant knowledge, information and proficiency are 
required (Jones et al., 2010). Thus, effective and supportive institutions can create 
successful adaptive capacity within a community. Buckle (2006) also pinpoints that various 
characteristics influence adaptive capacity at the individual, family, and community levels. 
These characteristics encompass hazard knowledge, common values, and skills. 
Consequently, adaptive capacity is not only related to the understanding of knowledge, but 
also it needs external support to implement flexible efforts at the local level.  
From the above arguments, I propose one relevant program that could increase adaptive 
capacity in Mentawai to reduce tsunami risk and this is a tsunami risk reduction program 
through adaptive capacity development. This program is about how to empower the 
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community to access to various factors of adaptive capacity development processes in order 
to increase the tsunami risk reduction.  
Since the program requires the involvement of and commitments from many institutions 
within the wider community, a strong co-creation of public values becomes important 
(Baser, 2007; Benington, 2011; Williams, 2011). Therefore, I propose that the village heads 
be responsible for implementing the program. In the government system of Indonesia, the 
lowest government is a village government. The village government has a particular office, a 
selected village head, and several people to work at providing public services to the village 
people. A head of a village has a legal standing position within the community based on the 
Act No 5 of 1979 on The Village Government and the Act No. 6 of 2014 on Village. The head 
is respected within the community and one of village government’s tasks is to develop the 
orderliness of village people. This task corresponds with the aim of this program to develop 
orderliness in adaptive capacity development to reduce the tsunami risk. In Mentawai, there 
are 43 villages and 40 of them are close to the coastal areas. Therefore, strong involvement 
of the heads of villages will impact on tsunami preparedness in Mentawai.  
As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, several root causes and dynamic pressures have 
forced the local community of Mentawai to live in unsafe locations where there is potential 
for a tsunami. The exposure to external cultures, the changes of settlement patterns and of 
the social and economic system have been identified as the root causes for the community’s 
tsunami vulnerability. The rapid population growth, limited support from the local 
government and deforestation have contributed to tsunami vulnerability. On the other 
hand, the islands of Mentawai are situated in a hot spot of fault lines that can trigger 
tsunamis when an earthquake occurs. These factors should be linked to the potential 
solutions of reducing their vulnerability by increasing their adaptive capacity. To build and 
sustain capacity is not easy; however, it is possible to do and systemic efforts are needed to 
reduce risk disasters (DRR).  
UNISDR (2007b) defines DRR as:  
“the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic 
efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including 
through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and 
property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved 
preparedness for adverse events.”  
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As indicated in Figure 7.1 above, as a concept, DRR is simply about increasing capacity so 
that vulnerability and exposure to the hazards are decreased. As a practice, DRR requires 
comprehensive strategies to reduce the disaster risks. It necessitates existing and diverse 
livelihood strategies, the usage of social networks and an increase of knowledge (Turnbull et 
al., 2013). Moreover, Turnbull et al. (2013) argue that a conceptual understanding of risk is 
required in order to develop adaptive capacity. These strategies mean that disaster risk is 
strongly related to hazard exposure and vulnerability. In order to decrease disaster risk, 
reduction in vulnerability and exposure to hazards is necessary. The development processes 
of adaptive capacity are influenced by a number of factors namely: political, institutional, 
cultural, social, environmental, human, economic, and physical. Therefore, it is important to 
decrease disaster risk through understanding the risk knowledge by conducting continual 
efforts to ensure surviving of unexpected events by adjusting systems within a community 
(as seen in Figure 7.7). 
 
 
Figure 7. 7 
Factors influencing adaptive capacity 




In relation to the adaptive capacity development in Mentawai, this model is suited to 
implementation within the community of Mentawai to reduce potential risk of tsunami 
hazards through a comprehensive program. This program includes all factors that are 
mentioned in the Figure 7.7. I propose to name a program as Disaster Risk Reduction on 
Tsunami (DRRonT). Based on the research findings, DRRonT will be suitable for the local 
community of Mentawai to be able to survive from tsunami hazards. This program will 
involve the systems within the community such as the village governments and even higher 
levels of the governments (district and provincial levels). The aim of DRRonT is to develop 
disaster risk reduction on tsunami hazards within the local community of Mentawai through 
the efforts of adaptive capacity and it will encompass in an integrated perspective from a 
multi-faceted approach. Below are the comprehensive efforts proposed to develop adaptive 
capacity through the program in Mentawai. 
 
a. Political factors 
It is important to have political support for DRRonT. As discussed previously, traditionally 
the indigenous people of Mentawai were egalitarian with respect to social, political, and 
economic affairs (Schefold, 1991). Therefore, there was no particular position for leadership 
in the community. However, since the resettlement of isolated people (PKMT), the local 
community has been exposed to the system of dusun and village. Based on the Act No 6 of 
2014 on Village, in Indonesia, the designation of a village head is based on a general election 
by the village people who are able to vote. In relation to DRRONT, the community can urge 
the candidates of village heads to have clear standpoints on the issue of tsunami 
preparedness. There are three waves of general election for the village heads in Mentawai. 
The first wave was conducted in January 2015 in several villages, and the second and the 
third waves will be conducted in 2017 and 2019. Therefore, there is a good chance to know 
the standpoints of the candidates about DRRonT for the other villages.  
As a government, a village also has Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD)(The 
Village People Endurance Institution). LKMD is a parliament-like institution at the village 
level that accommodates and channels the aspirations from and to the village people and 
informs the people about their political rights. In conjunction with DRRONT, the community 
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can urge LKMD to push Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (KPUD) (the district general election 
committee) to task the candidates’ village heads with an additional requirement. This is to 
include the candidates’ commitments to tsunami preparedness measures. At the village 
level, LKMD is also responsible for screening the potential candidates before it officially 
proposes the candidate to KPUD. Therefore, it is important that the candidates sign a 
political contract on this issue.  
On the other hand, the existing heads of villages also need to have tsunami risk knowledge 
and to understand the urgency of tsunami preparedness. The village people can urge the 
heads of villages to have clear standpoints on tsunami threats and to actively involve to 
manage the coping and adaptive capacity programs in Mentawai. Therefore, it is important 
to ensure that the village governments plan and implement certain activities from their 
annual programs. If a head of a village pays less attention to the problem, the people must 
know they have a political right to propose to Bupati through LKMD that this designated 
head be fired. Therefore, it is important to inform the local community of their political 
rights regarding candidates and designated heads of villages and their tsunami 
preparedness measures.  
b. Institutional factors 
One way to support DRRonT is to empower institutions that exist within a community. Lack 
of awareness and knowledge regarding tsunami hazards is apparent among community 
institutions, the local community and religious leaders, private businesses, and government 
officials. As lack of knowledge increases the vulnerability of people, it is important to 
develop adaptive capacity among them regarding tsunami hazards. As briefly mentioned 
above, each village in Mentawai has a village government that consists of a head of village, 
LKMD members, and several persons to serve public values to the people. The heads of 
villages can use their annual budget to support the implementation of public activities with 
an orientation towards DRRonT.  
To make sure the above aim is met, it is important to conduct a Musyawarah Perencanaan 
dan Pembangunan (Musrenbang) Desa (the village forum to conduct development planning) 
based on the Act No 32 of 2004 on the Rural Development. Musrembang Desa is an annual 
planning mechanism to meet the local needs through bottom up planning. The village 
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government and the village people need to have a series of meetings for participatory 
village appraisal and produce Rencana Kerja Pembanguan (RKP) Desa (an annual 
development program plan). Therefore, through this mechanism, the village governments 
can have strong commitments to DRRONT.  
c. Cultural factors 
Cultural factors are an important part in DRRONT. As discussed above, the traditional tools 
can be used to produce warning sounds in Mentawai and have a direct impact on tsunami 
preparedness. However, there are several other cultural elements of Arat Sabulungan that 
can be useful to develop DRRONT. G. A. Persoon (1997) explains that Mentawai is unique in 
many aspects of their lives and originally, the indigenous people had many traditional rituals 
or punen such as punen kudduat (having new uma), punen sinuba (festivals for good fishing 
catches), punen patiti (ritual for tattooing). However, many punen are never or seldom 
performed since the people have mainly become Christians or Muslims (Rudito, 2013).  
Nevertheless, in particular dusun, the indigenous people still perform particular punen. 
Tamba (2009) provides an example from Simatalu Lubaga Village. The people from this 
village still use kabit (traditional loincloths) and live from hunting in the forest. The people 
are mainly tattooed and moreover, they often do punen by dancing turuk (Figure 7.8).  
 
Figure 7. 8 
A group of adult males from Mentawai people performing Turuk dance 
Source: Reygina (2016) 
 
We can also find several ornaments in Mentawai. Schefold (1991) found three basic 
patterns in their cultural ornaments with the first pattern being very conservative as a row 
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of dots (legu), triagles, jagged lines (sot), wave-like lines, spiral-like lines, webbing-like lines 
(teleurui), standing spiral lines (pagagalik), taika-labbo, and bilou. These are mainly found 
on the traditional tools such as traditional boats (abak) or parang (traditional knives). The 
second pattern is a combination of the first pattern into wooden crafts. Mostly the crafts 
are in the shape of human skulls (jaraik), turtles (rerepak), monkeys (bokkoi), or lizards. 
These crafts are placed in the uma (communal house), on the pavilion of uma or abak. The 
last pattern has several shapes such as traversing lines, stars, roses, suns (matat sulu), or 
asymmetric axes. They are normally used as tattoos (titi) for the people (Loeb, 1935; 
Schefold, 1991). 
As defined that DRR is also related to the development of the people’s livelihood, the above 
cultural factors have economic value if the people can use the opportunity. They can draw 
the ornaments on canvases and/or make wooden crafts which can be traded as souvenirs. 
In addition to this, nowadays the Indonesians love to wear batik and almost every district 
government in Indonesia produces its unique, traditional batik with its own patterns. It is a 
good chance for the local community of Mentawai to develop its own batik with the above 
patterns to preserve Arat Sabulungan. Aside from its economic values, this batik can 
preserve the traditional cultures. Similarly, their traditional livelihoods can be used for 
cultural tourism and these cultural factors can be used to develop tsunami preparedness as 
well as livelihoods. To adequately increase their livelihoods, it is critical to reduce the 
underlying drivers of the risks affecting the farmers, fishers and gardeners in Mentawai. 
They can have regular incomes by developing batik with Mentawai nuances and people can 
do their work far away from the coasts. Therefore, by building a resilient livelihood for the 
local community of Mentawai, it increases DRRonT. 
d. Social factors 
Social factors include the aspects relating to divisions defined by religion, ethnicity, and 
income that have an important effect on adaptive capacity development for tsunami risk 
reduction. As identified earlier, various ethnicities have come and lived in Mentawai and, 
aside from Mentawai ethnicity, Swasono (1997) identified that Minangkabau, Javanese, 
Batak, Aceh and Palembang are very common ethnicities found in Mentawai. Before the 
2010 tsunami occurred, the newcomers transferred their knowledge on tsunami hazards to 
some of the local people so therefore, the local people experienced to have some benefits 
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from the newcomers, in particular tsunami prevention measures. However, the indigenous 
people often thought that the incoming ethnicities were more intelligent and civilized and 
called them “Orang Tepi”. The indigenous people often judged themselves as old-fashioned 
(Febrianto & Fitriani, 2012; Swasono, 1997). This puts the indigenous people in a low 
bargaining position to sell their products, as previously discussed.  
On order to make the community mix with one another, the heads of villages can do several 
things. Firstly, they can revitalize the local culture to gather the community. Another 
example of punen that the heads of villages can use to mix other ethnicities with the 
indigenous people is punen pasambaat. This intangible product of Arat Sabulungan is 
performed when there are new comers to the community. Therefore, it could be useful to 
make other ethnicities socialize with the indigenous people. Punen pasambaat can be 
followed by activities such as a cultural galas. The heads of villages can regularly organize 
cultural galas in which all ethnicities can participate and show their cultures with dances, 
foods, or crafts. Eventually, punen pasambaat and other socializing events can make all 
people at the village level mingle with one another 
Secondly, the heads of dusun can organize inter-dusun races or contests for Indonesia 
Independence Day or the Commemoration Day of the 2010 Tsunami. Through the events, 
each dusun people can perform their personal tsunami escape practice and create tudukkat 
and gajeuma. It is also important to involve particular groups in these events including 
Satlinmas, children, and women. The children could participate in writing or drawing about 
a tsunami and the women could have running races. The victims of the 2010 tsunami could 
give messages regarding the eeriness of the waves. Therefore, their knowledge, 
experiences, abilities, and skills can be shared to increase others’ knowledge and awareness 
to face potential tsunami hazards. 
The Batak people have adapted well to the indigenous people (Sihombing, 1979). As we 
know, the local community of Mentawai now is mostly Christian and after the first Christian 
missionary, August Lett (a German), started in Mentawai in 1901, other German 
missionaries brought a number of teachers and missionaries from Batak (North Sumatra). In 
1861 the Batak people had started to convert to Christianity through the German 
missionaries and many of them could read and teach, and even evangelize others 
(Aritonang, 1993; Sihombing, 1979). Therefore, the German missionaries used the Batak 
212 
 
missionaries to evangelize the indigenous people of Mentawai. Similarly, this method can be 
used to spread tsunami knowledge and tsunami preparedness to the people in Mentawai. 
As briefly mentioned, Orang Tepi is highly appreciated by the indigenous people; therefore, 
the heads of villages can persuade the newcomers, especially the Batak people, to 
disseminate the tsunami knowledge and tsunami preparedness to the people of Mentawai.  
e. Environmental factors 
Environmental factors also influence DRRonT through adaptive capacity. Natural barriers 
such as mangroves can provide protection from a tsunami as they can reduce the flow 
velocity (Pathirage et al., 2015). In earlier discussions, we understood how coastal 
vegetation can block tsunami waves from penetrating inland. We can see from Chapter 3 
that the district government of Mentawai reports that 70 per cent of the coastal vegetation 
is still in good condition (Pemda Mentawai, 2010). However, Yayasan Minang Bahari (2009) 
reports that the condition is much worse than that. Many of the local community members 
have exploited the mangroves for making fires and coastal erosion due to human activities 
also wrecks the vegetation growth (Yayasan Minang Bahari, 2009). In fact, dense mangroves 
can be important aspects to protect coastal areas from tsunamis (Adger et al., 2005; 
Diposaptono & Budiman, 2008; Forbes & Broadhead, 2007). Accordingly, the heads of 
villages should organize the local community including children to plant new seeds on the 
coastal areas next to their dusun. Moreover, the schoolteachers keep teaching and 
encouraging their students to do this. In addition, the heads of villages can issue an official 
letter to ban the cutting of trees from the coastal areas. These efforts will help create a 
natural barrier for the tsunami waves in the future. 
Traditionally, the indigenous people of Mentawai would do a “tippu sasa” ritual for 
someone who had committed a misconduct. Tippu sasa (another intangible product of Arat 
Sabulungan) was the most serious sanction by the community and consisted of making an 
oath. The oath was that the person would be dead if she or he repeated the same deed 
(Coronese, 1986). Therefore, tippu sasa may be applied to those who cut the mangroves. 
The heads of villages can instruct the people not to cut the mangrove trees. If someone is 
found guilty of cutting the mangrove trees, the community will ask for the tippu sasa ritual. 




f. Human factors 
Turnbull et al. (2013) argue that human factors are important to develop adaptive capacity 
and consist of food security, health, and education. In relation to food security at the 
household level, one of the research participants ever said: 
“The adults [in Mentawai] prefer having bananas or taro [as the main 
foods]. But [our] children prefer having rice [instead]. That is why [we] try 
to create [dry] paddy field. In fact, subbet [a traditional food from taro] is 
delicious. If [I] have enough money, we [I] will buy rice. The people buy 
rice Rp. 10.000 per kg [equals to USD 1.08]. If [I have] no money, ya [we 
are] back [to have] traditional foods.” (Community Member No. 04) 
The above finding implies that there has been familiarization to non-traditional food among 
the indigenous people in Mentawai. The people usually plant taro, bananas, and sago plants 
as their main food next to their dusun. However, the change of food preferences, particular 
for the children, can create problems for the people. They will not spend their time planting 
paddy rice as they have never known how to cultivate it (Febrianto & Fitriani, 2012; 
Schefold, 1991). Instead, they will spend about half of their income in buying the rice. It has 
been indicated previously that the household income average was USD 64.84 a month 
(Kamal, 2013) and Schefold (1991) found that normally the people eat three times a day. If 
we assume that a household uses one kg of rice a day (for three meals), they will use 30 kg 
of rice a month or equivalent to USD 32.43 a month. However, the finding also clearly 
emphasizes that they always go back to their traditional foods if they have not enough 
money to buy rice. It seems that they have no problems with accessing traditional foods. 
One thing that needs consideration is that the people in Mentawai cook their foods in a very 
simple way. Usually, they steam the sago material after they have mixed it with coconut 
milk or shredded coconut in banana leaves (Schefold, 1991). They also boil the ripe bananas 
and have them for breakfast. This could make the people, especially the children prefer 
eating rice rather than the traditional foods. In order to make meals from the above viands, 
it is important for the local community members to develop new cooking skills. Therefore, it 
is suggested that the heads of villages organize a cooking training program for the people, 
targeted in particular towards women.  
Consuming rice and other foods from the external islands and renouncing their traditional 
foods will keep the people in poverty because of the extra expenditure. The prices of the 
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external goods are higher in Mentawai than that in Sumatra. The poverty causes the people 
to be at high risk from tsunami hazards because they keep living in old settlements in the 
coasts. Therefore, the reduction of external food demands in Mentawai would allow the 
local community to save money that they can use for other purposes such as moving their 
settlements to safer places. 
g. Economic factors 
Economic factors are one of the keys to successful DRRonT. Economic planning measures 
comprise parts relating to production, circulation, and consumption of goods and services in 
a society (Pathirage et al., 2015). The research findings also indicate that it is easy to find 
taros, bananas, and sago in Mentawai. My observations during the field research also 
indicated that massive amounts of them were taken from Mentawai to Padang (in Sumatra) 
via the ferry. However, the local community always sells them to middlemen as raw 
materials as I have elaborated in the previous chapter. According to Jacobs, Nelson, 
Kuruppu, and Leith (2015), the people who are dependent on a natural resource as their 
livelihood should be able to convert them to another form. Therefore, it is necessary that 
the local community of Mentawai to produce and sell their products as intermediate goods 
or even finished goods. 
In order to produce the intermediate and finished goods, it is important to develop new 
skills for the local community members and the heads of villages could organize several 
kinds of training to develop the people’s skills. They could request assistance from Bupati to 
provide the related experts to train the people. One kind of training is about how the local 
people could turn goods such as sago or taro into flour and sell the flour outside Mentawai. 
Another is how to make finished goods from natural products, such as sago and taro cookies 
or banana chips. As we know, it is easy to find cookies made from sago in Indonesia, but 
cookies from taro are rare. In addition, as they normally sell raw sea food, they can also 
make and sell the fish as fish floss instead. Therefore, through such skills development, the 
local community can produce intermediate and finished goods, and sell them outside 
Mentawai. 
To make it work, however, the heads of villages needs to form a particular “kelompok tani” 
by grouping about 20-25 dusun people who have the same interests, goals, and desires 
(Nuryanti & Swastika, 2011). A kelompok tani has the function of a means to study general 
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affairs, to increase skills, and to produce particular products. The kelompok tani, eventually, 
will also have a good engagement with the traditional markets and avoid price fraud by the 
middlemen.  
Since the Mentawai Islands face the Indian Ocean, the sea waves are as high as 6 metres all 
year. Reygina (2016) found that 70 beaches have potential for surfing activities (Figure 7.9). 
However, Ponting (2001) argues that it is not easy to find agreement from the community to 
support tourism development. It is because the tourism sector never involves the local 
people and therefore cannot run very well. It is important that the heads of villages urge the 
tourism sectors to employ the local people as tourism guides, drivers of boats, or even as 
surfing trainers. However, commitment from the local government is also important to help 
train the local people.  
 
 
Figure 7. 9 
A high wave is enjoyable in Pantai Mapadegat, Mentawai 
Source: Reygina (2016) 
 
In addition, the local government is also required to promote the richness of Mentawai as a 
tourist destination. The local government can propose to the provincial government of West 
Sumatra or Central Government to carry out regular tourism festivals and exhibitions in 
domestic and overseas locations. Therefore, by using the different cultures in Mentawai, it 
is considered that adaptive capacity to tsunami risk will increase. However, strong 
commitments from the village, local, provincial and central governments are needed. 
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The above activities are considered to be able to generate incomes for the local community 
of Mentawai. Income-generation activities are critical for the potential to reduce tsunami 
risk. A study in Vietnam in 2005 indicated that such activities ensure adaptive capacity 
development among the participants (Turnbull et al., 2013). Therefore, involving the local 
community of Mentawai in the above activities will boost their economy. The people have 
access to the labour, knowledge and market linkages that make the people learn about 
many things including DRRonT. 
h. Physical factors 
The strengthening of buildings and infrastructure will reduce the exposure to tsunami 
hazards. Therefore, it is important to build settlements on hilly grounds, so that the tsunami 
waves cannot reach the settlements. The research findings have shown that the dusun 
people of Malakopa who have moved to a hilly ground from before the 2010 tsunami were 
saved from the waves. Similarly, other people from dusun that are next to the coasts must 
move to higher grounds next to the sea so that they can easily fish. Furthermore, as there 
are many trees in the forests, the people can obtain the timber to build their houses. 
According to Rudito (2013), the indigenous people used to build their uma from the logs of 
katuka (Shorea bracteolatadyer). This kind of tree is easily found in the forests. Therefore, 
the heads of villages must encourage those who are still there to move to higher ground. In 
the case that the people must pay other people who own the land, the heads of villages can 
discuss how to solve the problem. Traditionally, the durian plants and coconut trees paid 
the dowries (alat toga) or the cultural fines (tulou) (Febrianto & Fitriani, 2012) and this 
practice can be used to pay for the settlement land. Therefore, having the new settlements 
at a higher elevation will lessen the risks in the future.  
As discussed above at the village level, there is a mechanism of planning by the community 
through the Musrembang Desa, and the same mechanism is also found which is known as 
District Musrembang. It is important to plan to rebuild and relocate the public schools and 
the community health centres (Puskesmas). These two public facilities should be mainly 
located next to the coasts on hilly ground. Therefore, by reallocating them, the local 
community also will tend to move next to the facilities. 
To conclude this section, it is important to understand the local community’s tsunami risk in 
order to develop adaptive capacity in Mentawai. Their vulnerability and exposure to 
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tsunami hazards put them at high risk of disaster in tsunami waves. It is thought that the 
adaptive capacity development can be implemented through the processes of DRR. Through 
a model of Turnbull et al. (2013), a multi-faceted perspective can elaborate on tsunami risk 
reduction in Mentawai. By using this perspective, we can find political, institutional, cultural, 
social, environmental, human, economic, and physical factors that can be developed, 
created, and expanded to develop tsunami risk reduction processes. Strong commitments 
from the local community, local leaders, and cross-government levels are required to use 
traditional, existing, and external resources and opportunities. 
7.5. Potential support for sources of the programs 
Since saving the people’s lives is critically important, the implementation of the above 
programs is urgently needed. The heads of dusun must persuade the dusun people to 
participate in the programs; otherwise, the people will keep living in danger of tsunami 
hazards. Various potential sources can be identified for the proposed activities. As Baser and 
Morgan (2008) state that capacity needs collective actions and it is important for the 
community to grow and survive through their capabilities. Therefore, firstly and most 
importantly, the local community should show their collective commitments to supporting 
all these activities. It is thought that most opportunities to develop and increase coping 
capacity need no or little financial support. During the implementation of the activities, the 
community can bring “pot luck” for refreshments, as it is a common public practice in 
Mentawai. The venues for the activities can be the fields, houses, churches, or school 
classes. The churches or mosques can also donate a certain amount of money to support 
particular activities.  
However, for longer-term goals, external financial support is needed. The heads of villages 
can allocate the programs as annual activities on the Annual Village Budget. In cases where 
they need more support, they can propose certain activities to the local community. Based 
on the Act 17 of 2003 on the State Finance, the local government allocates public services 
and social welfare to supporting the village governments. APBD consists of the detailed 
activities, budget resources, and the upper ceiling of expenses.  
Furthermore, the heads of villages can propose activities to gain support from a special 
mechanism as known as the village budget allocation. This allocation is based on the Act No. 
6 of 2014 on Villages which allows the villagers to have the right to know and to control the 
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planning and implementation of village development. It is clearly formulated in the Act that 
the State should provide the annual budget for each village. Referring to the Act, the 
Government of Indonesia has developed a Governmental Order No. 22 of 2015 on the 
Village Budget Sources from the National Budget. Based on the Act, the Minister of Village, 
Underdeveloped Regions, and Transmigration has issued a Ministerial Order No. 5 of 2014 
highlighting two main priorities of the village budget namely physical and economic 
development and the empowerment of the villagers. This allows every village to develop its 
economic and social status and to preserve and revitalize its traditional cultures. 
Consequently, each village has an obligation to arrange annual and mid-term development 
plans based on its district or municipality strategic plan.  
It is strongly suggested that the local community of Mentawai through the heads of villages 
propose their activities to develop their capacity to face tsunamis through the allocation 
budget from the government. Although the Act does not substantially mention that the 
budget can be used to empower the villagers on disaster preparedness, the Article 9 of the 
Act indicates that a village can be erased due to natural disasters. From the article, we can 
argue that the State acknowledges that disasters can substantially demolish the villages in 
Mentawai. By using the threats of tsunamis in Mentawai, they can propose certain activities 
to develop their capacity. Therefore, the villages with dusun close to the coastal zones are 
strongly advised to use the potential budget allocation to support their hazard management 
activities. 
Another potential support to develop coping and adaptive capacity in Mentawai can be 
obtained from PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan. This is one tool of the Government of Indonesia to 
decrease poverty and unemployment rates through the development of infrastructures and 
socio-economic empowerment. As indicated in previous chapters, the development of the 
evacuation routes in Mentawai was from the support of PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan. As it has 
supported a number of activities in Mentawai, this mechanism can also support the 
DRRONT through adaptive capacity development at community level. 
It is also considered that several of the above efforts involve the district government of 
Mentawai, the provincial government of West Sumatra and the Central Government and 
NGOs. For this purpose, the institutions can allocate their own money to support the 




We can see from this chapter that capacity can be impactful, sustainable, and strategic to 
protect people from hazards. Although a number of challenges are identified, the 
development of capacity is possible to counter tsunami hazards in Mentawai. As the field 
findings indicated a number of issues in conducting current tsunami preparedness, the 
heads of dusun and the heads of villages have the main responsibility to encourage the local 
community in tsunami preparedness measures, both emergency and longer-term 
mechanisms to respond to tsunami hazards. With the support from the local government 
and NGOs, coping and adaptive capacity development programs are potentially conducted 
in Mentawai by using existing and traditional strategies. However, intensive, integrated, 
repetitive, and intensive efforts are required to achieve these aims and a number of 
challenges are also identified. Nevertheless, through strong commitments, coping and 
adaptive capacity efforts will overcome the challenges. In increasing their coping capacity, 
the local community mostly not only needs to revitalize their own traditional tools but also 
to carry out new initiatives as part of community early warning systems. For this, the local 
government can show its commitments to serve its community. Meanwhile, the efforts to 
develop adaptive capacity require external financial and technical assistance. The processes 
of developing adaptive capacity take longer than that those of coping capacity; therefore, 
wider efforts are also required to adaptive capacity development. By conducting all the 
proposed efforts, it is believed that in the future the community of Mentawai will be able to 
face potential tsunamis.  
This chapter has presented a number of applicative programs to enhance the capacities of 
the local people of Mentawai in coping with potential tsunami hazards. It is considered that 
this thesis has provided an integrated and comprehensive exploration of the research 
questions and of the proposed programs. Therefore, the next chapter will conclude all 








Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
“The power of qualitative research lies precisely in the rich interaction with human 
stories that matter and in the fact that it cannot be reduced to a row of numbers but 
must retain the lives of its participants” (Pawson & DeLyser, 2016, p. 430) 
 
8.0. Introduction 
This thesis is a human story of the local community in Mentawai about how the people 
prepare for potential tsunami waves. The study is one of few academic studies to explore 
the social perspectives in relation to hazards knowledge and preparedness measures. The 
location of the study is in the Mentawai Islands (Mentawai), West Sumatra, Indonesia about 
100 km offshore of western Sumatra. In comparison, many scholars have provided academic 
findings in connection to the seismic and paleo-tsunami studies in Mentawai (Collings et al., 
2012; Horspool et al., 2013; Natawidjaja, 2007; Philibosian et al., 2014; S. C. Singh et al., 
2010). Therefore, this thesis contributes to decrease a dearth of academic writing on 
tsunami preparedness measures in Mentawai.  
This final chapter consists of six sections, as follows. 
Section 8.1. Overviews the chapters of this thesis. 
Section 8.2. Shows how the research questions have been answered from research 
findings. 
Section 8.3.  Shows a number of proposed programs as the recommendations. 
Section 8.4. Identifies a number of public policy reforms or reviews based on the 
research findings. 
Section 8.5. Offers further potential research. 
Section 8.6. Shows the last remarks of the thesis. 
8.1. Overview of the thesis  
This study has focused on how the local community of Mentawai develops their tsunami 
preparedness. It provides a number of new, insightful facts that have never previously been 
revealed through academic studies. The basic understanding on preparedness measures is 
the central point of this thesis so therefore, the measures should be well embedded and 
mixed with people’s daily activities. As the local community of Mentawai lives in an area 
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prone to earthquakes and tsunamis, they should have undertaken various measures to 
prepare for any potential tsunami waves.  
This thesis contributes to a thorough understanding of the different aspects of hazard 
knowledge for tsunami preparedness measures. Chapter 1 delivers an overview of the 
national context and how the Indonesian Government has formulated its disaster 
preparedness policies. It also consists of some rationales of this study and the problem 
statements for the local community to counter potential tsunami waves in the future. Two 
main research questions were brought forward to identify the problems, and several 
subsequent questions were raised to elaborate on the main questions. 
Chapter 2 concerns the theoretical contexts and key concepts that are employed in the 
study. It focuses on a number of academic definitions related to disaster preparedness. 
Generally, disaster is a serious occurrence that creates human, poverty and economic, 
social, and environmental disruption (Fritz, 1961; Gregg & Houghton, 2006; WHO, 2002). It 
often requires external assistance to relieve the sufferings of those affected. Therefore, 
disaster preparedness measures become the central point of disaster management 
(Alexander, 2002; Godschalk, 2007; Lindell & Perry, 2007; B. D. Phillips & Neal, 2007). 
Disaster preparedness measures are related to how people decrease their vulnerability by 
increasing their capacity and reducing their exposure to hazards. It also consists of how local 
communities build such measures in the local context. Furthermore, it shows how 
individuals and households have important roles to shape stronger community 
preparedness (Johnston & Dudley, 2009; Lin et al., 2009; Scheer et al., 2011). Lastly, it 
reveals the necessity of local partnerships to enhance and to promote the measures 
(Haddow & Bullock, 2006; Thompson, 2012; Zyck & Kent, 2014). 
Chapter 3 covers the vulnerability progression to tsunami hazards in Mentawai based on the 
Pressure and Release (PAR) model (Wisner et al., 2004). This model traces the underlying 
root causes and dynamic pressures that cause the local community of Mentawai live in a 
location that is unsafe because of tsunami hazards. It is found that the root causes of the 
vulnerability are the history and the social changes of the people. The people originally lived 
in the jungles; however, over time they became victims of exposure to western cultures and 
the resettlement programmes to the coastal areas (Hernawati, 2007; G. A Persoon, 2007; 
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Schefold, 1988; Tulius, 2012a). The changes also resulted in the banning of their traditional 
beliefs and practices by the Government of Indonesia. These root causes are compounded 
by a number of dynamic pressures such as the rapid population growth, the local 
government’s programme priorities, and deforestation. The last, for example, has 
significantly decreased the space and access to nature for the local community (Darmanto & 
Setyowati, 2002; Schefold, 2007; Sihombing, 1979). Indeed, their Arat Sabulungan was 
closely attached to the natural environment (Hernawati, 2007). Therefore, such pressures 
have forced them to live in the coastal zones - the unsafe locations for tsunamis.  
Furthermore, this chapter also emphasises why the local community is physically vulnerable 
to tsunami hazards. The Mentawai archipelago is located above the Mentawai Segment 
(Ambikapathy et al., 2010; Borrero et al., 2006; Briggs et al., 2006; Natawidjaja, 2007; Weller 
et al., 2012) that is close the Sunda Megathrust. The Megathrust is the convergent boundary 
between the Indian - Australian Plate and the Eurasian Plate, moving at about 5-6 cm per 
year. The convergence cumulatively accommodates a huge energy to be released at any 
time as earthquakes that can generate tsunami waves. Also, the backthrusts from the 
Mentawai Fault Zone (Mukti et al., 2012; S. C. Singh et al., 2010; Wiseman et al., 2011) can 
deform the rear of the wedge from the Mentawai Basin. The backthrusts are active and 
have the potential to create steeply-dipping seismic events that create tsunami 
earthquakes. Lastly, coastal vegetation in Mentawai is also rarely found, caused by the 
natural conditions and human activities. (Anwar & Gunawan, 2006; Pemda Mentawai, 2010; 
Yayasan Minang Bahari, 2009).  
Chapter 4 emphasizes how the field data was collected. In order to answer the research 
questions and to provide the research findings from the phenomena, a qualitative case 
study was designed (Gerring, 2007). The exploration of past and current social phenomena 
(P. Baxter & Jack, 2008) has been done within a particular, unique community (Yin, 2014) of 
Mentawai. With the semi-structured interview questions, the field research successfully 
interviewed 20 participants from 19 dusun and nine villages from three islands (North Pagai, 
South Pagai, and Sipora). The recruitment of the participants was based on the purposive 
sampling (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Longhurst, 2010), with the snowball method (Mack 
et al., 2011; Parfitt, 2005). Ethical considerations were deliberated during the interviews and 
after the interviews (Yin, 2014). In order to avoid my subjective judgment affecting the 
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research findings, it was important to conduct a number of methods for the data 
triangulations (Ayoub et al., 2014; Creswell, 2013; Stake, 2008) through the interviews with 
the non-community participants, the observations and the insertions of statistical data into 
the text of the thesis. As Creswell (2013) suggested using the Data Analysis Spiral Model to 
analyse the voluminous and rich data from a qualitative research, I conducted step-by-step 
approaches in order to retain my objectivity as the outsider to ensure the quality of the 
research findings.  
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 consist of the presentation of the search results. The next section 
will briefly cover the conclusions of both chapters as the answers to the research questions. 
Chapter 7 is about how the community can increase their capacity to counter their problems 
related to tsunami preparedness measures. The following section will also concisely address 
this chapter as part of the recommendation.  
8.2. Answering the research questions 
As written in Chapter One, there are two main research questions in conjunction with 
tsunami preparedness in Mentawai. They are: 
1. How great was the knowledge of the local community of Mentawai regarding 
tsunami preparedness prior to the 2010 Mentawai Tsunami? 
2. How are the current tsunami preparedness measures formed in Mentawai? 
To answer the above questions, I carried out research procedures to collect the field data 
and the step-by-step data analyses. I found it fascinating to learn a number of paradoxical 
facts as “lightbulbs” from the study findings. Through reading this thesis, we can understand 
how historically and currently the local community of Mentawai has become vulnerable to 
tsunami hazards. In fact, the 2010 Mentawai tsunami that hit Mentawai is proof of how the 
people are vulnerable to tsunami waves. To recap the major findings, I will repeat a number 
of “lightbulbs” findings below. 
To analyse the main first question in field data, a designed cross-cultural and institutional 
framework of knowledge management model from Mohannak and Hutchings (2007) was 
used. Through this model, several questions under the first main question were explained. 
Firstly, it was found that two groups among the participants had never heard or known 
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about tsunami hazards. There were several reasons that the first group had never heard or 
knew about tsunami hazards before the tsunami. Historically, the indigenous people of 
Mentawai lived in the jungles as the fruit gatherers and hunters. Although the great 
earthquakes (Mw 8.3-8.7) in 1797 and (Mw 8.9) in 1833 triggered tsunami waves in 
Mentawai and Sumatra (Collings et al., 2012; Natawidjaja, 2007), they did not experience 
both events. Furthermore, no anthropologists discovered oral stories and historical 
memories related to the tsunamis (Tulius, 2012a). In addition, no particular words are found 
in the local language to express a big wave in Mentawai. In addition, accessibility to media 
contributes to knowledge capture and sharing within a community. After a number of 
tsunamis have hit several areas in Indonesia since 2004, the national TV channels have aired 
news and programs related to tsunami hazards. However, the people from this group 
preferred to enjoy TV dramas rather than news or public programs, or hardly accessed TV 
programs. The unavailability or limitations of electricity also influenced the locals’ access to 
TV or other electronic tools such as radio. Moreover, they never attended the local 
meetings regarding tsunami education for the community from the local activists. Lastly, 
they also rarely read the distributed education materials. On the other hand, the second 
group knew about tsunami hazards mainly through TV channels, and followed by the NGOs’ 
activities, education materials, and new people who came to the community.  
As the cross-cultural and institutional framework model shows three dimensions of the 
process of transferring knowledge in Chapter 5 (Mohannak & Hutchings, 2007), the research 
also discovered the same dimensions within the local community of Mentawai. For the first 
dimension (the macro level), how the political condition, the level of education and socio-
economy had little influences in order to transfer the tsunami hazard knowledge and 
preparedness to the community. The district government had a complacency that tsunamis 
would never have occurred to Mentawai, since no oral histories about tsunamis within the 
community. Also, the local NGOs had conducted a number of knowledge transfer activities, 
however, because of difficult access to the community they found it hard to expand or 
continue their programs causing high –cost operational programs. Furthermore, the poverty 
and illiteracy of the community also made the people reluctant to attend the community 
meetings. As a result, at the macro level, the support of the knowledge transfer on tsunami 
hazards was very low.  
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The second dimension (the micro level) is about how the knowledge provider(s) transfer of 
explicit knowledge becomes an asset for the community (Mohannak & Hutchings, 2007). 
Based on the research, it was identified several types of knowledge providers were 
identified in Mentawai, namely the local NGO activists, local government officers, media 
and newcomers. The research findings also indicated that the participants preferred the 
knowledge providers from the NGOs rather than the local government. The activists were 
more sensitive, patient, and innovative in providing solutions to their problems. On the 
other hand, the government officers often just had a brief meeting with the community. 
However, it was suggested by the social researcher that the NGO activists should always 
update the knowledge they are transferring to the local community since the earthquake’s 
characteristics in Mentawai are different from the earthquakes in other parts of Indonesia. 
Furthermore, some of the local community could not access the knowledge about tsunami 
hazards. They did not like reading, the females preferred watching TV dramas rather than 
the news or public education, many adult males also perceived no benefits from watching 
TV, and the lack of electricity influenced their access to TV programs. Some others could 
capture and access the knowledge from the newcomers to the community, local 
government officers and NGOs activists, and mass media. For them, the tsunami knowledge 
had become an explicit knowledge (Dalkir, 2011; McIneeney & Koenig, 2011; Ribeiro, 2013; 
Roberts, 2010); however, they seldom discussed their knowledge among themselves. 
Therefore, some cadres were recruited to share the issues of tsunami hazards with the 
others. However, because of the geographical and demographical problems of the 
community and the financial programs of the NGOs, this seemed too difficult to implement. 
Thus, at this moment many of the community have no or limited ways to contextualize the 
knowledge. Meanwhile, their explicit knowledge about tsunamis was also mixed with their 
experiences of the previous earthquakes that did not trigger tsunami waves.  
The third dimension (the community level) is about how the community captured the 
explicit tsunami hazard knowledge and preparedness from the knowledge providers. They 
tried to share and apply the explicit knowledge with their local knowledge and local 
cultures. Furthermore, the community also had tried to internalize the explicit knowledge 
into tacit knowledge with the combination of the explicit knowledge with their perceptions, 
emotions, beliefs, and values to become tacit knowledge (Dalkir, 2011; Kumar & 
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Chakrabarti, 2015; Lundvall, 2000; McIneeney & Koenig, 2011; Ribeiro, 2013; Roberts, 
2010). Their traditional belief was that an earthquake, in the local word “teteu”, was to be 
respected and blessing, but the explicit knowledge gave them a different view of teteu. 
Therefore, the knowledge confused them in relation to their traditional belief. 
Other tacit knowledge was also found when they linked the magnitude of earthquakes to 
tsunami waves. As they had experienced the 2007 Bengkulu Earthquakes of Mw 8.4 and Mw 
7.9 (Ambikapathy et al., 2010; Fujii & Satake, 2008; Natawidjaja, 2007) without tsunami 
waves, they thought that smaller earthquakes than they had experienced would not cause 
tsunamis. They were never exposed to tsunamigenic earthquakes that created a weak but 
long-period seismic wave energy from a low rupture velocity in a less rigid piece of land. 
Therefore, when a tsunamigenic earthquake shook the islands in 2010 the local 
community’s tacit knowledge was that the earthquake would not have generated tsunami 
waves, but they were wrong. For those who lived in the coastal zones, they did nothing to 
anticipate the waves and became victims.  
The next phase was they realized that they lived in a tsunami prone area; however, in 
relation to the application of the knowledge, I divided them into two groups according to 
their responses. Firstly, a number of local community members applied this knowledge to 
protect themselves from tsunami threats in the future by moving their settlement from the 
coast zones. Some of them moved about 1.5 to 2 km from the coast to higher ground and 
the others moved farther inland about 8 km. When the people from Mentawai experienced 
the tsunami, those who had moved to the higher ground were safe. However, from those 
who moved to further inland, many became tsunami victims, because they still lived down 
in their gardens next to the coast to do their old jobs, namely gardening and fishing. Often 
they slept over in their hut, which was next to the shore during weekdays. 
Secondly, a number of community members kept living in their old settlements. They relied 
on their own intuition to anticipate any potential tsunamis triggered by earthquakes or just 
remained passive. These kinds of responses caused many of them to became tsunami 
victims.  
To analyse the field data for the second main research question, I used the Multi-Level 
Model (Figure 6.1) to understand the present tsunami preparedness measures. This model 
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has examined the measures at the individual and household, at the dusun and at the district 
levels. At the individual level, I found that the research participants were aware of the 
devastating tsunamis that could hit Mentawai at any time. Some of them would run to safe 
points and climb the coconut trees. Others would ignore them or put their valuable things in 
their huts in the jungle to avoid loss from potential tsunamis. However, it is astonishing that 
they would hardly do anything to increase or maintain their awareness of tsunami hazards, 
such as training. Even worse, many people also put their motorcycles on the evacuation 
routes and blocked the pathway. Therefore, if they try and use the congested routes in the 
event of a tsunami, the people will find it difficult to reach the safer points.  
Scholars (Apatu, 2013; Reynaud et al., 2013; Scheer et al., 2011) have shown evidence that 
household evacuation plans are the most necessary in order to escape from tsunamis. In 
relation to household evacuation plans, firstly, the field research in Mentawai revealed that 
no participants had them. The main reason was that they had no understanding of the 
benefits of the plans. Additionally, Johnston and Dudley (2009) mention that household 
exercises are also needed for family members to understand where to go in the event of a 
tsunami, thus, individuals or family members should be trained. However, the field research 
revealed that no participants had conducted a household exercise and relied on the tsunami 
simulation exercises from their children’s schools. They also had no idea what the exercises 
meant for for them. Lastly, although some experts criticize the tsunami tendenko maxim as 
increasing selfishness and immorality in the event of a tsunami, others claim that the maxim 
will avoid the deaths of the rescuer and the rescued by going separately. However, the 
study findings contradicted the tsunami tendenko maxim. All participants would save their 
neighbours (the vulnerable) in the event of tsunamis, although they clearly had no idea 
where they were. The relationship among the community is very tight because they may be 
siblings.  
Scholars (Arlikatti et al., 2010) identify several categories of domestic stockpiles that are 
functionally important to households in the event of a tsunami and the most applicable to 
the local community of Mentawai are shelters, food preparation, and first aid and other 
supplies. Mainly, the study revealed that no significant difficulties were found in the 
community to provide the above elements in the event of a tsunami. In an emergency, the 
people could live or move into their huts in the jungle, or build temporary shelters from the 
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wood in the jungles. Similarly, they can also find foods that they have planted in the jungles. 
Lastly, if they are injured they could use natural herbs from the jungles as medicine. In fact, 
the Ministry of Health conducted a survey in Mentawai in 2014 and found that the local 
people often used herbs to heal their wounds (Agung et al., 2014).  
At the dusun level, preparedness measures were also found. Firstly, a simple tsunami hazard 
map is known to be a good tool to indicate all topographic data, buildings and information 
that will potentially be inundated by the tsunami waves (Cadag & Gaillard, 2012; Forrester & 
Cinderby, 2012; Samant et al., 2008). From the field research, there were no dusun found 
that had such tsunami hazard maps. There was an indication of developing tsunami risk 
assessment maps; however, no physical evidence of the maps was found nor were they 
displayed by the community.  
Secondly, evacuation routes and signs are also important in the event of a tsunami within a 
community as the continuous and unobstructed path of exit from any point within a 
community to a place of safety (Pu & Zlatanova, 2006). As found from the study, all dusun 
next to the shorelines have one or two evacuation routes. Nevertheless, the research 
participants have not provided enough in the number and in the size of the routes. From the 
observations conducted, however, I found that some of them were blocked by parked 
motorcycles, water pipes, overgrown grass, or others. A number of experts have warned 
that the routes will be useless in an emergency if they are blocked (Nelan & Grineski, 2013; 
Reynaud et al., 2013; Scheer et al., 2011). Similarly, evacuation route signage was found in 
the dusun in Mentawai, but in some cases, the signs were unclear and almost unreadable. 
However, the local community had made no effort to restore them.  
Furthermore, an evacuation point is considered an easily accessible point to avoid hazard(s) 
and is often placed at a reasonable distance from the point of departure either on higher 
ground or far inland (BNPB, 2013a). As I observed, all dusun near to the coasts have a 
certain evacuation point about 15 m above sea level. However, the study found the dusun 
people do not take much care in keeping the points free from overgrown grass. Few 
evacuation points are provided with signage to show people their function.  
Additionally, an emergency message or sign in a community also could be mutually agreed 
on among community members to decide how to deliver an emergency warning, and then 
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to receive, accept, and respond to it (King, 2006). When I observed a tsunami simulation 
exercise in Dusun Pasibuat, I found that the people used a kentongan or tutuko (bamboo 
gong) to communicate an emergency to others, but its size was too small to produce 
enough strong sounds for the people in a wide dusun to receive the warning signs. In fact, 
old traditional tools such as tuddukat and gajeuma can be used to disseminate the 
warnings. 
Moreover, public education on tsunamis and tsunami exercises are found in several dusun in 
Mentawai, but the dusun people need to work hard in order to increase the quality of the 
exercises. Additionally, information materials such as banners and billboards need to 
urgently appraised, so that the people easily understand the messages. Lastly, the roles of 
Satlinmas are also important to encourage and support the community to be prepared for a 
potential tsunami in the future. However, it is critically important to train the members to 
increase their capacity by utilizing the existing trained persons in Mentawai from BNPB. 
I could say that the district government of Mentawai still provides little effort in supporting 
the tsunami preparedness measures. Several actions by the Central Government have been 
established; however, the local government still allocates few resources to expand or to 
continue them. The Central Government through BNPB has developed a disaster risk 
measurement in the Mentawai District with the conclusion that most potential hazards in 
Mentawai are earthquakes and tsunamis. From the report, a tsunami could inundate about 
83,185 ha and affect a population of 11,000 (14 % of the total population) (BNPB, 2012). The 
risk assessment is aimed firstly as an additional document/input to support public policy 
making, but the local government has not synchronized the report with any public policies 
making process. Secondly, the risk assessment document also aims at developing a 
community-based program. However, the local government has not used it to develop its 
community-based program. Lastly, the risk assessment document can be used as a 
foundation to build practical programs such as the establishment of evacuation routes and 
points. Certainly, these efforts have been implemented within the community, but they 
were too far from the people or too difficult to reach, in particular for those individuals with 




BNPB also has designed disaster risk maps for each sub-district in Mentawai. The maps can 
show the level of the risk of hazards, vulnerability, and capacity (BNPB, 2012). However, the 
local government has not zoomed out the maps at the dusun level to see clearer and more 
detailed features. This would identify the weaknesses and the strengths of the dusun people 
so they can counter the possible problems caused by tsunami waves in the future. 
Lastly, BNPB has provided one operational emergency centre (OEC) in the capital town of 
the Mentawai District, Tuapejat in Sipora Island to facilitate operational controls and to 
conduct information communication systems in an emergency (BNPB, 2013a). The OEC 
centre in Tua pejat has the minimum standard of an OEC according to the BNPB standard of 
OEC. However, in order to communicate to and from the dusun, not all dusun have 
supporting tools such as community or handy talkie radios.  
8.3. Recommended programs 
Living in a prone tsunami area is a reality for the local community of Mentawai. Tsunami 
waves can be generated by earthquakes at any time so, in order to minimize the devastating 
impacts of a tsunami, conducting tsunami preparedness measures is a necessity. Therefore, 
as mentioned in Chapter Seven, I recommend the local community of Mentawai implement 
three intensive and simultaneous programs. One program is to increase their coping 
capacity through community emergency warning systems (CEWS). The other two are to 
increase their adaptive capacity through a community-based outreach program and a 
sustainability program for tsunami preparedness.  
By implementing CEWS, the community would comprehensively and simultaneously 
increase both the individuals’ and community members’ coping capacity to avoid threats of 
hazards and/or the impacts of hazards. They are empowered to use their existing skills, 
resources, and strategies to increase their capacity. They will determine pivotal collective 
actions to increase their tsunami risk knowledge, tsunami monitoring strategies, capability 
to respond to potential tsunami waves, and warning communication (Grasso & Singh, 2012; 
IFCR, 2012). To do so, however, requires mainly technical support from the local NGOs and 
local government as well as the political will of the local government and parliament.  
In order to develop adaptive capacities, I also recommend implementing a tsunami risk 
reduction program through adaptive capacity development at the community level. This 
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integrated and comprehensive program would look at the problems within the local 
community from a wider perspective. By involving the heads of villages and some key 
officers at the district level, it would mostly use the existing knowledge, skills, and 
opportunities in the progress of disaster risk reduction (Turnbull et al., 2013). This multi-
faceted approach can use political, institutional, cultural, social, environmental, human, 
economic, and physical factors to develop, create, and expand tsunami risk reduction 
processes.  
8.4. Policy implications from the research findings 
This study has important implications for discourses on disaster preparedness, especially in 
Mentawai and generally in Indonesia. The scholars (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2014) agree that 
the findings of a qualitative case study can be generalizable to all local community of 
Mentawai and even other parts of Indonesia. The generalizability of this study case is that 
tsunami preparedness measures are important to be implemented, especially in all parts of 
Mentawai. As we can see, the Mentawai islands are prone to tsunami hazards; therefore, all 
the population at risk, the heads of dusun and villages, religious leaders, NGO activists, the 
media, and the district government should be involved in the end-to-end preparedness 
measures. The planning, implementation, and evaluation processes of tsunami 
preparedness measures require the involvement of all. Moreover, the generalizability can 
be made that the Indonesian Government is required to develop a number of public 
programs, policies, and certain regulations to implement disaster risk reduction programs in 
general, and tsunami risk reduction programs in particular, in tsunami hazard prone areas in 
Indonesia.  
Nowadays, people easily carry out activities for business, pleasure, or have social 
interactions with people from other areas, including coastal areas. Thus, in terms of tsunami 
threats, people who live inland can be exposed to tsunami waves. In relation to this, 
therefore, all communities of Indonesia should have public education on tsunamis. The 
Central Government needs to address and accelerate tsunami community preparedness 
measures and involve all elements to participate. As also found, a number of the traditional 
tools in Mentawai can be used for tsunami warning systems and I believe other 
communities have their traditional and local tools that can be used. Therefore, the Central 
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Government should develop standard pre-designated codes, so that all people understand 
the codes as warnings. 
8.5. Areas for further research 
This study focused on only small parts of the whole picture of Mentawai. Although the study 
produces a number of significant insights, it never completely describes the whole 
phenomena in Mentawai. Below are potential research questions that are important to be 
answered, as follows:  
- The documentation of tacit knowledge related to escaping from tsunami waves is 
necessarily imperative to be done within the local community of Mentawai. This will 
enable the capturing of their tacit knowledge and then explicitly sharing it with other 
community members. 
- The implementation of a public program from the study findings is important and 
involves the relationship of the community, the local NGOs and the local 
government. However, the findings also indicate, that somehow the relationship is 
not too harmonious. Hence, it is critical to discover the relationship model in order 
for a better implementation of the public program in Mentawai. 
- The study findings also show the significance of how the women have important 
roles in developing tsunami preparedness as well as how they could potentially 
comprise more of the victims in the event of a tsunami. Therefore, undertaking 
further research on the importance of the women’s roles is important. This research 
can focus on disaster risk reduction from a wide perspective and on tsunami 
preparedness from a more specific perspective in Mentawai. 
- The research demonstrates that the local community of Mentawai seems to have 
less influence of the local government in term of tsunami preparedness. However, 
literature and evidence show that the role of local governments in developing a 
community’s preparedness is central. Hereafter, a qualitative research on how the 
district government of Mentawai can provide proper insights about the local 
government can be undertaken. 
- As found from the field, although a number of the local community members in 
Mentawai had moved inland, however, they still worked, and slept over night in the 
coastal areas. It could be that the same practice is found within the community. 
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Therefore, it is important to find a good model on how the local community could 
have livelihoods inland or, alternatively, how they can fish and not sleep over in the 
coastal areas. Thus, research to develop this model is imperative in the future.  
- Besides the Mentawai Islands being close to the subduction zone of the India-
Australia Plate and Eurasia Plate, a number of islands are also situated close to the 
same zone. The islands of Batu (located up north) and Nias and Simeulue (further 
north) and Enggano (far west) from Mentawai are also prone to tsunami waves. 
Therefore, it is also important to carry out a number of qualitative researches in 
those communities to provide better insights into how the communities are 
prepared for potential tsunamis.  
- It is important to develop certain pre-designated codes to warn the community 
about the tsunami waves. As discussed, traditionally, the people used certain codes 
when hitting tuddukkat to inform of specific occasions to others. Therefore, it is good 
for the local government to research this potential and decide on suitable pre-
designated codes to deliver warnings to the community. In the future, these pre-
designated codes can be expanded to other communities in Indonesia. 
8.6. Concluding remarks 
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that there is high vulnerability of the local 
community of Mentawai to tsunamis and limited efforts in developing preparedness. It has 
also been revealed that a number of channels as information resources delivered the 
tsunami hazard warnings; however, a number of factors hindered the community’s access 
to the needed information. These paradoxical conditions rooted my investigations that they 
are simple facts in the real-life situation in the community. 
I have found that that several factors cause their vulnerability. The change in their old 
settlement from the coasts to inland was not accompanied by active alteration of 
livelihoods. Moreover, their ignorance or even complacency was increased by relying on 
passive actions that can jeopardise their safety any potential tsunamis. In addition, although 
tsunami preparedness measures at the individual, household, and dusun levels are found, 
the people have not maximized their potentials, resources, and local strategies to enhance 
their capacity. On the other hand, the local government, local NGOs, and media are 
important for the community, but they are not always available and accessible. 
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In the end, self-empowerment among the community and a beneficial relationship amongst 
the local government, local NGOs, and local community can be an integrated development 
approach to solving the limited capacity, to develop and sustain their livelihoods, and even 
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